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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Civil religion, a term first used by Rousseau, refers
to the religious dimension of the polity.

Civil religion in

American society, or American civil religion, has been the
subject of an extensive field of literature generated by
American philosophers, historians, theologians, social scientists, poets, and novelists since the inception of the nation.
Stimulated by the work of Robert Bellah, the concept of American civil religion has recently generated interest among
American sociologists, leading to a sociological debate on
American civil religion.

The debate is wide-ranging, begin-

ning with disagreement about the definition of American civil
religion and its existence in American society.

Among sociol-

ogists who accept the assumption that American civil religion
exists, there is still considerable controversy over the
historical origin and continued development of American civil
religion.

There is also fierce debate raging on such issues

as the structural differentiation of American civil religion
from other social institutions and on the functions
performed by American civil religion.

(if any)

The major objective

of this study is to examine the social science literature on
American civil religion in an attempt to order the literature
into a coherent, comprehensive, and logical set of definitions
1
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and assumptions open to empirical examination.

In order to

arrive at a set of sociological propositions concerning American civil religion, the sociological literature will be
highlighted and selectively reviewed, with representative
studies examined as typical of a particular model of American
civil religion.

The purpose of this study is not to assemble

a patchwork quilt comprised of every piece ever written about
American civil religion.

The purpose is to construct a rep-

resentative theoretical map of the most significant American
civil religion studies and to glean from these studies a set
of propositions which would be testable by sociological
methods.
Models of American Civil Religion
The first objective of this analysis, addressed in
parts I and II, is to define the central concept of American
civil religion.

~1uch

of the intellectual debate surrounding

the concept of American civil religion is based upon a lack
of consensus for a precise definition.

Richey and Jones

(1974:14) report "at least five broad, and to some extent

interrelated meanings of civil religion" in the literature:
folk religion, transcendent universal religion of the nation,
religious nationalism, democratic faith, and Protestant civic
piety.

The five meanings of American civil religion can be

seen as models, and will be used collectively as a device
for ordering the literature.

Because the five models are

not mutually exclusive, some studies contain elements of
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more than one model, but the majority of the studies can be
usefully classified as representative of a particular model.
Folk Religion
Folk religion is a civil religion conceived of as
emerging from the daily life experiences and expressions of
the American populace.

The major functions of civil reli-

gion according to the folk religion model are legitimation of
cultural values and social integration.

Alexis de Tocque-

ville's two-volume work, Democracy in America (1966), contains one of the first intellectual developments of American
folk religion.

During his contact with the American people

in the 1830s, Tocqueville observed that a fusion of democratic and moral principles was expressed in the daily behavior and customs of Americans.

Tocqueville's ensuing model of

democratic, republican religion assumed that liberty, law,
morality, and religious belief were symbiotically related in
American society, serving as a basis for social cohesion.

A

classic sociological analysis of American folk religion is
found in W. Lloyd Warner's (1961) examination of the Memorial
Day celebrations in an American city.

Warner's folk religion

is a functioning set of civic rituals which are socially
integrating and identity-reinforcing for citizens.

A more

controversial treatment of American civil religion as folk
religion is presented by Will Herberg (1960).

Herberg's folk

religion is the deification of the American way of life, seen
by Herberg as derived from, but standing above, the American
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biblical religions of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism.

Herberg's folk religion legitimates, integrates, and

deifies American society, placing it in a self-transcendent
position above traditional religion.

The folk religion model

is also represented by the work of religious historian Martin
Marty (1959), who describes American folk religion as a
religion-in-general lacking the theological content and
prophetic force of denominational religions.

Marty's por-

trayal of folk religion is echoed by Roy Eckhardt (1958) and
Franklin Littell (1962) and typifies Andrew Greeley's (1972:
166) definition of folk religion as the religion of comfort,
reassurance, and self-righteousness.
Transcendental Universal Religion of the Nation
The transcendent universal religion of the nation
model portrays American civil religion as a set of transcendent ideals by which the society is both integrated and
ultimately judged.

Transcendent universal religion is

capable of greater challenge to society than folk religion,
due to its prophetic capacities.
Mead's (1963; 1975)

Religious historian Sidney

"religion of the republic" is an example

of the transcendent universal model of American civil religion.

Mead's religion of the republic consists of a syn-

thesis of democratic and deistic values which challenges both
sectarianism and national self-transcendence.

Mead traces

the historical development of a transcendent American
civil religion, which distinctly departs from the folk
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religion model of American civil religion as a deification
of the American way of life.

In 1967 a sociological model

of transcendent universal American civil religion was introduced by Robert Bellah.

Using the method of systematic

examination of presidential inaugural addresses, Bellah
documented the existence and institutionalization of civil
religion as an aspect of the American religious dimension.
Bellah's model proposes that American civil religion exists
as an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs, providing cohesion and prophetic guidance through times of
national crisis.

Bellah cites examples of the unifying and

prophetic manifestations of American civil religion throughout American history, noting that at times the symbols of
American civil religion have also been misused for national
self-reinforcement and self-transcendence (Bellah, 1975).
The folk religion model is thus partially contained within
the transcendent universal model, with folk religion representing the distortion of universal ideals into national public theology.

Bellah believes, however, as does Mead, that

the ideals of American civil religion have universal application which transcends American society (Richey and Jones,
1974:16).

Greeley (1972:116) calls the transcendent univer-

sal model of American civil religion "elite" civil religion,
representing the highest ideals of the nation.

The transcen-

dent universal model of American civil religion has stimulated
the greatest amount of contemporary sociological response.
Empirical tests of the transcendent universal model include

6

content analyses by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978) and Thomas
and Flippen (1972) and individual belief surveys by Wimberly
(Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976).

Of the four studies,

only Thomas and Flippen failed to find support for a transcendent universal religion of the nation.
Religious Nationalism
The third model of American civil religion noted by
Richey and Jones (1974:16) is religious nationalism.

Reli-

gious nationalism represents a worldview wherein the nation
itself is glorified and adored, becoming self-transcendent.
The idolatrous component is highly manifest in the model of
religious nationalism, as compared to the latent selftranscendence of the folk religion model.

Like folk reli-

gion, religious nationalism also functions to reinforce
cultural values and integrate citizens.

Rousseau's original

conception of civil religion comes close to being a model of
religious nationalism.

Social integration, rather than

nationalism, was Rousseau's intended objective, but his
state-sponsored civil belief system which would insure good
citizenship and political legitimacy has nationalistic potentia1.

There has been little systematic examination of reli-

gious nationalism as a distinct model of American civil
religion.

Religious nationalism has been conceived as the

opposite type in the transcendent universal model (Bellah,

1975), or as folk religion taken to its most idolatrous
extreme (Marty, 1959).

Bellah is not unaware of the
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manifestations of religious nationalism in the United States,
but treats these phenomena as examples of the "broken covenant" between the nation and its transcendent authority
(Bellah, 1975).

Marty (1974) has developed a typology of

American civil religion in which one type, priestly, selftranscendent civil religion, is presented as a form of religious nationalism.

Although Bellah and Marty work from

different models of American civil religion, both agree that
there is a dynamic tension between transcendent and selftranscendent modes of American civil religion.
Democratic Faith
The democratic faith model of American civil religion
is primarily represented in the writings of philosophers and
theologians who have attempted to construct a humanistic
philosophy based on the American ideals of justice, liberty,
and equality.

Democratic faith typically refers neither to

a transcendent authority nor to a self-transcendent nation
and is thus more a humanistic value system than a transcendent religion.

The common faith of John Dewey is a classic

example of democratic faith.

Dewey's common faith was based

on the conscious and dedicated pursuit of democracy.

Dewey

believed that this pursuit was religious, as any experience
had religious values as long as it produced "a better,
deeper, and enduring adjustment in life"

(Dewey, 1934:14)

Adjustment was not seen as a psychologically passive accommodation to society but was to be found in working for liberal

8

goals and building social institutions which would facilitate
individual freedom.

Devotion to building these institutions

was Dewey's religion (Clebsch, 1973:176-177).

Dewey's common

faith best serves as an example of how the humanistic values
of American civil religion could be embodied in the personal
value system of an individual citizen.

Because Dewey's

common faith is more of an individual belief system than a
cultural value system, the elaboration of common faith or the
democratic faith model it illustrates is not treated further
in this volume.
Protestant Civic Piety
Richey and Jones (1974:17) note that a particular model
of American civil religion as Protestant civic piety is to be
found among the writings of some Protestant theologians and
American religious historians (e.g., Winthrop Hudson, 1970;
H. Richard Niebuhr, 1959; John Smylie, 1963; Ernest Tuveson,
1968) .

The Protestant civic piety model emphasizes that the

origin of American civil religion can be found in the fusion
of the American and Protestant historical traditions.

The

Protestant civic piety model typically contains the following elements:

(1) the theistic conception of a transcendent

authority for the nation,

(2) the legitimation of Protestant

values as applied to national life, and (3) the integration
of Protestant citizens as Americans.

Charles Long (1974)

has objected to the narrowness of the Protestant civic
piety model, which tends to ignore the contributions of
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non-whites and non-Protestants to the value system of American civil religion.

Although Protestant civic piety is the

least comprehensive of the five models of American civil
religion and has generated the least sociological interest,
the model

w~ll

be explored in some detail in part I, chapter

II of this study, as the concept of Protestant civic piety
has historical importance for tracing the origins of American
civil religion.
The five models of American civil religion differ (with
partial overlapping) in their conceptions of (1) the definition of American civil religion,
civil religion,

(2) the origins of American

(3) the relationship between American civil

religion and other American institutions,

(4) the functions

performed by American civil religion, and (5) the current
existence and future evolution of American civil religion.
Due to the confusion created by varying models, there is a
need for conceptual clarification in the field of American
civil religion research and a further need for the generation
of logical, testable propositions concerning American civil
religion.

Because the transcendent universal model of Amer-

ican civil religion is the most comprehensive of the five
models and has received the most theoretical and empirical
attention from contemporary sociologists, it will serve as
the basic model from which definitions and assumptions are
derived.

Parts III and IV of this volume will explore four

basic propositions concerning American civil religion,
derived from the transcendent universal model of Bellah.
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specifically, the four propositions are adapted and condensed
from John A. Coleman's (1970) evolutionary theory of civil
religion, which is an outgrowth of Bellah's transcendent
model of American civil religion.

Coleman's definition of

American civil religion is contained in the first proposition, while the remaining three propositions concernthefunctions and development of American civil religion and its
relation to other social institutions.
Basic Propositions
Proposition I
American civil religion is the religious symbol system
which relates the citizen's role and American society's place
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate
existence and meaning.
Proposition II
American civil religion is structurally differentiated
from both the political community and the religious community.
Proposition III
American civil religion performs specialized religious
functions performed neither by church nor state.
Proposition IV
The differentiation of American civil religion from
political and religious communities follows the general
direction of cultural evolution.
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The remainder of the study will continue the review of
the American civil religion literature in a search for logical and empirical support for the stated propositions.

The

search consists of an inductive process by which the existing data concerning American civil religion are gathered,
ordered, and formalized for the eventual purpose of being
tested against new data.

The result is a synthesis of Amer-

ican civil religion theory, testable by sociological methods.

PART I
THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CIVIL RELIGION

CHAPTER II
THE FOUNDATIONS:

ROUSSEAU AND DE TOCQUEVILLE

The term civil religion first appears in Rousseau's
The Social Contract.

The relationship between a society's

religious and political ideals has been discussed throughout
the history of social thought, but Rousseau provides the
first description of a belief system explicitly labeled civil
religion.

Rousseau's civil religion emerges in the context

of his larger interest in the legitimacy of the social bond.
In a chapter entitled, "Of Civil Religion," added shortly
before the publication of The Social Contract, Rousseau advocates a religion of civil virtue which would consecrate and
legitimate common social life.
Rousseau arrives at the necessity for a civil religion
after examining various ways that religion may function in
relationship to the social order.

Rousseau observes that

throughout history political institutions have depended upon
religious legitimacy.

Primitive societies were often theoc-

racies, and monarchs claimed divine inspiration to strengthen
collective loyalty.

But the power of religious institutions

and the divisiveness of religious sectarianism have ultimately
proven threatening to political stability.

Rousseau examines

and rejects three religious types which threaten the social
order.

The first is "the religion of man as man
13

. without
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temples, without altars, without rites .
called natural divine law"

. what may be

(Rousseau, 1960:300).

This pure

form of Christianity fails to bind the citizen to the state,
teaching instead detachment from worldly affairs.

Rousseau

(1960:302-303) sees the true Christian destined for slavery
under tyranny.

The second type is the "religion of the citi-

zen," the religious nationalism of primitive societies.

This

type of theocracy gives each nation its own exclusive deities.
"Its dogmas, its rites, its forms of worship are all prescribed by law" and facilitate social cohesion.

But because

everything outside the society is judged "infidel, alien, and
barbarous" it makes citizens "bloodthirsty and intolerant"
(Rousseau, 1960:301).

Theocratic nations are likely to

become involved in self-destructive warfare.

The third type

of religion, the religion of the priest, is exemplified by
modern separation of church and state.

Church-state separa-

tion threatens social unity by giving citizens "two legislative orders, two rulers, two countries, imposes on the two
contradictory systems of duty and makes it impossible for them
to be at the same time devout individuals and good citizens"
(Rousseau, 1960:301).

In Rousseau's opinion, nothing could

be worse than this dual, contradictory system which destroys
social unity.
Rousseau concludes that social cohesion could best be
served by the requirement that the political leader establish
articles of a "purely civil" religion "not with the precision
of religious dogmas, but treating them as a body of social
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sentiments without which no man can be either a good citizen
or a faithful subject"

(Rousseau, 1960:305).

The dogmas of

civil faith were to be kept simple, including only the following ideas:

the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient,

beneficent God; life after death; the reward of just behavior and the punishment of transgressions; and the sanctity
of the social contract and the law.

Civil intolerance would

be prohibited, for in Rousseau's judgement intolerance leads
to cleavage and the ultimate disruption of civil life.

No

citizen could be forced to believe in the dogmas of civil
religion, but those who did not could be banished from the
society, "not on grounds of impiety, but as lacking in social
sense. . . . " (Rousseau, 1960: 306) .
In the ideal society that Rousseau envisioned in The
Social Contract, civil religion would serve a dual function.
Established by and under a political ruler, civil religion
would legitimize the political order without establishing a
competing religious authority.
the priests would be avoided.

The dualism of religion of
Civil religion's ban on intol-

erance would insure that divisive sectarianism would be avoided.

Civil religion, conceived by Rousseau as a state-directed

religion of good citizenship, would perform the social functions of insuring political legitimacy and social cohesion.
Although Rousseau's civil religion proclaims a belief in an
all-powerful God, there is no evidence of a prophetic function.

In this final position, Rousseau's thought was congru-

ent with that of his contemporaries Voltaire and Montesquieu,
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who also believed that religion should be under the state,
because some type of religion, however false, was required
to maintain social order and morality (Cobban, 1934:78-79).
Rousseau's civil religion is ultimately a form of selftranscendent, religious nationalism.
Alexis de Tocqueville's description of a "republican
religion" in the nineteenth-century United States has been
influential both for historians and sociologists of American
civil religion.

Tocqueville's view of civil religion differs

significantly from that of his predecessor and countryman
Rousseau.

Rousseau arrived at his conception of civil relig-

ion by abstractly considering the requirements of the ideal
society.

Tocqueville discovered republican religion during

an empirical examination of American life in the 1830s.
Rousseau wrote of a civil religion established by the state,
while Tocqueville observed a form of civii religion which
emerged precisely in the situation of church-state separation
that Rousseau believed would undermine social cohesion.

Both

Rousseau and Tocqueville were motivated by an interest in the
role of religious ideals in the European political future.
Tocqueville's reliance on the American case as a predictive
type led him to be a forerunner of American historians and
social scientists who would describe American civil religion
as a folk religion of the American people (e.g., Marty, 1959;
Herberg, 1960; Warner, 1961).
During Tocqueville's tour of America in 1831, he was
impressed by the popularity of both religious values and
democratic ideas.
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On my arrival in the United States the religious
aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my
attention; and the longer I stayed there, the more I perceived the great political consequences resulting from
this new state of things (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:308).
predisposed to see "the spirit of religion and the spirit of
freedom marching in opposite directions"

(Tocqueville, Vol. I,

1966:308), as was the case in France, Tocqueville was challenged to seek further explanation of the surprising Arnerican situation.

Focusing on the character and habits of the

American populace and relying on interviews and observation,
Tocqueville constructed a model of a democratic and republican Christianity which functioned as a nonsectarian folk
religion.

Republican religion is specifically the moral law

which affects political life indirectly, but significantly,
through its influence on customs and domestic life (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:304).

The various American religious

denominations might disagree on specific matters of denominational doctrine, but could all agree on general Christian
mores.

Even American Catholics, whose specific beliefs

diverged most strongly from the American Puritan heritage,
adhered to republican religion so as to "constitute the most
republican and most democratic class in the United States"
(Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:300).

Tocqueville concluded that

the minority status of American Catholics gave them a vested
interest in supporting republican religion's tenets of equality and freedom.

Tocqueville's democratic and republican

Christianity did not encompass Jewish Americans, but their
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subsequent inclusion by Herberg (1960) under the generalized
umbrella of American folk religion follows the lines of
Tocqueville's logic for Cathologic inclusion.
Tocqueville presented a model of American civil religion in which religious belief and morality were fused with
a political system of democratic values and laws.

Such a

fusion might generally imply the existence of a state church
or a politically established belief system like that proposed by Rousseau.

Instead, Tocqueville believed that the

symbiotic relationship between American religious and political values was due particularly to the innovative American
feature of legal nonestablishment.

Tocqueville noted that

religious toleration was first observed in the United States
under the Catholic proprietorship of Maryland, which prior
to the 1654 Puritan overthrow demonstrated more religious
freedom than did any of the other colonies (Strout, 1973:
xii).

Ultimately, Puritanism solved the paradox of religious

dogmatism versus political freedom through the institutionalization of legal nonestablishment.

The separation of the

denominations from political institutions left religion free
to inform political decisions without being dependent upon
the success or failure of a particular government.
In America religion is perhaps less powerful than
it has been at certain periods and among certain nations;
but its influence is more lasting.
It restricts itself
to its own resources, but of these none can deprive it;
its circle is limited, but it pervades it and holds it
under undisputed control (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:312).
When religion and politics are undifferentiated, religious
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institutions become vulnerable to political limitations.
"The alliance which religion contracts with political powers
must needs be onerous to itself, since it does not require
their assistance to live, and by giving them its assistance
it may be exposed to decay"

(Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:311).

Tocqueville believed that the danger is particularly acute
in democratic systems, which by their nature insure systems
of leadership turnover and internal self-modification.

Change

is a predictable feature of democracies which could threaten
the eternal values of a religious system.

If religious val-

ues embody democratic principles, however, this threat is
reduced.
Although religious values might not require political
institutionalization for their persistence in society, differentiation of religious and political institutions could lead
to internal value conflict.

Rousseau suggested this conse-

quence in his warning that church-state separation disrupted
social cohesion by giving citizens contradictory systems of
loyalties (Rousseau, 1960:301).

Rousseau, however, was con-

trasting denominational religious institutions (which he called
the ''religious institutions of the priests") with political
institutions.

Tocqueville's republican religion was suffi-

ciently nondenominational to act as a generalized belief
system which could bind divisions of religious and political
loyalties.

In Tocqueville's model, republican religion per-

formed a socially integrating function as a mechanism for
preventing liberty from degenerating into anarchy.
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Tocqueville observed that "liberty . .

is generally estab-

lished with difficulty in the midst of storms; it is perfected by civil discord . . . " (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:247).
He believed that republican religion could function to prevent civil discord from destructively dividing the society.
By emphasizing the cohesive function of republican
religion for American society, Tocqueville necessarily limited its prophetic potential.

Republican religion was rooted

in public opinion and could serve the conservative forces of
the "tyranny of the majority."

Tocqueville feared that the

power of majority opinion in democracies would feel threatened by reform measures and would become unable to make "a
strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose"
Vol. II, 1966:236).

(Tocqueville,

Strout points to this issue as a contra-

diction in Tocqueville's model.
Tocqueville never recognized this implicit conflict
in his theory.
Similarly, he produced another paradox
by his admiration both for vigorous intellectual freedom
and a wide moral and philosophical consensus that could
tame the majority's will.
Religion favored the latter
at the price of diminishing the former . . . . His fears
about the tyranny of the majority were to some extent
historically grounded in the very factor of popular religion that he identified instead of with influences favoring liberal democracy (Strout, 1973:340).
Republican religion by definition rested on a generalized
moral consensus, but this consensus has functioned historically to provide both transcendent and self-transcendent
interpretations of the American destiny.

Conservative move-

ments, such as the pro-slavery forces of the 1850s as well
as reform movements like abolitionism, would use religion as
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a moral base for action.
Tocqueville's model of republican religion was the
first to describe a generalized democratic belief system,
based in the religious and moral traditions of a society,
which is observed to be structurally and functionally differentiated both from the political and religious institutions.
Republican religion appears to have been derived from the
American denominations but not to be delimited by any particular church or sect.

Republican religion supported a demo-

cratic political system but did so indirectly by infusing
the folkways and mores of citizens.

Democracy and equality

were thus political ideals with a religious dimension to be
interpreted within the American historical tradition.

Tocque-

ville hoped that republican religion could be generalizable
to Europe, but he also recognized the singularity of the
American experience (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:329-330).
Tocqueville's model of democratic and republican religion has
thus had its greatest impact on American historical and
social thought.

CHAPTER III
THE CIVIL RELIGION OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS HISTORIANS
American religious historians have demonstrated considerable interest in the concept of American civil religion.

In a review of civil religion literature, Phillip

Hammond (1976:170) notes that Sydney E. Ahlstrom's 1,000page volume, A Religious History of the American People
(1972), focuses upon American civil religion as one of its
major themes.

Bedell, Sandon, and Wellborn's Religion in

America (1975) also devotes considerable attention to the
topic of American civil religion.

Civil religion in Amer-

ica has additionally been a subject of special concern for
a number of well-known American religious historians.
H. Richard Niebuhr (1959) and Winthrop Hudson (1970) have
concerned themselves with Protestant civic piety, locating
the origin and boundaries of civil religion in the American
Protestant tradition.

Ernest Tuveson (1968) demonstrates

the tendency of Protestant civic piety to become a type of
religious nationalism under certain historical and social
conditions.

Sidney Mead (1963; 1975) has devoted a consid-

erable portion of his career to documenting the concept of
a transcendent universal civil religion of the American
nation.

Other religious historians such as Martin Marty
22
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(1959; 1976) and Franklin Littell (1962) see American civil
religion now becoming differentiated from its Protestant
roots and developing into a generalized and secularized folk
religion of the American people.

Each of these differing

but partially overlapping conceptions of civil religion
among American religious historians has contributed significantly to the current status of American civil religion as a
sociological construct.
Protestant Civic Piety
Richey and Jones (1974) note that a particular view of
American civil religion as a form of Protestant civic piety
is to be found among the writings of the following historians:

Jerald C. Brauer (1965), William Clebsch (1968),

Winthrop Hudson (1970), H. Richard Niebuhr (1959), James
Smylie (1963), and Ernest Tuveson (1968).

These religious

historians have emphasized that the origins of American civil
religion can be found in the fusion of American Protestantism and nationalism.

The works of Hudson, Niebuhr, and

Tuveson serve as representatives of the Protestant civic
piety model.
Winthrop Hudson
In his "Introduction" to Nationalism and Religion in
America (1970), Winthrop Hudson attributes the origin of American civil religion to Protestant civic piety.

Using histor-

ical sources of data including sermons, inaugural addresses,
and writings of theologians and politicians from 1640 to the
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twentieth century, Hudson concludes that the American colonists were bound together by their common political and religious traditions.

The common religious tradition was the

Puritan Protestantism of Great Britain and the predominate
political belief was what Edmund Burke (quoted in Hudson,
1970:xxv) described as a "fierce spirit of liberty."

The

fusion of these traditions in America formed the basis for
the new nation's civil religion.
Tracing the roots of American civil religion to British
religious and political traditions, Hudson (1970:xxiii) notes
that at the time of the American Revolution over 80 percent
of the colonists claimed British heritage.

To Hudson, this

heritage implies the existence of a common set of religious
beliefs.

Although the American colonists represented various

denominations, Hudson sees an overriding influence of British,
Puritan Protestantism.

Hudson (1970:xxiii) views the early

American denominations as being divided only on "subordinate
issues," not by the "fundamentals of faith."

Later in Amer-

ica, prophets of the Great Awakening, such as Jonathan
Edwards, would emphasize the unity of heart and basic brotherhood of God's people in the new nation.

Hudson argues that

the puzzling phenomenon of American nationalism which united
the colonies during the Revolution sprang in part from the
bonds of a shared faith originating in a common cultural heritage.

"The outward interests of the colonists may have been

diverse but they were made brothers by an inward common devotion to freedom, both civil and religious"

(Hudson, 1970:xxiv).
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The relationship between British Puritanism and democratic values is traced to Sir Edmund Coke's Institutes of
the Laws of England, which emphasized the tradition of
ancient Saxon and British liberty, continually threatened by
the Normans.

Hudson also cites the importance of John Foxe's

Acts and Monuments of Matters Most Special and Memorable
(known as the "Book of Martyrs"), which portrayed the British as the modern successors to the ancient Hebrews' special
relationship with God as the chosen people.

The relation-

ship between Puritanism and civic values was most directly
stated by Puritan leader Oliver Cromwell, who considered
"religion" and "civil liberty" to be "the two greatest concernments that God hath in this world"
1970:xxviii).

(quoted in Hudson,

This fusion of Protestant and democratic be-

liefs was given greater life in the colonies.

Some American

colonists identified themselves with the Biblical Hebrews
and saw their move to the new nation as an exodus.

Hudson

(1970:xxx) compares this exodus to the one made previously
by the Saxon ancestors crossing the English Channel from the
Continent to establish a tradition of liberty in a new land.
There are two assumptions critical to Hudson's description of American Protestant civic piety.

He first assumes

that British history embodied democratic values which were
then expressed and experienced within the Puritan tradition.
Second, Hudson assumes that the American colonists experienced sufficient British identification to try to build a
new Britain in the new world.

According to Hudson (1970:xxxi),
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the American colonists believed that "the struggle to preserve their liberties was a struggle to preserve the liberties of Great Britain."

The American Revolution was

conducted against a tarnished England in order to reestablish its original ideals in the colonies.

Both assumptions

are supported by Hudson's historical data.

Of interest to

sociologists is the fact that Hudson describes an American
civil religion derived from the values of a colonial culture
which functioned as mechanisms for the social cohesion of
the colonies.
Ernest Tuveson
Elements of Protestant civic piety may be found in
Ernest Tuveson's (1968) study of the millennial role of America throughout history.

According to Tuveson's historical

analysis, during the Protestant Reformation Biblical scholars
began to believe for the first time that the millennium was
to be a utopia built on earth by Godly men (Tuveson, 1968:ixx) .

America soon became the chosen nation of the chosen

people who were to establish God's kingdom in the world.
Once the nation was established by members of Protestant
sects who literally viewed themselves as a millennial people,
subsequent national history came also to be interpreted in
millennial themes.

Tuveson pinpoints two millennial themes

which have alternated throughout American history.

The dom-

inant theme is (1) withdrawal from the world of evil, thereby
setting a silent example for other nations.

American
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isolationism preceding each of the major World Wars exemplifies the withdrawal theme.

The second and subordinate theme,

(2) active messianism, could be inspired by the right situation.

Manifest destiny, the Civil War, and the eventual

involvement in the World Wars provided opportunities for
active messianism to dominate (Tuveson, 1968:213-214).

"The

expansion of the nation, the Civil War, the entry into the
second World War--all would have occurred in the course of
things.

But millennialist ideas did influence national ex-

pectations about their outcome and results"
13).

(Tuveson, 1968:

Tuveson's evidence of the influence of Protestant mil-

lennial motifs is drawn from the Bible, sermon texts, political speeches and nineteenth century popular.magazines.
Tuveson makes no effort to bring in data which might not
support the millennial thesis, and no soiological data are
used.

Despite these limitations, Tuveson's study is an inter-

esting historical account emphasizing the Calvinist foundations of Protestant civic piety which is neither wholly
divinely transcendent nor totally nationally self-transcendent.
Instead, there is a dialectic tension between prophetic ideals
and their nationalistic application in specific historical
situations.
H. Richard Niebuhr
A prophetic model of Protestant civic piety has been advanced by H. Richard Niebuhr (1959).

Viewing American Protes-

tantism as a social movement rather than as an institution,
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Niebuhr traces the influence of Puritanism, Evangelicalism,
and social gospelism on American civil beliefs.

Niebuhr

concurs with Hudson and Tuveson that American civil religion
is based on the Protestant civic piety of the early colonists, but he challenges the idea that the Puritan settlers
and their descendants hoped to establish an earthly kingdom
of God in America.

Niebuhr (1959:xii) stresses that the

early Puritans and Quakers envisioned a kingdom of God based
on the "sovereignty of God."

To illustrate this hypothesis,

Niebuhr (1959:174) quotes Lyman Beecher who identified the
New England Puritan law and the subsequent laws of the republic with the moral law of God:
Our own republic in its constitution and laws is of
heavenly origin.
It was not borrowed from Greece or Rome,
but from the Bible. . . . It was God that gave these
elementary principles to our forefathers, as "the pillar
of fire by night and the cloud by day" for their guidance.
Niebuhr believes that it was the Evangelical movement in American Protestantism which undermined the prophetic function of
American civil religion to emphasize the idea that American
Christians are a specially favored and chosen nation.
forth the kingdom of the Lord was a human possession"

"Hence(Nie-

buhr, 1959:179) and the function of American civil religion
moved from that of transcendence to national self-transcendence.
Niebuhr credits the social gospel movement of the end of the
nineteenth century with "institutionalizing 11 the concept of
American self-transcendence.
As propagandists they (the social gospel reformers)
sought the extension of democratic institutions--if necessary by recourse to military force--in order that all
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the world might share in the blessings of the kingdom of
God on earth (Niebuhr, 1959:184).
Niebuhr's concept of American civil religion is discussed entirely within the context of the boundaries of the
Protestant movement.

Niebuhr is exclusively concerned with

the prophetic function of Protestant civic piety, its erosion, and the call for prophetic renewal.

Niebuhr's descrip-

tion of the self-transcendent phase of Protestant civic piety
corresponds to Tuveson's (1968) analysis of the tension between prophetic and nationalistic applications of American
civil religion.

Unlike Tuveson, Niebuhr recommends a return

to the original, Puritan-based civil religion.

"Apart from

God and his forgiveness nationality and even Christianity
particularized in a nation become destructive rather than
creative"

(Niebuhr, 1959:xvi).

Charles Long (1974:211-221) criticizes the historians
who defined American civil religion in the Protestant, civic
piety tradition.

Long suggests that we consider the meaning

of the words "American" and "religion" in the concept of
American civil religion.
If by "American" we mean the Christian European
immigrants and their progeny, then we have overlooked
American Indians and American blacks. And if religion
is defined as revealed Christianity and its institutions,
we have again overlooked much of the religion of American blacks, Amerindians and the Jewish communities . .
In short, a great deal of the writings and discussions
of the topic of American religion has been consciously
or unconsciously ideological, serving to enhance, justify and render sacred the history of European immigrants
in this land (Long, 1974:212).
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Long's main objection to the notion of American civil religion as Protestant civic piety is that the concept is narrow
and contributes to the historical and cultural invisibility
of certain American groups.

As Richey and Jones (1974:12)

note, Protestant civic piety is the least comprehensive of
the five meanings of American civil religion.

The concept

of Protestant civic piety, as used by Hudson, Tuveson, and
especially Niebuhr, refers only to Protestant beliefs about
the role of the American nation rather than to a differentiated civil belief system available to all American citizens.
Sidney Mead's Transcendent Universal
Religion of the Nation
Religious historian Sidney Mead (1963; 1975) challenges
the thesis that American civil religion can be narrowly defined as Protestant civic piety.

Mead documents an American

civil religion based on a synthesis of deistic and democratic
principles and characterized by a synergistic cosmopolitanism.

Mead locates the origin of American civil religion in

the Western European tradition by which emerging nations
adapted the ideal of Christian universalism to their own
nationalistic interests.

The United States departed from

the European pattern by separating church from state and refusing to establish any of the denominations.

America became

a nation based on the legitimacy of religious diversity (Mead,
1963).

Clebsch (1968:209) also notes that American religious

pluralism began as a historical accident which led to an
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official policy of government religious neutrality.

By acci-

dent, the colonies harbored groups of different faiths, each
of which was required to interact tolerantly with the others
in order to ensure its own survival.

Far from diluting Amer-

ican religiosity, pluralism stimulated it.

Clebsch (1968:209)

cites Roger Williams as the father of "the distinctly American
theory that unrestrained varieties of religious expression
heighten the spiritual vigor of a single society."
Both Mead (1963:134) and Clebsch (1968:210) agree that
early American pluralism was dominated by the Protestant tradition.

Mead (1963:135) believes, however, that by the second

half of the nineteenth century American had "two religions,"
the Protestant orthodoxy of the denominations and a "religion
of the Republic."

The latter was the civil religion of adem-

ocratic society.
This was rooted in the rationalism of the Enlightenment (to go no further back) and was articulated in terms
of the destiny of America, under God, to be fulfilled by
perfecting the democratic way of life for the example and
betterment of all mankind (Mead, 1963:135).
Although Mead agrees that the two faiths were synergistically
interrelated in American life, the tradition of religious
pluralism prevented the religion of the Republic from being
circumscribed by Protestant orthodoxy.

Under a pluralistic

system, no one denomination could claim to function as "the
church."

Mead (1975:71) contends that, from its inception,

the United States itself began "assuming the traditional function of the church."

Mead (1975:48) cites G. K. Chesterton's

statement that the United States was the only nation founded
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on a creed.

The American creed was based on the Jeffersonian

theory of equality and envisioned the United States as a new
homeland for the world's homeless.

According to John E.

Smylie (quoted in Mead, 1975:72-73), "American Protestantism
endowed the nation with churchly attributes, with three theological notes in particular."

First, America became "the

primary agent of God's meaningful activity in history."

The

beliefs that the millennium would begin in America and that
it was America's role in history to evangelize the world both
illustrate this religious function of the state.

Mead also

concurs with Smylie that in the United States it was the
nation itself, not a religious denomination, which functioned
as the primary social setting for the discovery of personal
and group identity.

Finally, "as the nation became the pri-

mary community for fulfilling historic purposes and realizing personal identity," it also began to assume "a churchly
function in becoming the community of righteousness"
quoted in Mead, 1975:73).

(Smylie

These functions could be, and some-

times were,performed in the interest of religious nationalism.

The natlon-as-church was always in danger of becoming

heteronomous toward other nations and attempting to superimpose the American value system on the world.

Mead believes,

however, that the theological tradition of the religion of
the Republic was essentially theonomous, or ruled by God.
Historically, the social structure of American religious
pluralism necessitated tolerance.

The vitality of the reli-

gion of the Republic was derived from its toleration of
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diversity, not from the establishment of one set of religious
precepts.

Generalized from a national to an international

setting, the religion of the Republic pointed to universalistic values.
As the Christian sects carried the universal vision
until it was, largely in spite of them, incarnated in a
religiously pluralistic commonwealth, so perhaps that
commonwealth is the bearer in history of the cosmopolitanism which, when and if incarnated in world institutions, may compel the nation-churches to live side by
side in overt peace under law . . . (Mead, 1975:77).
Mead describes a religion of the American republic
which emerged under the structure of religious pluralism.
Only within a pluralistic system, in which no denomination
could be established, could the nation itself begin to fulfill the traditional religious functions of providing a major
source of social cohesion, personal meaning and identity, and
prophecy for historical roles.

Religious differentiation is

described as producing a differentiated and highly generalized religion of the Republic, partially separate from the
denominations but also standing over them to insure against
the self-transcendent and particularistic tendencies of the
individual denominations.

On the pluralistic international

scene, the values of American civil religion could perform
similar religious function and serve as prophetic guidelines
to world unity while guarding against the tendency of nationalism.

Mead is exceptional among American religious histor-

ians for tracing American civil religion from its Protestant
origins beyond Protestant particularism and self-deifying
nationalism to potentially universalistic application.

The
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key to this logical progression is Mead's focus upon the
unique social form of American religious pluralism in the
generation of a divinely transcendent American civil religion.
The History of American Folk Religion:
Martin Marty
In The New Shape of American Religion (1959), ]1artin
Marty attempts to document the emergence of American civil
religion as a fourth major American religion, independent and
differentiated from Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism.
Marty agrees with Mead (1963) that American civil religion
was born in the natural religious beliefs of the nation's
Protestant-deist founders, and has been nurtured by the American tradition of religious pluralism.

r1arty's position de-

parts from that of Mead and also from that of the Protestant
civic pietists in its evaluation of American civil religion
as a religion-in-general which lacks the moral and theological rigor of denominational religion.

Marty's (1959:2) Arner-

ican religion-in-general is a syncretistic belief system in
which generalized religious sentiments have replaced partieularistic theological content.

Franklin Littell (1962:194-

195) describes American religion-in-general as the "hearty
and uncritical affirmation of everything American" typified
by the popular mass media slogan, "Go to the Church of Your
Choice, but GO TO CHURCH!"

The God of religion-in-general,

according to Marty (1959:34-39) is an understandable and manageable being who is comforting and "an American jolly good
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fellow."

The prophets of religion-in-general are popular

American clergymen, such as the Rev. Billy Graham and
Dr. Norman Vincent Peal, who have attracted cross-denominational support.

Religion-in-general is described by Marty

as a popular, highly generalized symbol system concerned
with the religious aspects of being an American.

Religion-

in-general is portrayed as a type of American folk religion,
serving a predominantly integrative function for American
society.
Marty cites the erosion of American Protestantism as
the main factor contributing to the rise of American folk
religion.

Protestant dominance declined in a religiously

plural society that soughttotolerate and even integrate
Roman Catholicism and Judaism.

Along with Protestant "capit-

ulation" to Catholics, Jews, and liberals, the American ecological trends toward urbanism and suburbanism hastened the
decline of Protestant civic piety and the rise of religionin-general (Marty, 1959:4-5).

Marty is unclear about the

specific impact of ecological trends upon American religion,
implying that, because suburban Protestantism often lacks
prophetic force, it has degenerated into religion-in-general.
Marty (1959:45-66) also suggests that the rise of religionin-general may simply be one of the many symptoms of the
American cultural shift from inner-directedness to otherdirectedness.

Marty concedes that the seeds of folk reli-

gion's vision of God as a benevolent, manageable deity were
sown in the Protestant conception of covenant.
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The winds of erosion first blew in the original
adaptation of Calvinism to· the American scene.
The federalist or covenantal idiom in Puritanism, which
forced God to keep his half of the bargain, was the beginning of the effort to manage Him (Marty, 1959:4).
once begun, the social transformation from Protestant civic
piety to religion-in-general has continued to the point of
dominating contemporary American religious life.
In a more recent statement, Marty (1974) has expanded
his treatment of American civil religion to include four
sub-types of civil religion.

Marty delineates two basic

types of civil religion, one divinely transcendent and the
other nationally self-transcendent.

The former, transcend-

ent civil religion, "sees the nation 'under God,'" while the
latter, self-transcendent civil religion, stresses national
self-worship (Marty, 1974:144).

Within each basic type of

civil religion there are two styles of religious leadership.
Civil religion may be either celebrative, affirmative, culture building,and therefore priestly, or "dialectical and
judgemental" and therefore prophetic (Marty, 1974:145).
Figure 1 summarizes Marty's typology.
Priestly transcendent civil religion is portrayed as a
version of folk religion which received ritual expression
through Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal style of fostering
national cohesion during the cold war years.

Eisenhower's

statement that "America is the mightiest power which God has
seen fit to put on his footstool"

(quoted in Marty, 1974:

147) exemplifies the concept of divine transcendence and
aptly illustrates the integrative and affirmative qualities
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CENTRAL THEOLOGICAL AFFIRMATION

Divine Transcendence

National
Self-Transcendence

RELIGIOUS
STYLE
Priestly

Prophetic

Fig. 1.

Priest:

Prophet:

Eisenhower

Lincoln

Priest:

Prophet:

Nixon

Sidney Mead

Types of American Civil Religion (Marty, 1974)
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of the priestly style of American civil religion.

Prophetic

transcendent civil religion is demonstrated by Abraham
Lincoln's prophetic role during the Civil War.

Lincoln

called upon those involved on both sides of the conflict to
seek knowledge of and obedience to God's will.
Priestly self-transcendent civil religion is the type
of American civil faith which most closely approximates the
concept of religious nationalism.
as ultimate authority.

The nation replaces God

An extreme example of priestly,

self-transcendent American civil religion can be found in
the John Birch Society's patriotic vision of America.

But

religious nationalism is not limited to political extremists.
Marty cites Richard M. Nixon as a more moderate priestly influence.

Analysis of Nixon's speeches reveals his tendency

to use religious terminology to describe ·his personal vision
of the nation.

Marty (1974:152) notes that, although Nixon's

speeches contained elements of both prophecy and idolatry,
his predominant emphasis was upon "the promise of American
life as a religious ultimate."
Although Richey and Jones (1974) see Sidney Mead as a
maior prophet of transcendent, universal civil religion,
Marty portrays Mead as the prophet of prophetic selftranscendent civil religion.

Marty (1974:154) observes

that God often gets ignored in Mead's advocacy of a universalistic, world civil religion.

Marty's evaluation of Mead

is debatable (see Richey and Jones, 1974:15-16) and unless a
stronger case can be built, prophetic, self-transcendent
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civil religion is the weakest cell in Marty's typology.
Harty concludes his analysis of types of American civil religion by suggesting the future possibility of a dynamic
tension between the priestly and prophetic modes of civil
religious expression.
Despite the inclusion of two divinely transcendent
types of civil religion in Harty's (1974) typology of American civil religion, Marty is best known for his emphasis on
the nationally self-transcendent types which typify American
religion-in-general.

Marty's view of American civil reli-

gion is that of an eroded, Protestant civic piety which has
become the suburbanized, homogenized, and syncretic religion
of the American public.

The only positive function Harty

attributes to religion-in-general is that of national integration, exemplified by the Eisenhower administration.
Otherwise, American civil religion is portrayed by Harty as
particularly corrosive to denominational Protestantism, deficient in providing alternative normative standards.
John A. Coleman (1970:75) has suggested that the alarm with
which Protestant churchmen such as Marty view American civil
religion is testimonial to its emergence as an autonomous
religious system no longer under the sponsorship of organized
religion.
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Conclusion
American religious historians, through their research
into the American religious tradition, were among the first
to document the emergence of an American civil religion
which overlapped with, but was also differentiated from, the
denominations.

For Hudson, Niebuhr, Tuveson, and the other

Protestant civic pietists, America's civil religion was a
nationalized version of Puritanism.

The functions of Protes-

tant civic piety were to foster cohesion by extending the
Puritan covenant to the national level and to provide prophetic guidance to a new nation under God.

But the United

states did not remain a totally Puritan or even completely
Protestant nation.

Mead was the first religious historian

to recognize fully the impact of religious pluralism on American civil religion.

As the American religious structure

became progressively differentiated and Protestant symbols
became restricted in their applicability to the denominations, the symbols of American civil religion expanded to
fill the void.

Every American, Protestant or not, could po-

tentially identify with the values of liberty and equality
and believe in the divine guidance of a nation throughout
history.
value

And according to Mead, the unifying and prophetic

system found in American civil religion had interna-

tional applicability.

Other historians such as Marty,

Littell, and Eckhardt were concerned that the emerging values of American civil religion constituted a watered-down
version of Protestantism which competed with the denominations
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in the field of religious meaning systems.

In Marty's view,

differentiation of religious structures has led to the generalization of civil religious values to the point where
theological content is lost and national self-transcendence
becomes the result.

Marty, Mead, and the Protestant civic

pietists agree on the existence of American civil religion
and the manner of its emergence in American life but disagree profoundly on its present form, functions, and depth.
This same debate is raging within contemporary sociology.

PART II
THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION

CHAPTER IV
FOLK RELIGION
Some of the earliest sociological studies of American
civil religion treated it as a folk religion emerging from
the daily life experience and expressions of the American
populace.

According to Richey and Jones (1974:15), folk re-

ligion "emerges out of the ethos and history of the society"
ultimately to become "an idolatrous faith competing with
particularistic religions."

Andrew Greeley (1972:173) de-

fines folk religion as "the religion of comfort and reassurance~

the religion of self-righteousness," which may be

contrasted with American civil religion in its more noble,
theoretical, "elite" form.

For Greeley, the difference be-

tween folk and elite types of American civil religion is
the difference between idolatry and prophecy.
W. Lloyd Warner
A classic sociological analysis of American civil religion is found in W. Lloyd Warner's (1961) examination of
the Memorial Day celebrations of a Massachusetts city in the
late 1930s.

Warner's symbolic study of Memorial Day cere-

monies is conducted within the theoretical framework of his
larger unit of analysis, the "American symbol system."
According to Warner (1961:17), symbol systems function to
organize individual and collective memories.and future
43
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expectations in a way which strengthens and unifies the
group.

Symbol systems become sacred when they "reduce and

help control the anxieties and fears felt by members of the
species because of insecurity in the moral and natural environment"

(Warner, 1961:11).

Warner attributes the present

diversity of American symbol systems, both sacred and secular, to the division of labor and complexity of the social
structure.

However, as American symbol systems become more

differentiated, Warner notes an opposing phenomenon:

the

generalization and standardization of symbols used commonly
by all members of the public.

This generalization of Ameri-

can symbols is derived from the need to maintain societal
cohesion on some level (Warner, 1961:14).

Warner cites the

ceremonial rituals of such American holidays as Thanksgiving,
the Fourth of July, and Memorial Day as units of analysis of
general symbol systems which have become sacred to Americans.
In "An American Sacred Ceremony," Warner (1974) does
not use the term "American civil religion" nor does he describe a normative, civil religious system.

Instead, he

selects the celebration of Memorial Day as one "important
occasion in the American ceremonial calendar"
90).

(Warner, 1974:

It is Warner's thesis that Memorial Day ceremonies

function as religious rituals to ease the individual's anxieties about death and to unify diverse segments of the community in a way in which competing, particularistic religious
organizations are unable to accomplish this.

Memorial Day

is examined as "a cult of the dead which organizes and
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integrates various faiths and national class groups into a
sacred unity"

(Warner, 1974:91).

The basic symbolic themes

of Memorial Day are the sacrifice of the soldier's life for
his country and the obligation of the living also to sacrifice for the good of the society.

The theme of individual

sacrifice is symbolized in various rituals including the
wearing of blood-red poppies and the participation in public
parades to the cemeteries where the war dead are buried.
warner (1974:97) stresses the unifying function of these
folk rituals.
Here we see people who are Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish and Greek Orthodox involved in a common ritual in
a graveyard with their common dead.
Their sense of separateness was present and expressed in the different
ceremonies, but the parade and the unity gained by doing
everything at one time emphasized the oneness of the
total group.
Each ritual also stressed the fact that
the war was an experience where everyone sacrificed and
some died, not as members of a separate group, but as
citizens of a whole community.
Rather than positing an ideal system of American civil
religion, Warner takes his data from the life of the American folk.

The indicators of Warner's folk religion are func-

tioning sets of civic rituals which are socially integrating
and identity-reinforcing.

This "ceremonial model" of Ameri-

can civil religion has been critiqued by historian John F.
Wilson (1974)

for including too extensive a range of phenom-

ena as indicators of American civil religion.

Wilson con-

eludes that Warner fails to differentiate criteria for civil
religious symbolism from other forms of cultural symbolic
behavior.

"If civil religion is viewed as coterminous with
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all rites and beliefs it truly is generic religion and is not
specifically useful in differentiating the set of rites and
beliefs primarily concerned with civic polity"
126).

(Wilson, 1974:

Warner's greatest contribution to the study of Ameri-

can civil religion was the suggestion that a broad range of
potential indicators of American civil religion may be found
in public ritual.

Subsequently, scholars such as Wilson

would legitimately call for evidence of greater differentiation between American civil religion and other cultural symbol systems.
Conrad Cherry is one contemporary sociologist who has
been inspired by Warner's symbolic analysis of American civil
religion.

Cherry (1970:304) defines American civil religion

as the "distinctively religious tradition which draws upon
American history for its revelatory events and personages,
treats official documents .

. as sacred scriptures and em-

bodies itself in American civic institutions."
Sacred Ceremonies"

In "American

(1970), Cherry explores three historical

examples of ceremonial occasions which served the ritual expression of American civil religion:

the funerals of national

founders Thomas Jefferson and John Adams in 1826, and the
funeral of Robert F. Kennedy in 1968.

The three events are

examples of what Warner called national "cults of the dead"
in which the living and dead are united, the living are also
united together, and all members of the society are united
with God and his purpose for the nation (Warner, 1974:109).
Cherry notes that the Kennedy funeral had a special potential
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for national unity due to the presence of millions of citizens via television.

Although the Kennedy funeral displayed

the particularistic religious symbols of Roman Catholicism,
the symbols of American civil religion were also in evidence.
Cherry (1970:307) selects the eulogy offered by Archbishop
Terence J. Cooke as the part of the service richest in civil
religious symbolism.

The eulogy emphasized Kennedy's role

in furthering the American dream and called upon his successors to fulfill the dream of freedom and opportunity for all.
Citizens could feel united with Kennedy's vision, one another, and God's purpose for America if they would take up
Kennedy's task of building a greater nation.
Warner stressed the unifying functions of national
sacred symbol systems.

Cherry is cognizant of the potential

for both unity and divisiveness in American civil religious
symbolism.
. . American sacred ceremonies invoke the archetypal themes and myths that have continuous popular
appeal to the American people. A comparative historical
study of the themes and myths in their cultic context
would reveal both the unifying and the divisive functions
of the American mythology (Cherry, 1970:308).
Cherry believes that the funerals of Jefferson and Adams were
able to transcend political divisions and unify a young nation in 1826.

Robert Kennedy's funeral in 1968 found the

nation sufficiently pluralistic to defy complete cohesion.
Although many citizens experienced a sense of gathering to a
common purpose in their pledges to renew the values which
Kennedy exemplified, others saw his violent death as a sign
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that justice, peace, and freedom would never become truly
realized in American daily life.

Cherry concludes that the

divisive function of American sacred ceremonies suggests
that American civil religion is not a monolithic entity but
a "national religious point of view" composed of different
"sects" divided along regional, ethnic, class, and ideological lines (Cherry, 1970:309-310).

The Memorial Day cere-

monies which Warner observed unifying a small city in the
1930s could have failed to unite a larger metropolis in the
1970s.

Such ceremonies might even have divided segments of

the population during the American involvement in the Vietnamese war, when the symbol of individual sacrifice for the
nation was not universally valued, especially by the young.
By suggesting the sub-differentiation of civil religious
symbol systems, Cherry makes a point relevant to Wilson's
concern that civil religion symbols are so general as to be
virtually indistinguishable from other cultural symbols.
Cherry agrees that American civil religious symbolism is often so highly generalized as to lack clarity.

"Words such

as freedom, democracy, providence, and (especially) God which
recur in the celebrations of the national faith seem to lack
uniform meaning for contemporary Americans"
18).

(Cherry, 1971:

Cherry does not specifically connect the increasing am-

biguity of American civil religious symbols to the increasing differentiation of American life.

However, Parsons's

(1971:26-27) thesis that increased structural differentiation is accompanied by increased value generalization
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supports Cherry's independent observations of the increasing
loss of clarity and specificity of these same symbols.
Cherry's observations of the Jefferson, Adams, and
Kennedy funerals do not entirely support the concept of
civil religion as folk r~ligion.

Although Cherry's method

of analysis begins with the ritual expressions of the American folk, his conclusions partially challenge the idea that
a set of national folk symbols exists which can unify the
American populace.

Cherry also challenges the assumption of

the folk religion concept that American civil religion is
ultimately banal and idolatrous.

Cherry observes that the

ritual expression of American civil religion has been nationally self-transcendent at times, but at other times as in
Archbishop Cooke's eulogy of Robert Kennedy, it has stressed
the divinely transcendent theme of American destiny under
God.
Will Herberg
Possibly the best-known description of American civil
religion as folk religion has been presented by Will Herberg
(1960; 1974).

Like Warner, Herberg does not begin his anal-

ysis with a normative definition of American civil religion,
but concludes instead, from the results of popular polls and
opinion surveys of the 1950s, that there is "an organic
structure of ideas, values and beliefs that constitutes a
faith common to Americans and is generally operative in their
lives"

(Herberg, 1974:77).

The particular ideas, values,
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and beliefs of American civil religion are democratism, humanitarianism, idealism, optimism, egalitarianism, moralism,
inner-directedness, individualism, and free enterprise (Herberg, 1960:76-90).

These symbols, which represent "the

American Way of Life," function as a common American religious symbol system in the manner outlined by Robin Williams.
According to Williams (1952:312), all functioning societies
possess a common religion whose symbols provide an overarching sense of cohesion even in the face of internal conflict.
According to Herberg, it is the American Way of Life which
gives a pluralistic America this overarching basis of unity.
Herberg agrees with other analysts of American civil
religion, such as Mead and Clebsch, that it is the structural differentiation of American society which contributes
directly to the emergence of American civil religion.
berg explores two sources of differentiation:
pluralism and ethnic pluralism.

Her-

religious ·

For Herberg, the history of

the emergence of American civil religion is the history of
the American immigrant experience and the adaptation of each
immigrant group to the American way of life.

Herberg

selects religion as the only identifying characteristic immigrants were not expected to give up in order to become
good Americans.

It was permissible for the assimilating im-

migrant to retain his religion, in part because of the tradition of religious pluralism, but also because the predominant
religions, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, were simply three different representations of similar religious
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symbols:

the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of mankind,

and the dignity of the individual.

Herberg concludes that

Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are three major
branches of "American Religion" and that identification with
one of these branches is necessary for one's acceptance by
American society (Herberg, 1960:38-39).

The renewal of reli-

gious interest observed during the 1950s in America could be
interpreted as a reflection of the social need to identify
with a community, with community becoming increasingly identified in religious terms as ethnic bases of identification
declined.

Herberg concluded that the religious revival of

the 1950s was compatible with secularism, as one of the
changes which had contributed to secularism--namely, the
assimilation of ethnic groups--also contributed to the need
for identification within a religious community (Herberg,
1960:41).

According to Herberg, American religion as a syn-

cretic blend of Puritanism and Americanism first emerged in
the mid-nineteenth century and later became an "unembarrassed religionization of the American Way" as the ethnic
churches dissolved into the more generalized traditions of
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism to become mere
branches of American religion (Herberg, 1974:84).

In this

evolutionary scheme, immigration and assimilation are the
major independent variables which contributed to the rise of
American religion as a unifier of differentiated groups.
Herberg stressed that despite the cohesive function of
American religion it is not a common denominator religion
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synthesized from the religious symbols of the biblical religions.

American religion is a·true folk religion, an "organ-

ic structure" of norms, values, and beliefs which can be
observed actually functioning in the daily social life of
the American people (Herberg, 1974:76-77).

Although Ameri-

can religion is neither sponsored by nor dominated by other
religious organizations, there is little conflict between
American civil religion and the American denominations.

The

only sources of tension observed between American religion
and other religious organizations are to be found among the
still-remaining ethnic churches, a few sects such as the Jehovah's Witnesses who oppose some manifestations of American
civil religion such as the pledge of allegiance to the American flag, and a small group of critical theologians with
views similar to .those of Martin Marty.

With these excep-

tions, the relationship between American civil religion and
the biblical religions in America is harmonious, due to the
fact that American civil religion is not perceived as a separate competing religion by its American adherents (Herberg,
1974:85).
The indicators of American civil religion cited by Herberg are the American symbol systems noted by Warner (1961).
Herberg locates evidence of American civil religion in the
apotheosis of national life, the religionization of national
values, the divinization of national heroes such as Washington and Lincoln, and the transmutation of American history
into a redemptive history (Herberg, 1974:78).

The spiritual
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aspect of American civil religion is evidenced by the nearunanimous American belief in a "supreme being" and the tendency of Americans to see national history and endeavors as
"moral crusades overseen by God."

As symbolic evidence, Her-

berg describes the Great Seal of the United States which depicts an unfinished pyramid "representing the American
national enterprise, and over it the all-seeing eye of God"
(Herberg, 1974:80).

This image suggests a prophetic dimen-

sion of American civil religion, but Herberg cautions that
the structure of American religion as overarching the traditional biblical religion leads ultimately to a self-transcendent position .
. . America's civil religion is not, and cannot
be seen as, authentic Christianity, or Judaism, or even
a special cultural version of either or both. Because
they serve a jealous God, these biblical faiths cannot
allow any claim of ultimacy or absoluteness . . . short
of God . . . . To see America's civil religion as somehow
standing above or beyond the biblical religions, .
as somehow including them and finding a place for them
in its overarching unity, is idolatry, however innocently held and whatever may be the subjective intentions of
believers (Herberg, 1974:87).
Herberg portrays American civil religion as a genuine
folk religion.

The symbols of American culture and American

civil religion are not differentiated because American civil
religion is the American culture religionized.

Herberg has

no problem viewing American folk religion as a genuine civil
religion, and points to Athenian and Roman civil religion as
ancient examples of the congruency between a society's civil
religion and its culture.

Herberg's folk religion functions

primarily as a mechanism for the pattern-maintenance of
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American culture and the integration of American society.
Andrew Greeley (1972:163), in an evaluation of Herberg's
American folk religion, observes that "not since Emile Durkheim has anyone so astutely described the social-integration
dimension in a religion."

Yet Greeley questions Herberg's

conclusion that the prophetic dimension found in biblical
religion is absent from American civil religion.

Greeley

acknowledges that the prophetic function is lacking in American civil religion in its popular folk religion form.
American civil religion as folk religion comforts, reassures,
and celebrates conformity.

However, Greeley believes there

is another "elite" form of American civil religion based on
the American values of the right to dissent.

According to

Greeley, the tradition of dissent has at times produced
forces to counteract the self-transcendent tendencies of folk
religion.

For example, American clergymen who have protested

war or racial injustice have done so not only from the perspective of their biblical traditions, but also from the
tradition of dissent embedded in American civil religion
(Greeley, 1972:167).
Conclusion
The concept of American folk religion, which was developed in the historical analyses of Marty, Littell, and Eckhardt, has been elaborated by the sociological analyses of
Warner and Herberg.

As social scientists attempting objec-

tive analyses, neither Warner nor Herberg was burdened with
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a need to warn the public of the dangers of folk religion.
As Greeley (1972:165) notes in comparing the sociological to
the historical treatments of American civil religion, "while
Herberg's analysis is astute, the reader in the 1970s may be
inclined to find both Marty and Eckhardt to be irritable and
irritating."

The major contributions of Warner are the loca-

tion of American civil religion in the national symbol systems and ritual celebrations of the American public and the
recognition that such symbols and ritual behaviors perform
the religious function of uniting believers in a moral community.

Herberg built upon this premise to explore his

thesis that folk religion had replaced the American biblical
religions as the major unifying force in American society.
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism had become religious
sub-structures subsumed under, but remaining partially differentiated from, the overarching folk religion.

As a result

of folk religion's overarching position, it must ultimately
foster an attitude of national self-transcendence.

Warner's

and Herberg's careful elaboration of an integrative and selftranscendent American folk religion, based on studies of symbolic behavior and surveys of American values, stimulated
other sociologists to question whether folk religion was the
only manifestation of American civil religion.

Might Ameri-

can civil religion have an "elite" form as Greeley suggests?
If American civil religion were to manifest the functions
traditionally associated with religious systems, a prophetic
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dimension could be expected.

Perhaps the greatest contribu-

tion of the folk religion tradition in sociology was the
stimulus of further inquiry into the manifestations of American civil religion in American life.

CHAPTER V
THE TRANSCENDENT CIVIL RELIGION
OF ROBERT BELLAH
It is ironic that in the 1950s, a time of religious revival in the United States, historian Marty and sociologist
Herberg found American civil religion manifest as a general,
popular folk religion with little specific theological content.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, popularly characterized

as a nonreligious, "God Is Dead" era of American history,
sociologists such as Robert Bellah and Andrew Greeley began
to write of a transcendent, universal religion of the American nation.

Transcendent universal religion of the nation

is the second model of a civil religion reported by Richey
and Jones (1974:15-16) in their review of the American civil
religion literature.

Within this model, American civil reli-

gion is portrayed as a set of divinely transcendent, normative ideals by which a society is defined, integrated, and
ultimately judged.

Transcendent universal religion differs

from folk religion in two important respects.

First, tran-

scendent religion assumes a system of national ideals which
exist as social facts apart from the extent of their acceptance by the American populace at any point in time.

Folk re-

ligion, in contrast, takes the daily life behavior of the
public as its major data source.
57

Second, transcendent
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religion is seen as fulfilling all the functions attributed
to traditional religious systems.

The functions of folk re-

ligion are limited to only two of the traditional social
functions performed by religion:

the creation and legitima-

tion of cultural meaning and social integration.

Memorial

nay rituals, for example, help legitimize the war experience
as an act of national purpose and rededicate the living to
the goals of the nation.

These rituals are socially inte-

grating and identity reinforcing but are ultimately nationally self-transcendent.

Transcendent universal religion is

a civil religion capable of fulfilling the integrating and
legitimizing functions of folk religion, with the additional
function of divine prophetic guidance.
The Definition of American Civil Religion
In 1967, in an

arti~le

entitled "Civil Religion in

America," Robert Bellah introduced the concept of transcendent universal religion of the nation into the field of sociological discourse.

Bellah's model of American civil religion

flows from the Durkheimian assumption that moral facts, along
with social facts, are sui generis, and that social cohesion
rests upon common moral understandings rooted in religious
meaning structures (Bellah, 1975:ix).

Bellah's model is

based also on Parsons's (1966:10-11) theory of a religiouslybased moral order, although Bellah does not necessary accept
all of Parsons's assumptions.

Bellah asserts that American

civil religion exists as a social fact, subject to the same
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type of inquiry as other religious systems.

Bellah defines

American civil religion as an institutionalized collection
of sacred beliefs about the American nation, providing cohesion through national times of crisis (Bellah, 1974a:29).
civil religion is "that religious dimension found I think in
the life of every people, through which it interprets its
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality"
(Bellah, 1975:3).

The symbols of American civil religion

and their institutionalization in American society may be observed through systematic examination of national documents.
Specifically, Bellah examines the Declaration of Independence
and the inaugural addresses of American presidents as indicators of the beliefs and values of American civil religion.
Central to the American civil belief system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a belief in the existence

.

of God, in the American nation being·subject to God's laws
and in the divine guidance and protection of the nation
(Bellah, 1974a:26-27).

Common civil religious values were

liberty, justice, charity, personal virtue, and individual
freedom.

America was often characterized by its early citi-

zens as a new Israel, a wilderness which could be revealed
as a paradise for God's chosen people (Bellah, 1975:x-xiii).
According to Bellah (1975:153), these American beliefs, values, and symbols have a sacred dimension in that "they have
revealed what reality is and how we should act in relation
to it."
Although the symbols of American civil religion are

60
often rich in biblical imagery, they are clearly differentiated from the symbols of American denominational religion.
Bellah (1974a:29) observes that from its inception American
civil religion did not oppose and in fact shared much in
common with Christianity; yet American civil religion "was
neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian."
The differentiation of American civil religion from Christianity was not accomplished in order to placate members of
minority religions.

The differentiation occurred early in

American history because national founders such as Franklin,
washington, and Jefferson determined that there should be a
division of functions between American civil religion and
Christianity.
Under the doctrine of religious liberty, an exceptionally wide sphere of personal piety and voluntary
social action was left to the churches. But the churches
were neither to control the state or be controlled by it.
The national magistrate, whatever his private religious
views, operates under the rubrics of the civil religion
as long as he is in his official capacity .
" ( 19 7 4a:
29-30).
Bellah notes the official behavior of President John F. Kennedy as a modern illustration of the relationship between
American civil religion and the American denominations.

The

Kennedy inaugural address of January 20, 1961, was filled
with civil religious imagery but was void of any reference to
denominational religion.

Roman Catholic Kennedy reminded the

nation that the rights of man were given by God, and that the
achievement of national goals was dependent upon God's will,
but refrained from mentioning Christ, Christian churches, or
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Roman Catholicism (Bellah, 1974a:21-23).

Bellah concludes

that the separation of church and state in the United States
has not prevented the political sphere from developing a religious dimension.

It is this religious dimension of the

polity as expressed through sacred beliefs, symbols, and
rituals which Bellah distinguishes as the American civil religion (Bellah, 1974a:24).
The History of American Civil Religion
In The Broken Covenant:

American Civil Religion in

Time of Trial (1975), Bellah traces the symbolic history of
American civil religion from seventeenth century Puritanism
through the mid-1970s, stressing the unifying symbolism of
the American "covenant" conceived of as existing between God
and the citizens of the society.

The covenant symbolism of

American civil religion emerged initially in the parallel religious and political ideologies of the New England Calvinists.

The Puritan religious dialectic of personal liberation

through conversion, balanced by the moral obligation of covenant, is compared to the political process of revolution balanced by constitution (Bellah, 1975:32).

Bellah stresses the

close parallel between the religious and political dialectics
of the Revolutionary period and believes their similarity
represents more than mere formal analogy.

Both religious

conversion and political revolution are liberating processes
whose potential for anarchy require counteraction through
establishment and institutionalization.

The American
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constitution was written by men who had experienced the climates of spiritual conversion and political revolution.

The

constitution is an "external covenant" with a religious
foundation, requiring periodic revival of its moral directive
(Bellah, 1975:34).

By conceiving of the United States Con-

stitution as a type of covenant, Bellah provides an analogue
for his model of American civil religion.

The Constitution

is clearly a political document guiding the political organization of a society, yet it also is based on the religious
ideal of citizens bound to a higher moral order.

The image

of Constitution-as-covenant symbolizes the religious dimension of the American polity.
The Functions of American Civil Religion
The concept of an American covenant is strongly suggestive of the unifying function of American civil religion.
Bellah does not maintain that the potential for unity is always fulfilled.

Instead, Bellah observes that the new Ameri-

can covenant was violated at once in the genocide of the
American Indians and the institution of slavery.

It required

the revivalism of nineteenth-century evangelicalism and abolitionism, guided by the moral example of an Abraham Lincoln,
to restore the covenant.

Bellah views the twentieth century

as a "new time of trial," as the American covenant is torn
both internally and externally by two major sources of division:

racial conflict and economic instability.

Exploring

the first source of division, Bellah finds that the civil
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ideal of egalitarianism sometimes failed to unify an ethnically plural society.

From the genocide of the American

Indians, slavery, nativism, anti-Semitism, to twentiethcentury racism, the dominant majority of Americans could
sometimes see themselves as a "chosen people" engaged in a
"holy war" against a "sinful" minority group (Bellah, 1975:
101).

As Cherry (1970:308) observes, in a culturally differ-

entiated society, the values of American civil religion can
become sub-differentiated to the point at which they foster
societal division rather than cohesion.

Bellah (1975:106)

notes that, at certain periods of cultural change, a "transvaluation of roles" may be observed which "turns the despised
and oppressed into symbols of salvation and rebirth."

The

1960s romanticization of the American Indian and the intense
public reaction in the 1970s to the slavery experience dramatized in Alex Haley's Roots serve as two recent examples of
the transvaluation of minority roles.

It remains to be seen

whether such an altered image of the minority has a significant impact on the integration of that minority.
Along with their inability to unite ethnic groups in an
egalitarian structure, the values of American civil religion
have failed to prevent structural cleavage in the economic
sphere.

Bellah traces the origins of twentieth-century eco-

nomic strains to the early fusion of the Protestant Ethic
with the developing capitalist system.

Puritan Cotton Mather

ceased serving as the archetypal American to be replaced by
the utilitarian Benjamin Franklin (Bellah, 1975:71).

Bellah
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believes that American capitalism was originally concordant
with the civil religious ideal of individualism, but twentieth-century multinational corporations and interlocking
directorates render that association obsolete today.

As a

result, "there is far more tension between basic American
values and the capitalistic economic system than is usually
assumed"

(Bellah, 1975:116).

Bellah argues that the Puritan

view of work as a calling never sanctioned transforming work
and the pursuit of wealth into ends-in-themselves.

He be-

lieves that the American pursuit of material objects, fostered by advertising and central to the continuation of the
existing economic system, clashes with the spiritual values
stressed by the American national founders.

The existence

of large corporations does not embody individualism, the distribution of wealth does not exemplify egalitarianism, and
freedom to choose a nonmaterialistic life-style does not
really exist as an option available to the American masses.
Bellah concludes that the external structure of American
civil religion has been stretched to the breaking point by
the economic development of the United States.

A form of

democratic socialism based on the idealistic principles of
freedom and egalitarianism is recommended as an economic revival of the original ideals of the American covenant (Bellah,
1975:136-138).
The paradoxical potential of American civil religion
for fostering both unity and division in society is symbolized by Bellah in the concept of the "broken covenant."

The
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image of a broken covenant is itself suggestive of a dialectic.

When Bellah (1975:142) states that "today the American

civil religion is an empty and broken shell," he does not
mean that American civil religion has disappeared from American culture.

Instead, the broken covenant signifies a soci-

ety temporarily unable to be informed by its values and
temporarily unable to institutionalize these values in a
binding way.
Until we are all angels, external law and restraint
are necessary for any kind of social existence. But in
a republic an external covenant alone is never enough.
It is the nature of a republic that its citizens must
love it, not merely obey it. The external covenant must
become an internal covenant and many times in our history
that has happened.
In a series of religious and ethical
revivals, the external covenant has become filled with
meani~g and devotion.
Even though that inner meaning
and devotion has often been betrayed, genuine achievements have been left behind.
It is better that slavery
has been abolished.
It is better that women have the
vote. But the internal covenant can never be completely
captured by institutions; its life is that of the spirit
and it has its own rhythms (Bellah, 1975:142).
The dialectic of the broken covenant is also employed
in Bellah's exploration of the transcendent and self-transcendent applications of American civil religion.

Like historian

Mead, Bellah has from the very beginning stressed the prophetic function of American civil religion.

Bellah (1974b:225)

believes that at the core of American civil religion is the
belief that "the nation is not an ultimate end in itself but
stands under transcendent judgement."

American civil reli-

gion has value for American culture only to the extent that
it recognizes an ultimate reality higher than the society
itself.

Bellah's model of a transcendent civil religion is
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in marked contrast to the folk religionists' view of American
civil religion as culturally reinforcing and socially integrating affirmation of the American way of life.

Bellah

(1976b:l67) argues that
American civil religion has never been primarily an ideology intended to reinforce the authority of the state or
cast a halo over institutions. The American civil religion has been quite explicitly oriented to a level of
reality that transcends the state and institutions and
relatively to which state and institutions are viewed as
only conditionally legitimate.
Bellah contends that to conceive of American civil religion
as folk religion is to see only public theology and not the
genuine American civil religion.

Transcendent American civil

religion originated with the belief in a power higher than
the citizen and the society, and that belief has been periodically renewed at significant moments in American history.
For example, the tradition of morally-based civil disobedience, legitimized by Thoreau, found modern expression in the
civil rights movement and the opposition to the Vietnamese
war (Bellah, 1974a:40).

Bellah is particularly interested

in Abraham Lincoln as a civil religious prophet.·

Bellah

cites Lincoln's opposition to the Spanish-American War
(Bellah, 1974a:39) and Lincoln's 1857 speech attacking the
Dred Scott decision of the United States Supreme Court
(Bellah, 1976b:l68) as examples of the institutionally critical potential of American civil religion.
Bellah is aware that the transcendent dimension of
American civil religion is not always recognized by American
society.

At times the symbols of American civil religion are
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used to support a pattern-maintaining public theology or are
twisted into religious nationalism.

Religious nationalism

is the third model of American civil religion noted by
Richey and Jones (1974:16).

The direct opposite of transcend-

ent American civil religion, religious nationalism represents
a world view wherein the nation itself is personified and
adored.

Cherry distinguishes between religious nationalism

and the transcendent universal religion of Bellah and Sidney
Mead.

"Religious nationalism implies a corporate attitude

of unconditional reverence for the nation and for its intended goals."

Transcendent civil religion, in comparison, "sug-

gests a national attitude of reverence for a transcendent
sovereign authority whose designs cannot be identified as
one-to-one with the designs of the nation" (Cherry, 1971:17).
There has been little systematic examination of religious
nationalism as a specific model of American civil religion.
Marty's (1974:152) analysis of priestly self-transcendent
civil religion, embodied in the John Birch Society and some
of Richard Nixon's speeches, indicates that religious nationalism may be one manifestation of American civil religion.
Bellah is not unaware of the past and present effects of religious nationalism in the United States, such as imperialism, national isolationism, and racism.

But Bellah treats

these phenomena as examples of the broken covenant between
the nation and its transcendent authority.

Religious nation-

alism emerges when a society fails to remain informed by
civil religion's prophetic message.

Religious nationalism
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is transcendent universal religion turned idolatrous.

In

Bellah's view, the transcendent and idolatrous applications
of American civil religion are not separate forms of civil
faith but good and evil sides of the same phenomenon.

The

variables which Bellah highlights as intervening in American
society to foster the ideology of religious nationalism include the rise of science, the market economy, and industrial
capitalism, which work together to facilitate self-transcendent interpretations of civil religion (Bellah, 1975:xiii).
Bellah's symbol of the broken covenant illustrates that
an overarching, meaning-endowing, prophetic American civil
religion can be forgotten by a society and its leaders, leaving a nation floundering in internal division, meaninglessness, and self-transcendence.

Each of Bellah's major works

on American civil religion has stressed the need for the renewal and reinstitutionalization of the original values of
American civil religion.

"Civil Religion in America"

(1967)

concludes with a prophetic call for the application of the
underlying ethical principles of American civil religion to
current national problems.

In The Broken Covenant (1975:151),

Bellah continues the prophetic warning:

"We must reaffirm

the outward or external covenant that includes the civil religion in its most classical form."

Bellah looks to religious

revival as the most promising vehicle for the renewal and reinstitutionalization of American civil religion.

Bellah

(1974b) postulates that American society may turn in the
ideological direction of humanistic religious revolution
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characterized by religious pluralism and heralded by some of
the new religious movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Among

the new religious organizations which are most likely to
facilitate a renewal of American civil religion are millennial movements presenting ethical criticisms of modern American society and possessing democratic structures.

The

necessity for the latter attribute, a democratic structure,
limits the field; for as Bellah (1975:160) observes, "the
more egalitarian the group, the more ephemeral it is."

Some

of the most successful religious movements to emerge in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, such as The Unification Church of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon and the Children
of God, are authoritarian in structure and unlikely to ernbody the traditional civil values of individualism and egalitarianism.

Regardless of the source, Bellah believes that

the religious renewal of the values of American civil religion is essential for the future of American society.
Bellah's own belief in the potential of American civil religion to guide American society is not, however, sufficient
to make him optimistic about American civil religion's restoration.

Despite his own faith, Bellah (1974b:272) objectively

concludes that "the crisis in the civil religion is deepening
more rapidly than I had expected."
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Bellah's Typology of American Civil Religion:
General and Special Civil Religion
Bellah is able to discern numerous dimensions and manifestations of American civil religion.

Bellah (1975:142)

writes of American civil religion manifest as an internal
covenant and as an external covenant.

This distinction re-

fers to the moral ideals of American civil religion as compared to their external institutionalization in society.

Both

manifestations are considered by Bellah to be social facts
subject to sociological investigation.

Bellah (1976a:l67)

also writes of the American civil religion as compared to
public theology.

Here Bellah compares the original transcend-

ent ideals of American civil religion to their self-transcendent application by different groups at various times in
history.

In addition to these varying forms of American

civil religion Bellah isolates two additional manifestations:
general civil religion and special civil religion.
General civil religion, based on universal values, is
the type of civil religion considered for many centuries to
be a necessary prerequisite for political and social order.
General civil religion provides the type of religious discipline necessary as the basis for the responsible, moral citizenship that leads to an integrated society.

Bellah finds

the idea of general civil religion evident in the writings
of various American leaders.
Roger Williams, for example, for all his insistence on
the separation of church and state, believed that such
general religion was essential for what he called "government and order in families, towns, etc." .
. Elsewhere
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Franklin emphasized the importance of general religion
when he wrote, "If men are -so wicked as we now see them
with religion, what would they be without it?"--which in
turn foreshadows Eisenhower's famous remark, "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt
religious faith--and I don't care what it is" (Bellah,
1976a:l56).
Tocqueville's concept of republican religion is a comprehensive classical analysis of general civil religion.

Republi-

can religion is the moral law which affects political life
through its influence on customs and daily life (Tocqueville,
Vol. I, 1966:304).

Through republican religion's general-

ized synthesis of democratic values and belief in a supreme
being, a foundation of good citizenship and social cohesion
is built.
In the United States a special form of civil religion
developed which is congruent with, but partially differentiated from, the general values of the culture.

In the case

of the United States, special civil religion came to be
based particularly upon the specific democratic values derived from the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary tradition (Bellah, l976a:l56).

Special civil

religion is American civil religion as it has been documented
by Bellah's systematic examination of national documents.
For example, the general belief in democratic values exemplifies general civil religion, while the derivation of these
beliefs from the American Constitution illustrates special
civil religion.

Special civil religion is also evidenced in

the belief in America as a "new Israel"

(Bellah, 1976b:l67).

Bellah (l976a:l56) notes the partial overlapping of general
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and special civil religion in American society, and observes
that most religious groups in the United States have been
able to affirm aspects of both general and special civil religion.

Figure 2 illustrates the central attributes of gen-

eral and special civil religion, presented here as varying
along the Parsonian continuum of value generalization, which
Parsons (1966:23) classifies as a process of modernization.
Bellah's typology of general and special civil religion is
more descriptive than predictive.

Bellah suggests that forms

of civil religion may vary in generality, ranging from the
universal general civil religion to the particular special
civil religion, but fails to specify the conditions under
which special civil religion develops as a religious form
which is partially differentiated from general civil religion.

Bellah's typology of civil religion remains a cate-

gorical tool most useful for describing different levels of
value generalization observable in civil religious symbol
systems.
Conclusion
Bellah is the first to develop a sociological model of
a transcendent American civil religion.

According to John F.

Wilson (1974:127-129), Bellah's model specifically refers to
several distinct dimensions and functions of American civil
religion neglected by previous models.

According to Wilson,

the most central dimension of Bellah's model is ideological.
The ideological dimension of American civil religion is that

73

VALUE GENERALIZATION
Universalism
I. General Civil Religion
Provides general moral
basis for citizenship

Fig. 2.

Particularism
II. Special Civil Religion
Provides specific
national symbols of
divine transcendence

Generality of Civil Religious Values

(Bellah, 1976a)
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of a nation living out God's will on earth.

Through use of

the motif of a new Israel Americans are able to locate their
role in history and legitimize national actions as God's will.
The ideological dimension of American civil religion points
to its prophetic function, as God is seen as the higher authority governing and judging the society.

A second dimen-

sion of Bellah's model refers to the civil religious figures
who have been major prophets or priests of American civil religion.

George Washington and Abraham Lincoln are obvious

leaders, and modern prophets such as John Kennedy and Martin
Luther King, Jr. are also important.

Even self-transcendent

figures such as Richard Nixon have made contributions to the
history of American civil religiop.

A third dimension of

Bellah's model is the specific historical events and the
places· associated with them which have become sacred to the
American people.

Gettysburg, Washington, D.C., and the

Alamo are sacred places representing sacred history to many
Americans.

The recollection of these historical events func-

tions both to define the society's role in history and to
unify its citizens.

A final dimension in Bellah's model of

American civil religion is the ceremonial dimension.

Bellah,

like Warner and Cherry, focuses upon the ritual expression
of civil religion as indicators of its ideology.

The cere-

monies of a presidential inaugural, Memorial Day, or the
Fourth of July provide opportunities to observe ceremonial
civil religious behavior.
Wilson (1974:129)

concludes that Bellah's model of
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American civil religion is superior to Warner's folk religion model, although both include some of the same dimensions
and sources of data.

Bellah's model succeeds where Warner's

fails in pointing out specific types of symbolic behavior
and belief which refer to the religious dimension of the
American polity.

Unlike Warner and Herberg, who tend to

view all cultural symbolism as civil religious, Bellah differentiates civil religious from other types of cultural
symbolism.

Wilson observes that Bellah's differentiation of

civil religious phenomena makes his model more productive
than Warner's for generating empirical research.

Bellah's

model of American civil religion also contains an additional
element missing from the folk religion model:

theology.

The central, theological dimension of Bellah's American civil
religion refers to a transcendent God.

In contrast to the

theologically contentless folk religion of Marty, Warner,
and Herberg, Bellah stresses the transcendent and universal
features of American civil religion which could make it, in
Bellah's words, "simply one part of a new civil religion of
the world"

(quoted in Richey and Jones, 1974:16).

Of all of

the elements of Bellah's model of American civil religion,
it is its theological dimension which has generated the
greatest amount of subsequent controversy.

CHAPTER VI
THE RESPONSE TO BELLAH
The reaction to Bellah's sociological model of a transcendent universal American civil religion was considerable.
several books (e.g., Cherry, 1971; Novak, 1974; Richey and
Jones, 1974) and numerous articles (e.g., Cherry, 1970; Coleman, 1970; Fenn, 1972, 1974, 1976; Greeley, 1972: Chap. 7;
Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978; Neuhaus, 1970; Stauffer, 1973;
Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Wimberly, 1976) appeared in direct
response to Bellah's model.

Contemporary social scientists

were not responding simply to the concept of American civil
religion.

Historical models (e.g.,

To~queville,

Hudson, Marty,

and Mead) have been well-known but have stimulated little
sociological attention.

The folk religion models o£ Warner

and Herberg have become sociological classics but generated
only sporadic sociological inquiry in the 1970s (e.g.,
Cherry, 1970; Greeley, 1972).

Bellah renewed intellectual

inquiry into American civil religion by seriously postulating the existence of a transcendent universal American
civil religion which, in its impact on American culture,
went far beyond ceremonial occasions.

Bellah also sug-

gested a systematic method for the study of American civil
religion through the examination of national documents.
Bellah's model and his methods stimulated two types of
76
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response:
by Cherry

theoretical and empirical.

Theoretical statements

(1970; 1971), Fenn (1970; 1972; 1974; 1976),

Greeley (1972), and Stauffer (1973) serve as representative
of the most significant theoretical evaluations of Bellah's
model of American civil religion.

Relevant empirical tests

of Bellah's model include published studies by Jolicoeur and
Knowles (1978), Thomas and Flippen (1972), and Wimberly
(1976).
Theoretical Response
Richard Fenn
Bellah's most outspoken critic has been Richard Fenn
(1972; 1974; 1976).

Fenn is skeptical of Bellah's entire

American civil religion model, but the heart of Fenn's critique is based on

hi~

disagreement with Bellah's basic

assumptions concerning the function of religion in contemporary American society.

At the center of the controversy be-

tween Bellah and Fenn are questions concerning the existence
of the United States as a society and the ability of religion to provide a basis for social integration.

Both Bellah

and Fenn ask the following questions, but arrive at different
conclusions:

(1) Does American society exist as an ideolog-

ical whole? (2) Can religion provide moral integration for
modern society? (3) Does American civil religion exist as a
social fact of contemporary life? (4) Can civil religion provide a basis for twentieth-century ideological renewal? and
(5)

Is it a proper role for the scientific observer to call
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for a reaffirmation of civil faith in a morally torn society?
Bellah's model is based on an affirmative response to all
five questions, while Penn's critique is based on a negative
response.
Penn doubts Bellah's basic premise that American civil
religion exists as a social fact institutionalized in the
American social structure.

Penn's doubts about the institu-

tionalization of American civil religion are based on his
general analysis of American society.

A summary of Penn's

(1970) critical response to Parsons's (1966:10-11) model of
a religiously based moral order can be seen as a preview of
Penn's subsequent position on the inviability of contemporary American civil religion.

Penn assumes that modern Amer-

ican society is involved in the process of secularization,
characterized by differentiation within cultural and social
systems as well as between these system levels.

Religious

pluralism is one by-product of this differentiation.

To the

extent that plural systems are internalized by personality
systems, they become bases for different religious affiliations and thus sources of ideological conflict rather than
sources of cohesion.

For example, the differentiation of

the social from the personality system leads to a situation
in which the individual's choice of ultimate meaning systems
is not tied to his social role performances.

An American

could succeed or fail in his economic role regardless of his
choice to be Presbyterian or agnostic.

Under a system of

structural pluralism, it is left up to the individual to
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attempt to integrate private religious choices with the normative system of society (Fenn, 1970:133-135).

Fenn (1970:

118) observes that "secularization implies the increasing
autonomy of both personality systems and role patterns from
the prescriptions of the normative order," with the result
that the normative order must fail to persist.

Fenn asserts

that the only remaining functions of religion in modern society are (1) providing expressive functions for groups and
individuals,

(2) defining ethnic or traditional boundaries

between groups, and (3)

legitimating demands of local groups

for control over institutions such as education.

Religion

continues to provide integration only for societies which
have difficulty training and motivating a labor force (Fenn,
1972:17).

Fenn believes that the sources for the new, non-

religious legitimacy in advanced societies are legal, political, and economic, based on the society's capacities to
meet popular demands for political participation and a high
consumption level (Fenn, 1972:17).
Fenn sees no overarching religious tradition in the
United States capable of binding moral force.

Fenn's posi-

tion on the deterioration of the religious basis of the normative order has direct implications for the study of American
civil religion.

Fenn (1976:165) acquiesces to the possibility

that American civil religion could have provided an overarching value system in the nineteenth century but argues that
American civil religious symbolism fails to bind cultural,
societal, and personal spheres of action in contemporary
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America.

Fenn does not deny that American civil religion

once developed.

He suggests instead that American civil re-

ligion developed early in the nation's history (under conditions which he does not specify) and then failed to persist
under the contemporary conditions of differentiation at all
system levels.
Fenn (1976) has developed a typology of American civil
religion in response to Bellah's typology (see part II, chapter 2:57-59) which illustrates his differentiation thesis.
Penn's two categories of American civil religion are produced by differentiation within religious culture.

Fenn

(1976:162) proposes that structural differentiation within
modern society will increase the degree of separation between
forms of religious culture.

This phenomenon is illustrated

by the emergence of two types of American civil religion,
societal and personal civil religion.

Societal civil reli-

gion combines national and biblical symbols and provides the
motivational base of corporate actors within the social system.

Personal civil religion expresses ethical piety and

assists the identity development of individual persons (Fenn,
1976:162).

Figure 3 summarizes Penn's typology.

Fenn (1976:

162) sees societal civil religion as comparable to Bellah's
special civil religion, while personal civil religion is analogous to Bellah's general civil religion.
chapter 5.)

(See figure 2,

Fenn argues that the differentiation of forms of

American civil religion at the societal and individual levels
is evidence that there is no overarching form of American
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DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN RELIGIOUS CULTURE
Personality
system
I. Personal Civil Religion

Social
System
II. Societal Civil Religion

A. Provides for timeless identity

A. Provides sociohistorical identity

B. Motivates individual identity development

B. Motivates corporate
actors

Fig. 3.

Personal and Societal Civil Religion

(Fenn, 1976)
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civil religion which can bind the individual to society.

In

Fenn's view, American religious culture currently possesses
no macro-level function, although values are manifestly important to the individual personality.

"The relevance of

personal identity or ultimate ends to any complex, large
scale organization is extremely tenuous''

(Fenn, 1976:165).

Applying this analysis to the religious dimension of the polity, Fenn concludes that societal civil religion (Bellah's
special civil religion) has lost its function for contemporary society.
An evaluation of Penn's versus Bellah's typology is
made difficult by the fact that Penn's categories of societal
and personal civil religion are based on structural differentiation, while Bellah's types of special and general civil
religion vary along a continuum of value generalization.
Value generalization and structural differentiation are complementary, but not identical, processes,
27).

(Parsons, 1971:26-

Penn's conclusion that societal civil religion is ex-

actly what Bellah means by special civil religion is open to
question.

Figure 4 presents the two typologies as if they

were structurally parallel, as Fenn concludes.

According to

figure 4, Bellah's special civil religion becomes progressively weakened in its ability to unite citizens with differing personal value systems.

However, it is possible to agree

with Penn's differentiation thesis without accepting the
assumption that special civil religion has lost its unifying
potential.

Figure 5 accounts for the possibility that
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DIFFERENTIATION
Personality
System

Social
System

I. General Civil Religion
(Bellah)

II. Special Civil Religion
(Bellah)

I. Personal Civil Religion
(Fenn)

II. Societal Civil Religion
(Fenn)

Fig. 4.

Bellah's versus Penn's Typology of Civil Religion:
Parallel Perspective
(Fenn, 1976)

VALUE
GENERALIZATION

DIFFERENTIATION
Social
System
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System
Universalism
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General Civil Religion (Bellah)

A.

II.

Personal Civil
Relig1on (Fenn)

B.
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Special Civil Religion (Bellah)

A.

Personal Civil
R~!1g1on (Fenn)

I

B.

Societal Civil
g~ligion (Fenn)

Particularism

Fig. 5.

Bellah's versus Fenn's Typology of Civil Religion:
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elements of both general and special civil religion could be
present at the societal level.

Although societal and person-

al types of civil religion may be differentiated, as Penn observes, both types may be subsumed under Bellah's category of
special civil religion.

Neither Bellah nor Penn currently

takes the synthetic perspective suggested by figure 5, although this perspective is as logically possible as either
of the independent typologies.

Until there is further sys-

tematic development of both typologies and further specification of the factors assumed to produce typological variation,
neither Bellah's nor Penn's typology of American civil religion is likely to generate productive empirical research.
Penn and Bellah differ on more than their models of
American civil religion or on their general theories of religion.

Moral cleavage accompanies their intellectual debate.

Penn operates within the traditional, scientific role of
ethical neutrality by dispassionately observing the increasing irrelevance of societal values to individual purpose.
If there is a contemporary crisis of faith and morality,
Penn serves as its detailed observer and analyst.

Penn's

philosophical stance concerning American civil religion is
expressed at the conclusion of a recent clarification of his
theory.
If the separation of the symbols and institutions
relevant to national authority from those relevant to
the individual's search for identity which will survive
the threat of death has antinomian implications, it will
not be for the first time in Western religious history
(Penn, 1976:166).

86

Fenn views Bellah as a sociologist stepping unwarrantedly into a prophetic role.

Bellah's own commitment to the values

of American civil religion makes the validity of his scientific view problematic for Penn.

In Penn's (1976:160) eval-

uation, Bellah's model of American civil religion represents
"the new orthodoxy ...

Bellah (1976a:l57), in turn, affirms

his ethical neutrality by arguing that if the particular
values of American civil religion can be historically and
socially documented, their weakening may also be observed.
A prophetic call for the renewal of American civil religion
is therefore justified for the preservation of a society's
identity.

The moral cleavage between Bellah and Fenn is

most deeply expressed in Bellah's rebuke of the scientist
who would examine a disease but avoid exploring its cure.
The philosophical distance between Bellah and Fenn is so
great that recent theoretical exchange between the two sociologists (Bellah, 1976a, 1967b; Penn, 1976) has been tainted
by personal bitterness that impedes productive discourse.
Andrew Greeley
Greeley devotes a chapter of The Denominational Society
(1972:156-174) to

11

The Civil Religion...

Unlike Fenn, Greeley

has no problem conceiving of an overarching normative order
in American society.

11

The sociologist, accustomed as he is

from reading Durkheim and Weber to expect religion in society, is not terribly surprised by these sacral underpinnings
of the American consensus ..

(Greeley, 1972:157).

After
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reviewing the folk religion models of Eckhardt (1958) , Herberg (1960), and Marty (1959), Greeley concludes that there
is more to the American normative consensus than a watereddown system of religion in general.

Folk religion is only

one observable manifestation of American civil religion.
The other manifestation is the noble, prophetic elite form
of American civil religion.

Greeley's concept of elite

civil religion corresponds to Bellah's model of transcendent,
universal American civil religion (Greeley, 1972:167-173).
Greeley agrees with Bellah's location of the symbols of American civil religion in national documents and civic celebrations.

Greeley·also agrees that the symbols of American

civil religion reveal that the American nation has a religious dimension represented, in part, by the celebration of
sacred places and sacred days.

Like Bellah, Greeley finds

no contradiction in the possibility that folk and elite forms
of American civil religion could exist alongside of one another in the same society.
It is easy to be cynical about America's civil religion, as we have noted before, but then it is easy to
be cynical about the principles of any religion because
the most noble of religious ideals are anything but universally honored in practice, no matter what the religion
be or what the society in which the religion operates.
Folk religion, the religion of comfort and reassurance,
the religion of self-righteousness, are not new in the
world. Neither is turning religion into a justification
for pursuing the selfish goals of the community, but the
difference between the theory and the practice should
not cause the observer to lose his respect for the theory
and for its power to be a norm against which the failures
can be evaluated (Greeley, 1972:173).
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Greeley's response to Bellah is an affirmation of the transcendent, universal model of American civil religion.

Both

Bellah and Greeley agree that the consensual basis of American society has a sacred dimension.

Both recognize the le-

gitimating, integrating, and prophetic potential of American
civil religion in its elite form, but recognize also that
the values of American civil religion can be practiced in
self-legitimating and self-worshiping forms.
Conrad Cherry
Cherry (1970; 1971) has been inspired by Warner's
method of symbolic analysis of American sacred ceremonies to
accumulate data supportive of Bellah's model of transcendent
universal American civil religion.

Through his analysis of

American cults of the dead such as the funeral ceremonies of
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Robert Kennedy, Cherry concludes that American civil religion performs legitimating
and integrating functions for American society.

Cherry, like

Bellah, finds that the American covenant is sometimes broken,
or weakened, in its integrative ability in modern society.
Early in the nation's history, the funeral services of Jefferson and Adams were able to overarch national divisions to
unify a young nation.

By 1968, American society was suffi-

ciently differentiated that Robert Kennedy's funeral failed
to bind certain groups who saw Kennedy's death as evidence of
the failure of national values.

According to Cherry, the di-

visive potential of American civil religion is not new in
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American history.

Cherry (1970:309) finds that Confederate

war propaganda used during the Civil War "relied heavily on
the time-tested motifs of the national faith" and is a clear
example of the "capacity of the same theme both to unify and
divide the nation."

Despite his observation of the sometimes

divisive effects of American civil religion, Cherry would not
agree with Fenn that American civil religion entirely lacks
integrative potential.

Although modern American civil reli-

gion is differentiated along regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines, it is a discernible "national religious
point of view."

Cherry concludes that "the myths, symbols,

and sources of revelation of civil religion are sufficiently
continuous and uniform to constitute an isolable religion
that has operated vigorously in the American public sphere"
(Cherry, 1970:310).

American civil religion need not be a

monolithic entity to remain more integrative than divisive
for the majority of citizens.
Another aspect of American civil religion observed by
Cherry is its dual relationship to American values and goals.
American civil religion has "offered both uncritical religious
sanction and prophetic criticism of the culture"
1970:313).

(Cherry,

American sacred ceremonies, such as Memorial Day

rituals, are often culturally reinforcing rites of folk religion.

But Cherry believes that the observers of American

civil religion have been too ready to identify this religion
with the banal celebration of the American way of life.
the national faith has issued in 'cookie prayers' in the

"If
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public schools, it has also been expressed in solemn occasions when American citizens dedicate themselves to high
human ideals"

(Cherry, 1970:304).

Some American sacred cere-

monies are notable for their prophetic messages.

For exam-

ple, Lincoln's second inaugural address attributed the Civil
war to the wrath of God descending on the American people.
Archbishop Cooke's eulogy for Robert Kennedy noted the discrepancy between the American civil value of freedom and its
unequal distribution in American life.

These and other Amer-

ican ceremonies serve as indicators "that the civil religion
need not be insensitive to the limitations and shortcomings
of the nation, that religious expressions of national ideals
need not be uncritical ones"

(Cherry, 1970:314).

Cherry, like Bellah and Greeley, has no difficulty conceiving of an American civil religion which is both integrative and divisive, legitimating, and prophetic.

Cherry (1970:

314) points out that this dual relation of American civil religion to American culture is typical of most forms of religion.

As Peter Berger (1967:97-100) observes, religion in

Western history has been both a "world-maintaining" and
"world-shaking" force.

It would be reasonable to assume

that American civil religion would also perform both functions.

The folk religion model, which focuses only upon

world maintenance, is limited in its perspective.

Bellah's

model provides for both world-maintaining and world-shaking
manifestations of American civil religion, and is therefore
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more congruent with the observed relation of religious forms
to their cultural contexts.
Empirical Response
Thomas and Flippen
Only a few empirical studies have specifically investigated transcendent civil religion in America.
Flippen's

Thomas and

(1972) content analysis of the editorials of a na-

tional sample of newspapers published during the "Honor America" weekend, July 4, 1970, is one of the earliest empirical
responses to Bellah's model of transcendent universal American civil religion.

Thomas and Flippen attempted to deter-

mine the existence of an independent American civil religion
which could "provide a transcendent goal and

me~ning

system

for the political process, and to motivate the achievement of
national, political goals"

(Thomas and Flippen, 1972:219).

The purpose of the study was a specific test of Bellah's thesis of a universal transcendent civil religion in American
society.

The coding instrument, intended to distinguish be-

tween civil religion items and their secular equivalents, relied on the mention of God as the main criterion of civil
religiosity.

For example, "God has blessed America" would

be coded as a civil religion item; "America has been blessed,"
as a secular item (Thomas and Flippen, 1972:221).

Analysis

of data indicated that a fairly large number of secular civil
themes were found in the Honor America editorials, but few of
the themes specifically referred to a deity.

Thomas and
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Flippen conclude that, although many of the values Bellah
attributes to American civil religion are significant values
of American culture, these values are not commonly attributed to divine origin.

Therefore, "a well-defined thesis of

civil religion may be more the creation (and fantasy) of the
liberal political intellectual elite than active faith among
the masses"

(Thomas and Flippen, 1972:224).

An alternative interpretation of Thomas and Flippen's
findings is suggested by an evaluation of their measurement
instrument.

Many sociologists of religion would not agree

that the defining criterion of religiosity is a belief in a
supreme being.

Presence or absence of a "sense'' of ultimate

meaning is a more commonly accepted contemporary criterion
of religiosity (e.g., Bellah, 1964; Yinger, 1963; Stauffer,
1973) , although this criterion is difficult to operationalize.

Thomas and Flippen's reliance on the mention of God to

separate civil religion items from secular items may have unfairly limited the number of items that could be considered
religious.

Even if it were agreed that a test of Bellah's

particular model of transcendent universal American civil religion would require some notion of a transcendent being, it

is not evident that the reference to God must be explicit.
It is not clear that the editorialist who wrote "America has
been blessed" did not assume or wish to imply that it was
God who did the blessing.

Unfortunately, there is no way to

measure items which reflect cultural values which may be so
generally associated with supernatural origins that the need
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to state the origins explicitly may be considered unnecessary.
Despite the difficulties in developing an accurate measure
ment of civil religious symbols, Thomas and Flippen's data
actually show that secular civil themes were commonly expressed, but the transcendent nature of these themes could
not be demonstrated.
Jolicoeur and Knowles
Another content analysis, conducted by Jolicoeur and
Knowles (1978), found evidence of a civil religion of transcendent values among Masonic fraternal orders.

Data were

collected from issues of The New Age, a national Masonic
journal, from 1964 to 1974.

Jolicoeur and Knowles used a

coding guide for civil religion items which was more general
than that used by Thomas and Flippen (1972) and which included fewer items.

One item, the mention of "founding fa-

thers: is coded as a civil religion item by Jolicoeur and
Knowles (1978:11)

although Thomas and Flippen (1972:221)

coded the same item as secular.

This lack of agreement be-

tween the coding forms used in the two studies hinders the
accumulation of a body of comparative data concerning American civil religion.

Based on their own coding scheme, Joli-

coeur and Knowles found support for Bellah's model of transcendent American civil religion in The New Age.

Unlike the

editorials reviewed by Thomas and Flippen, nearly half (46.5
percent) of The New Age issues mentioned "God.

11

Belief in

God was frequently cited in the context of references to the
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united States, United States history, and national goals.
In the Masonic journal, "belief in God is also viewed as the
foundation of American success and strength"
Knowles, 1978:12).

(Jolicoeur and

It is interesting that Jolicoeur and

Knowles discovered symbols of a transcendent American civil
religion, not among the "liberal intellectual elite" expected
by Thomas and Flippen, but among a traditional conservative
segment of the American public, Masonic lodge members.

Un-

fortunately, due to the differences between the measurement
instruments used by Jolicoeur and Knowles and by Thomas and
Flippe~

it is not possible to compare the conclusions of the

two content analyses in a meaningful way.
Ronald C. Wimberly
Two studies conducted by Ronald

c.

Wimberly (Wimberly

et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976) were designed to provide an
empirical test of Bellah's model of transcendent universal
American civil religion.
vidual belief systems.

Both studies were surveys of indiCivil religious belief measurement

items were designed to measure the transcendent aspects of
American civil religion cited in Bellah's (1967) work (see
Appendix).

The majority of civil religion items mentioned a

transcendent God, as in the item "We should respect the president's authority since his authority is from God."

The few

items which did not mention a supreme being linked Christianity to the political system, as in "Good Christians aren't
necessarily good patriots"

(Wimberly et al., 1976:893).

The
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civil religion measurement items, combined with items measuring denominational religious belief, were administered first
to a small sample (115) of orthodox Protestants.

Factor

analysis of the survey data revealed the presence of a separate civil religious dimension which was clearly differentiated from indicators of denominational religion.

In the

first order factoring, civil religion items clustered together more distinctly than the denominational religion
items.

Second-ordering factoring confirmed that, although

the civil religious dimension was positively related to aspects of denominational belief and behavior, civil religion
remained a distinct dimension clearly separable from denominational religion.
A second survey (Wimberly, 1976) used measurement items
drawn predominantly from the earlier study, supplemented
with additional items measuring degrees of political commitment.

Data were gathered from a heterogeneous sample of 574

persons which included subsamples of church attenders and
persons with political interests.

Factor and cluster analy-

sis of the data indicated that first order factorings and
clusterings showed a discrimination between civil religion
indicators and indicators of both denominational religion
and political dimensions.

Higher order analyses found the

civil religion dimension loading near two of the denominational religion indicators (belief and behavior) and close
to one political commitment indicator (belief).

Wimberly

interprets these findings as a confirmation of a distinct
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civil religious belief system which may prove to be an "intervening link" between denominational belief and political
commitment (Wimberly, 1976:350).

Due to the transcendent

content of the civil religion indicators, Wimberly is convinced that he has made a valid measurement of the transcendent civil religion of Bellah's model, and not of public
theology.

The fact that Wimberly's civil religion items

factored together, clustered tightly, and had fairly high
communalities indicates reliability of the instrument as a
whole.

Wimberly (1976:349-350) concludes that his research

''extends support for the civil religion hypothesis" of
Bellah and advances civil religion to "the status of a
social scientific concept."

The remaining empirical task is

the determination of the function of American civil religion
in American society.
Conclusion
The response to Bellah has been immediate and mixed.
On the theoretical front Richard Penn emerges as Bellah's
most adamant and sophisticated antagonist.

Penn doubts the

very existence of American civil religion and is particularly
skeptical of Bellah's transcendent model of American civil
religion.

In contrast, both Greeley and Cherry are comfort-

able with the idea of an overarching belief system for society and find Bellah's model of transcendent universal civil
religion to be a productive analysis of civil religion in
its elite form.

The theoretical state of American civil
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religion within contemporary sociology has become a proBellah versus anti-Bellah debate which is far from being
over.

Other voices in the next round of the debate will be

heard in the following chapter as the issue of theoretical
clarification of American civil religion is addressed more
specifically.
The empirical response to Bellah's model is still in
its infancy.

Studies which attempt to determine if American

civil religion exists are hampered by the absence of a clear
definition of American civil religion which is universally
accepted in the social sciences.

It has been particularly

difficult to develop a criterion for the measurement of the
transcendent aspect of American civil religion.

It remains

unclear whether including mention of God in an item is sufficient to insure indication of transcendent belief, or omission of God proves secularity.

Each of the studies reviewed

relied on a different civil religion measurement instrument,
making comparison of results extremely difficult.

Wimberly's

instrument was subject to the most sophisticated examination
and appears to be the most promising instrument for future
individual belief research on American civil religion.
Wimberly's research, which directly challenges Penn's assumption that a civil religious dimension does not exist, could
become the foundation upon which an adequate body of empirical data could begin to be built.

But it is evident that

some of the methodological problems of American civil religion measurement are embedded in the current chaos of
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American civil religion theory.

Until a logical, coherent

model of American civil religion can be systematized in the
form of testable propositions, American civil religion is
likely to remain elusive to empirical investigators.

CHAPTER VII
THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The analysis of differing traditions of American civil
religion research and differing theoretical models of American civil religion illustrates the contemporary need for conceptual clarification.

There are gaps in the body of

knowledge concerning American civil religion, varying definitions of American civil religion leading to conceptual debate
among major theorists, and difficulties generating precise
measurement instruments.
traced to the

coex~stence

civil religion:

Much of the confusion can be
of the five models of American

folk religion, democratic faith, religious

nationalism, Protestant civic piety, and transcendent universal religion of the nation (Richey and Jones, 1974).

The

five models have different emphases, but are also interconnected at various points.

As Richey and Jones (1974:18)

observe, "the very diversity of conceptualization represented
in this fivefold typology illustrates both the complexity of
the issue and the pioneer character of the study and debate."
In order to simplify the complexity and move American civil
religion research out of its pioneering stage, selection of
the most productive model or synthesis of models is in order.
Because the transcendent universal model of Robert Bellah is
the most comprehensive and has been the most empirically
99
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productive of the five models, it will serve as the basic
model from which definitions and assumptions concerning American civil religion will be derived.
The transcendent universal American civil religion of
Bellah (1967; 1975) is the most comprehensive of the five
models, due to the fact that it includes the other four
models as possible manifestations of the basic model or as
departures from it.

Bellah (1975), who placed the origins of

American civil religion within the American Puritan tradition,
includes the Protestant civic piety model as· typical of early
American civil religion.

Bellah would argue, however, that

Protestant values have to be universalized and generalized to
integrate diverse groups into the American tradition.

The

1961 inaugural speech of Catholic President John F. Kennedy
illustrates the success of this generalization of values
(Bellah, 1974a:21-23).

The transcendent universal model also

contains the options for the expression of folk religion and
religious nationalism.

Through the image of the ubroken cov-

enant," Bellah (1975) symbolizes the idolatrous application
of American civil values to public theology and national selfworship.

Bellah does not directly address the democratic

faith model of personal value construction, but Bellah himself exemplifies individual .adherence to a humanistic (and in
Bellah's case, theological) belief system shaped by the values
of American civil religion.

The transcendent universal model

of American civil religion advanced by Bellah is the most
inclusive of the five models because, by describing American
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civil religion in its ideal, normative form, all civil religious behavior directed toward or away from the ideal can be
measured and included for analysis.
Examination of various models of American civil religion presented in the literature led John F. Wilson (1974)
to evaluate the utility of each model for furthering research.
Wilson concluded that the model of American civil religion
developed by Bellah (1967) is the most productive, making
"visible, and even intelligible, ranges of phenomena in American history . . . " (Wilson, 1974:130).

The productivity of

the model is based on its specificity in distinguishing the
religious aspects of American symbolism and its inclusion of
empirically productive sources of data such as the pronouncements of civil religious figures like Lincoln, religious
events endowing ·symbolic meaning to civil faith, places
associated with civil religious events, and ceremonial rituals.

Although Wilson's own use of these data sources failed

to find sufficient evidence to support Bellah's transcendent
hypothesis, Wilson believes that the negative findings in no
way negate the testability of the model.

As has been previ-

ously noted, the transcendent universal model of American
civil religion has stimulated more recent sociological empirical studies (e.g., Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978; Thomas and
Flippen, 1972; Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976) than
have alternative models.
One of the limitations of Bellah's transcendent universal model of American civil religion has been the absence of
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a precise definition of American civil religion which distinguishes American civil religion from other religious
forms and from civil society.

Bellah originally defines

American civil religion as an "institutionalized collection
of sacred beliefs providing cohesion through national times
of trial."

The sacred beliefs of American civil religion

are to be found and delineated through examination of national documents (Bellah, 1974a).

John A. Coleman (1970), work-

ing with the transcendent universal model, has derived a
more specific definition of American civil religion.

Cole-

man suggests that a definition of civil religion should be a
logical outgrowth of a definition of religion.

Since there

is almost as little sociological consensus concerning the
definition of religion as the definition of civil religion,
Coleman follows Bellah's (1965:171)

defin~tion

of religion as

"a set of symbolic acts which relate man to the ultimate
conditions of his existence"

(Coleman, 1970:68).

Religion is

further defined as providing sources of social and personal
identity by assisting individuals in dealing with questions of
ultimate meaning and by suggesting a value system to guide
self-concept formation and role performance.

Coleman ob-

serves that it is not necessary for religion explicitly to
relate the individual to his nation or citizen role.

Univer-

salistic religions, for example, attempt to transcend the
limitations of national identification.

However, there are

often pressures, both from religious systems and political
systems,to extend religious symbolism to the citizen role.
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Religious organizations may require social support for their
continuance.

Political systems may need religious legitimacy

for the support of national values and social control mechanisms.

Thus, a need for a civil religious system which

relates the citizen's role and the society to issues of ultimate concern may develop.

Bellah (1967:173) suggested that

the need for a civil religious symbol system was most likely
to be demonstrated "at a moment of great social crisis
or at a time of momentous political transition."

This role

of civil religion would be analogous to the traditional role
of religion in providing symbols of identity and ultimate
meaning at critical moments of the individual life cycle,
such as birth and death.
Using Bellah's general definition of religion and its
functions, and applying these to cases in which religious
symbols are extended to the society and the citizen's role,
Coleman develops the most precise definition of civil religion to emerge from the literature.
Civil religion is a special case of the religious
symbol system, designed to perform a differentiated function which is the unique province of neither church nor
state.
It is a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man as citizen and his society in world history to
the ultimate conditions of his existence. Civil religion, however, is not always or usually clearly differentiated from the church or the state (Coleman, 1970:69).
Coleman's definition of civil religion has been condensed and
slightly reworded to form a basic definition of American civil
religion, stated in the form of the following sociological
proposition:
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Proposition I:
American civil religion is the religious symbol system
which relates the citizen's role and American society's
place in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate existence and meaning.
Coleman's definition, stated in Proposition I, is a
logical outgrowth of Bellah's sociology of religion and
Bellah's transcendent universal model of American civil religion.

In his 1975 work, Bellah offers a similar definition,

calling civil religion "that religious dimension, found . . .
in the life of every people, through which it interprets its
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality"
(Bellah, 1975:3).

Coleman's definition has the advantage of

including reference to both the individual and societal
levels of civil religion, and has the potential to guide
contemporary sociological research into American civil religion more specifically than have previous definitions.

PART III
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AND
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER VIII
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
FROM A11ERICAN DENOMINATIONS AND
AMERICAN POLITICS
Coleman (1970:69) has defined civil religion as a
"special case of the religious symbol system, designed to
perform a differentiated function which is the unique province of neither church nor state."

But civil religion as

it has been observed throughout history "is not always or
usually clearly differentiated from the church or state."
Coleman (1970:74) proposes, however, that "in America we
find almost a unique case of civil religion differentiated
from both church and state."

Coleman expects American

civil religion to be differentiated from political and
religious communities as a consequence of the general degree of differentiation in advanced societies.

Only in a

society such as the United States, where religious and political institutions are differentiated, would a further
differentiation of an institutionalized set of civil beliefs be expected.

Coleman's assumption is summarized in

the form of the second major proposition concerning the
history and development of American civil religion:
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proposition II:
American civil religion is structurally differentiated
from both the political community and the religious community.
Theoretical Studies
Talcott Parsons
Determination of the level of differentiation of American civil religion from other social institutions is partially dependent upon the criterion of differentiation.
Parsons (1971:26) defines differentiation as "the division
of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more
units of structures that differ in their characteristics
and functional significance for the system:"

In the general

action system, differentiation may occur within systems or
between major system levels.

Types of differentiation rele-

vant to the discussion of religious symbol systems include
differentiation within the cultural system, within the social structure, between social and cultural systems, and between social and personality systems.

Differentiation with-

in the cultural system can take place, for example, along
the line of generality of religious values.

Particularistic

values, such as religious fundamentalism, may arise to counteract the differentiation of more universal value systems.
Differentiation within the cultural system may account for
the differentiation of particularistic American public theology from the more transcendent universal values of Bellah's
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model of American civil religion.

The separation of reli-

gious and political institutions in historic times serves as
an example of differentiation within the social structure.
The further differentiation of a civil religious structure,
not dependent on political or religious communities, would
be an extension of this type of differentiation.

Differen-

tiation between system levels occurs because the two systems
do not exactly overlap.

The development of denominational

pluralism in the United States is an example of congruent
differentiation from the cultural system of Judeo-Christian
values.

Differentiation between social and personality sys-

tems would be evidenced when religious communities are challenged by individual autonomy.

Richard Fenn (1970:133-135)

has observed that the differentiation of the social from the
personality system leads to a situation in which the individual's choice of ultimate meaning systems does not affect his
social role performances.

Fenn (1976:165) concludes that

due to the differentiation between system levels, no religious symbol system, including American civil religion, is
capable of binding cultural, social, and personal spheres of
action.
In the Parsonian model, three other processes of structural change accompany differentiation:
inclusion, and value generalization.

adaptive upgrading,

Parsons (1971:26) spec-

ifies that differentiation at any level results in higher
evolution if and only if each new unit has greater adaptive
capacity than the old, previously undifferentiated unit.

109
parsons calls this process adaptive upgrading.

With adaptive

upgrading a wider range of resources becomes available to
differentiating units than had been available to their predecessors.

Both the processes of differentiation and adap-

tive upgrading pose problems for the integration of new units.
The problems can be solved by the inclusion of the newly
differentiated units within the normative structure of the
society.

Ultimately, the processes of differentiation, adap-

tive upgrading and inclusion are completed by value generalization.

If newly differentiated units are to gain legitima-

tion in the increasingly complex social structure

11

the value

pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to insure social stability"

(Parsons, 1971:27).

The relationship between differentiation, adaptive upgrading,
inclusion, and value generalization as outlined by Parsons
is important for tracing the development of American civil
religion.

The transcendent universal model portrays an Amer-

ican civil religion which is differentiated from other social
institutions, yet is sufficiently generalized to overarch and
integrate these institutions during times of national crisis.
Robert Bellah
Using a definition of differentiation which is similar
to that of Parsons, Robert Bellah (1964) has developed a theory of religious evolution based on differentiation.

Bellah

traces the course of religious change through five ideal
typical historical stages:

(1) primitive religion (primarily
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Australian religions);

(2) archaic religion (religions of

Africa, Polynesia, and early religions of the Middle East and
china);

(3) historic religion (transcendental religion in-

cluding Judaism, Islam, and early Christianity);

(4) early

modern religion (the Protestant Reformation); and (5) modern
religion (post-Reformation religions in Western nations) .
The major evolutionary process which Bellah specifies is
differentiation.

Through the five successive stages, the

evolution of religious symbol systems moves from compact to
differentiated forms, the self becomes differentiated from
the world, and religious institutions become differentiated
from other institutions (Bellah, 1964:358).

Bellah's five

stages and the indicators of differentiation for each stage
are summarized in figure 6.
Although Bellah does not mention American civil religion in his general treatment of religious evolution, he
makes several observations which can aid the construction of
a theory of the differentiation of American civil religion.
Bellah sets the stage of original church-state differentiation in the period of historic religion.

Prior to this

stage, religious and political institutions were not clearly
differentiated.

The Protestant Reformation of the early

modern period initiated the uneasy religious pluralism of
Europe which partially motivated American settlement by members of Protestant sects.

At the same time that this struc-

tural differentiation of religious institutions was occurring,
religious symbol systems were multiplying.

According to

""''I

RELIGIOUS STAGE

INDICATORS OF
DIFFERENTIATION

PRIMITIVE
(Most examples drawn
from Australian
religion)

ARCHAIC
(Religions of Africa,
Polynesia, and early
religions of Middle
East, India,
and China)

HISTORIC
(Transcendental religions-Islam, Judaism, Early
Christianity, etc.)

Religious
Organ1zation

No religious organization exists apart
from society

Emergence of the cult

Emergence of differentiated religious collectivities, including
church-state differentiation

Religious Symbol
Systems

Monistic--religious
myths overlap significantly with
daily life activity

The beginnings of dualism in the objectification of mythic
beings

Dualistic--natural and
supernatural worlds
are separated

Self-World Relationship

Fusion of self with
myth in ritual

Increased distinction
between humans and
gods

Clearly structured s~lf
concept emerges to
face transcendent
reality

Fig. 6.

Bellah's Stages of Religious Evolution
(Continued on next page)

(Bellah, 1964)
I-'
I-'

f-'

""'
RELIGIOUS STAGE
INDICATORS OF
DIFFERENTIATION

EARLY MODERN
(Protestant Reformation}

MODERN
(Post-Reformation religion
in Western nations)

Religious
Organization

Rejection of religious hierarchy
(papal authority} and establishment of a "religious two
class system: elect and reprobates" (369}

Denominational pluralism and privatization of religion

Religious Symbol
Systems

Focus upon the direct relationship between the individual
and transcendent reality

Multiple symbol systems open to individual selection

Self-World Relatlonship

This-worldly orientation of
self-involvement

Multi-dimensional self, conceived of
as capable of transforming both
self and world

Fig. 6.

Bellah's Stages of Religious Evolution
(Continued}

(Bellah, 1964}

I-'
I-'
N

113
Bellah, modern religion represents a distinctive evolutionary state in which traditional religious worldviews were
challenged, first by the rational ethics of Kant and later
by humanism.

Bellah views this process as one of evolution

from primitive monism, through historical dualism to a
modern structure of infinite possibilities.

The modern

effects of differentiation include the ''collapse of meaning"
and the "failure of moral standards"; yet in Bellah's view
there are also "unprecedented opportunities for creative
innovation in every sphere of human action"
373-374) .

(Bellah, 1964:

One such religious innovation which could be seen

as congruent with the differentiation of religious organizations and symbol systems is the emergence of a differentiated American civil religion.

According to Bellah (1975),

the symbols of American civil religion emerged initially in
the parallel religious and political ideologies of the New
England Calvinists.

Bellah's analysis does not set the dif-

ferentiation of American civil religion at any one point in
American history, but cites the reemergence and reaffirmation
of civil religious themes throughout history, especially during national times of trial.
John A. Coleman
Coleman's (1970) theory of the differentiation of American civil religion, from which Proposition II is derived, is
logically consistent with the assumptions of both Parsons
(1971) and Bellah (1964) concerning differentiation of
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religious symbol systems.

Coleman draws upon Bellah's (1964)

religious evolutionary stages to illustrate the differentiation of contemporary civil religion from both religious and
political communities.

It is Coleman's thesis, borrowed

from Bellah (1967), that civil religion is "the essential
middle term" necessary for the understanding of church-state
differentiation (Coleman, 1970:68).

In the stages of primi-

tive and archaic religions, society, religion, and civil religion are observed to be undifferentiated.

In historic or

early modern religious systems, church-state separation begins to be observable for the first time.

Although politi-

cal and religious organizations become differentiated, often
posing conflicts of interest, forms of civil religion are
not yet differentiated.

Civil religion may be controlled

either by religious organizations or by the state.

In modern

societies, civil religion may be observed in one of three
forms:

(1) continuing to be undifferentiated, and sponsored

by either religion or the state;

(2) holding monopoly status

as a form of secular nationalism; or (3) differentiated
civil religion controlled neither by religious organizations
nor by the state (Coleman, 1970:69).
Type 1: Continued undifferentiated
civil religion
Coleman suggests that just because civil religion
appears to be undifferentiated within a society, its absence
should not be assumed.

In these cases, the functions of

civil religion will be performed either by religious or
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political organizations.

Civil religion will appear either

as "Church-Sponsored Civil Religion" or "State-Sponsored
Civil Religion"

(Coleman, 1970:70).

Church-sponsored civil religion
In cases where an established religious tradition provides the context for sacred civic symbols, civil religion
may be said to be church-sponsored.

The church "lends rit-

ual to coronations of emperors and kings and adapts its doctrine of providence to questions of national destiny"
man, 1970:70).

(Cole-

The Christian-sponsored divine right of

kings exemplifies church-sponsored civil religion.

Modern

examples of church-sponsorship in the Judaic and Islamic
traditions include modern Israel and the Khomeini government
of Iran.

In these cases a differentiated civil religion is

not discernible, as political and religious symbols systems
are intertwined under the sponsorship of a dominant religious tradition.

Other examples of church-sponsorship of

civil religion "can be found throughout Latin America, in
the Orthodoxy of Greece, in Buddhism in Ceylon"
1970:70).

(Coleman,

Internal conflict, endemic to societies in which

an institutionalized religion performs the functions of
civil religion, includes strains created by the pressures of
religious minorities and the likelihood that the traditional
religion may be resistant to modernizing trends (Coleman,
1970:71).
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state-sponsored civil religion
Civil religion sponsored by the state, exemplified by
Imperial Rome and Restoration Japan, is evidenced in cases
where the political system institutes a nationally selftranscendent cult.

Structural weaknesses of civil religion

dominated by the state, observable in the Roman and Japanese
cases, include the problem of value specificity which challenges the values of competing religious organizations.
There may also be problems of rigidity associated with selftranscendence (Coleman, 1970:72).
Type 2:

Secular nationalism

Coleman views secular nationalism as a functional
alternative to civil religion to the extent that secular
nationalism provides a legitimating symbol system which competes with the symbol system of religious organizations.
Secular nationalism arises as the alternative source of
civil religion when the historic national religion is
either too traditionalistic or too closely tied to prerevolutionary regimes to serve as the civil religion of
a modernizing politico-economic regime (Coleman, 1970:
72) .
The secular nationalism of the U.S.S.R. is a prime example
cited.

Other examples include Turkey after Ataturk's revol-

ution and the Third Republic of France.

The strains inher-

ent in secular nationalism as a replacement for civil
religion include persecution of religious citizens and limitations on religious and civil liberties.

Secular nation-

alism can also be weakened, as in the case of the Third
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Republic of France, when its adherents are restricted to an
elite group (Coleman, 1970:72).
Type 3:

Differentiated civil religion

Coleman relies directly on Bellah's (1964) evolutionary assumptions to predict the emergence of a differentiated
form of civil religion in the most institutionally differentiated societies.

The United States is such a differenti-

ated society, characterized both by church-state separation
and religious pluralism.

The differentiation of these struc-

tures makes religious or state domination of civil religion
virtually impossible.

Secular nationalism is also an unlike-

ly choice for the United States, if Sidney Mead (1967) is
correct in his portrayal of the transcendent quality of the
traditional American cqnception of civil faith.

Thus, Cole-

man concludes that, in the United States, "we find almost a
unique case of civil religion differentiated from both church
and state"

(Coleman, 1970:74).
Conrad Cherry

Coleman's conclusion, that American civil religion has
emerged as an institutionalized religious symbol system, differentiated from both religious and political communities,
does not stand alone in sociological theory and research.
The differentiation of American civil religion from the American denominations has been observed by several contemporary
sociologists.

Bellah's (1974a:21) model of transcendent uni-

versal American civil religion assumes that in the United
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States civil religion is "elaborate and well institutionalized" and "rather clearly differentiated from the churches."
Bellah cites the 1961 Kennedy inaugural address as an example
of how civil statements can be religious, yet nondenominational.

Conrad Cherry (1971) believes that the differentia-

tion of American

civi~

religion from the American denomina-

tions is a recent, mid-twentieth century development.
During the early history of the nation, and continuing into
the twentieth century, the values of American civil religion
were usually expressed in Protestant terms by Protestant
spokesmen, resulting in an American civil religion which
largely reflected Protestant civic piety.

But the American

tradition of religious pluralism, advocated by most of the
Protestant denominations, opened the way for the differentiation of alternative religious systems.
Only after Protestantism lost its powerful grip on
the public life of the nation did the civil religion
begin to dislodge itself from Protestant articulation
and custody . . . . It took such factors as the impact of
non-Protestant immigrants, a Supreme Court determined to
de-Protestantize the public schools, and a pluralization
of values in many religions of American life through
modern means of communication to break through this confusion of Protestantism and the religion of America
(Cherry, 1971:15).
Franklin Littell agrees with Cherry and Bellah that immigration and the fairly recent ascendancy of non-Protestants to
positions of national power mark the point of differentiation
of American civil religion from Protestant civic piety.
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Not until the modern period when Catholics and Jews and
others have come into full and unabashed participation
in the public life of the nation, as symbolized by the
1960 election, has the old Protestant culture-religion
been frontally challenged (Littell, 1967:33).
The origin and early history of American civil religion is
located within and dominated by the Protestant tradition.
Yet contemporary American civil religion, whether viewed as
folk religion or as the transcendent universal religion of
the nation, is portrayed as a belief system which has become
differentiated from Protestantism and has been sufficiently
generalized to include Americans from varying religious
traditions.
Perhaps as a by-product of its differentiated status
in relation to·other American religious organizations, American civil religion has existed "in a relationship of.tension" to some other American religions (Cherry, 1971:16).

A

major example of this relationship of tension is found in the
rejection of civil religion's symbols and ceremonies by sects
such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members refuse to
salute the American flag or pledge allegiance to the nation.
Martin and Peterson (1978)

find, for example, that members of

American sects such as Assembly of God, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses display lower levels of civil
religiosity, as measured by opinion items, than members of
more established denominations.

Hembers of these sects re-

ject American civil religion as a religious option, and the
values of American civil religion are not sufficiently general to avoid conflict with the sectarian values of these
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particular organizations.

The very generalization of values,

a process Parsons (1971) observes as accompanying the differentiation of a new social form, has been a source of conflict
between American civil religion and traditional American denominations.

Articulate American churchmen, such as Marty

and Eckhardt, have condemned American civil religion as an
"American Shinto," or at best as a watered-down religion-ingeneral.

Marty (1959) criticizes what he sees as American

civil religion's banality, emphasis on conformity, and tendencies toward national idolatry.

Churchmen like Marty have

viewed American civil religion as a poor substitute for a
theologically rigorous denominational religion.

Whether or

not Martin Marty's folk religion model of American civil religion is accepted by contemporary scholars, the degree to
which American churchmen have perceived American civil religion as a threat to traditional religion is an indicator of
the degree to which American civil religion has differentiated as a separate, potentially competing, religious system
in American society.
Empirical Studies
Samuel Mueller and Paul Sites
An empirical study by Samuel Mueller and Paul Sites
(Mueller and Sites, 1977; Sites and Mueller, 1978) provides
relevant data concerning the contemporary relationship between American civil religion and the American religious denominations.

Data consist of tape recordings of religious

121
services from a simple random sample of one-third of all
churches in a metropolitan area of 500,000 (Akron, Ohio).
The religious services were recorded on Sunday, July 4, 1976,
the day of the American Bicentennial celebration.

Analysis

of data revealed that fifty-seven out of sixty Bicentennial
services contained mention of the relationship between America's role in history and the conditions of ultimate reality.
sites and Mueller (1978:9) describe the modal Bicentennial
sermon:
The modal sermon began with a historical recounting
of the birth of the nation along with a discussion of its
religious foundation.
After this, and a brief discussion
of the blessings the nation has received from God, the
clergy either began listing specific threats to the American heritage and/or gave a more general and abstract
warning concerning the problems which threaten the
nation.
The symbols and themes of

Ameri~an

civil religion appeared

equally in sermons given across all churches in the sample,
including Protestant and Catholic churches, black and white
churches, and among ethnic churches.

Some denominational

differences were observed, but no denomination strayed outside the core set of civil religious values as defined by
Bellah (1975).

For example, a comparison of sermons given in

Lutheran and Presbyterian churches revealed that in both denominations clergy stressed a basic set of civil religious
values which asked similar questions and arrived at similar
answers about the role of America in history.

Denominational

differences were manifest at the level of language choice and
theological context of the sermons, as sermons reflected each
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denomination's theological heritage and own "denominationspecific set of idioms"

(Mueller and Sites, 1976:12).

Lutheran sermons, for example, reflected the doctrine of the
"two kingdoms," while Presbyterian sermons sought the establishment of the Calvinist "kingdom of God on earth."

Because

denominational and ethnic differences were not substantial,
Mueller and Sites (1976:11) concluded that their data offered some limited support for Bellah's thesis that American
civil religion exists, and that American civil religion transcends specific religious denominations.
How are Mueller and Sites's findings to be interpreted
with regard to Coleman's structural differentiation thesis,
and Proposition II', which proposes that American civil religion is structurally differentiated from the religious community?

The findings, that the values of American civil

religion are manifest in the religious services of the American denominations, could be interpreted as a disconfirmation
of the structural differentiation thesis.

If the denomina-

tions espouse the values of American civil religion, can religious and civil religious systems be seen as differentiated?
Careful examination of the data, however, reveals that the
values of American civil religion and denominational values
expressed in the sampled sermons are held at different levels
of generality.

!,1ueller and Sites's findings are consistent

with Parsons's (1971) theory of the congruence of differentiation and value generalization.

Mueller and Sites found evi-

dence of civil religious values which were differentiated
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from denominational theology, yet couched at a sufficiently
high level of generality to overarch denominational differences.

The findings are also supportive of Coleman's thesis

and Proposition II.

When the values of American civil reli-

gion are found to be manifest at a high enough level of generality within institutions with more particularistic value
systems, it can be assumed that denominational and civil religious values are differentiated from one another, although
the two sets of values may at the same time be generally congruent.

This combination allows for an American civil reli-

gion which is differentiated from the particularism of
denominational theology, yet is sufficiently universal to
overarch and integrate these institutions at the societal
level.
Ronald Wimberly
Two recent empirical studies conducted by Ronald Wimberly (Wimberly et al., 1976;

~·limberly,

1976) also lend sup-

port to Proposition II, which states that American civil
religion is structurally differentiated both from religious
and political communities in the United States.

Wimberly

conducted two separate surveys of individual religious, political, and civil religious beliefs.

(The methodological

details of both studies are discussed in chapter VI, pages
94-96.)

Factor analysis of data taken from the first survey

(which did not include a measure of political belief) revealed four distinct first order factors:

civil religion,
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religious belief, religious behavior, and religious experience.

Second order factoring revealed that, while the civil

religion dimension was positively correlated with several
first order dimensions of denominational religiosity, the
civil religious dimension remained distinct.

Wimberly inter-

prets his findings as an indication of the existence of a
separate, civil religious dimension which is differentiated,
at least at the level of individual belief, from denominational religious belief (Wimberly et al., 1976:894-898).
Wimberly's second sample, which was larger and more heterogeneous than the first, was surveyed on items of political
belief as well as religious and civil religious belief.

Fac-

toring of the religious and civil religious items produced
the same four factors which emerged in the previous study.
Rotation of the first order factors produced an interpretation similar to that of the first study:

civil religion is

a religious dimension distinct from denominational religion.
Higher order analyses, however, indicated that the religious
and civil religious dimensions were more closely associated
in the second sample than in the first.
Once more, Bellah's contention of a differentiated
civil religious dimension is supported in regard to several church dimensions. However, with this more heterogeneous sample, the second order civil religious factors
are found to lie closer to church religion than they did
in the crusade data.
This implies that in a more diverse
population, there is less distinction between civil religion and religion in general (Wimberly, 1976:345).
Factor analysis of the second survey also revealed that civil
religion items factored distinctly away from political items.
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second order analysis found that civil religion and political belief stayed together on one factor, and away from
other political items (public behavior, social interaction,
experience, private behavior, and political knowledge)
berly, 1976:346-347).

(Wim-

Thus, the civil religious dimension

was found by Wimberly to be differentiated from both the religious and political dimensions of individual belief, as
measured by the survey items.
Wimberly's findings offer empirical support for both
the civil religion hypothesis of Bellah and Coleman (summarized in Proposition I) and the structural differentiation
hypothesis of Coleman (Proposition II).

Wimberly's data sug-

gest that American civil religion does exist to the extent
that it is indicated by individual beliefs concerning the
citizen's and the society's role in relation to conditions
of ultimate meaning.

With respect to the structural differ-

entiation hypothesis, American civil religion is found to be
a separate, individual belief dimension which overlaps minimally with individual beliefs concerning denominational religion and politics.

Wimberly's findings should stimulate

additional research efforts which will add further information concerning the relationship of American civil religious
beliefs with other religious beliefs and political attitudes
of Americans.

Only through additional research on American

belief systems and their location within American institutions
Will the structural differentiation hypothesis be confirmed
or disconfirmed.

CHAPTER IX
THE FUNCTIONS OF AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
In the previous chapters it has been proposed that
American civil religion is a religious symbol system and an
aspect of the American religious dimension.

It has addition-

ally been proposed that American civil religion is structurally differentiated from its closest institutional neighbors,
the American religious denominations and the American political community.

These two assumptions lead logically to a

third proposition, that American civil religion performs
functions traditionally performed by religious symbol systems, but that these functions are performed within the distinct province of civil religion's influence:

the roles of

the citizen and the society in relation to conditions of
ultimate reality.

Proposition III states the hypothesis of

functional differentiation, which logically follows from the
structural differentiation hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter.
Proposition III
American civil religion performs specialized religious
functions performed neither by church nor state.
In order to determine if American civil religion performs a specialized version of the functions performed by
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other religious symbol systems, it is necessary to determine
and clarify the function of religion for society.

Although

the functions of religion have been conceived of and expressed by sociologists of religion in various terms, three
functions would most likely be acknowledged as important indicators of religion's force in society:
role of religion;

(1) the integrative

(2) the legitimating role of religion; and

(3) the prophetic role of religion.

These three functions

of religion partially overlap with one another in the everyday life of the society, but can be separately analyzed.
The functions of religion for the individual, such as providing values for identity formation and personal meaning
creation are acknowledged, but will not be explored in detail
here.
Religion as a Source of Integration
The observation that religion may act as a source of
integration sterns from the Durkheirnian tradition.
defined religion according to this function as

11

Durkheirn

•••

a uni-

fied system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
things .

. . which unite into one single moral community . . .

all who adhere to them"

(Durkheirn, 1965:62).

Durkheirn ident-

ified the integrating function of religionina primitive, undifferentiated society in which members manifested their
interdependence through moral bonds, strengthened by religion.
The absence of religion would weaken these bonds and reduce
the cohesion of society.

As Kingsley Davis (1950:143) states,
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It is the possession of common ultimate ends that gives
the key to the integration of ends in human societies . .
As between two different groups holding an entirely different set of common ultimate ends, there is no recourse.
Modern societies are structurally differentiated and frequently religiously plural, factors which call into question
the integrative power of religion.

Phillip Hammond ( 197 4)

argues that Durkheim fails to go beyond the primitive stage
of mechanical solidarity to account for modern religious
forms such as pluralism.

Hawmond agrees with Durkheim that

in undifferentiated societies with mechanical solidarity integration is expressed in religious sentiments.

But Hammond

concludes that the integrating function of religion is an inadequate explanation of organic solidarity characteristic of
religiously plural societies such as the United States.
Hammond would reword Durkheim's thesis to state that rather
than religion producing the cohesive society, cohesion is
perceived to have a religious quality.

Because conflict

threatens societal cohesion, institutions which resolve conflict in modern societies will also take on religious qualities.

In religiously plural societies, the function of

conflict resolution moves away from the domain of the churches
and under the control of legal institutions.
(1) Plurality of religious systems requires redefinition
of order but does not escape the need for order.
(2)
Legal institutions therefore are called upon not only to
secure order but to give it a uniformly acceptable meaning as well.
(3) The result is a set of legal institutions with a decided religio-moral character (Hammond,
1974:129).
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In Hammond's view, the legal structures of modern society become the new source of moral integration.

Hammond (1974:129-

134) presents data from United States Supreme Court decisions
to support his thesis of the "religio-moral character" of
legal institutions and concludes that the religious qualities
now attributed to the legal system are most clearly evidenced
in American civil religion and institutionalized in national
documents.
American Civil Religion and Integration
Determining the integrative potential of religion or
its functional alternatives in a differentiated society is an
important task for the sociologist of civil religion.

If the

integrating function of religion cannot be demonstrated in a
differentiated society, sociologists like Richard Penn (1976)
can argue that no overarching religious tradition can unite
members and institutions.

If, as Hammond suggests, religious

functions and meanings shift to differentiating institutions
such as the legal system, the possibility of new sources of
integration remains open.

American civil religion could be a

modern, differentiated religious dimension potentially capable of contributing to social integration at times of societal strain or conflict.

Bellah's model of American civil

religion, which stresses the unifying potential of American
civil religion during times of national crisis, maintains that
just such a religious dimension is now institutionalized in
the United States.

130
John A. Coleman
Coleman's (1970) elaboration of Bellah's model of
transcendent universal American civil religion assumes that
American civil religion performs an integrating function.
"By definition civil religion is a religious system given to
the social integration of society by providing for "national
identity and solidarity"

(Coleman, 1970:76).

Coleman bases

his assumption that civil religion is integrating "by definition" on Durkheim's classic definition of religion.

In a

subsequent proposition, Coleman (1970:76) goes so far as to
state that, if it can be shown that civil religion and organized religion perform differing functions for society, "it is
an empirical question whether organized religion is integrative or divisive in society."

In Coleman's view, where civil

religion is sufficiently differentiated, it may displace organized religion as a primary institutional source of societal cohesion.

Thus, for Coleman the empirical question

becomes one of determining whether or not denominational religion still provides any integration for modern society.
Coleman is the only American civil religion theorist who
takes such an extreme position on the integrative function of
American civil religion.

More typical are the more moderate

positions of N. J. Demerath II and Phillip Hammond (1967) and
Robert Bellah (1975) which propose that American civil religion has integrative potential but evidence of the actual
performance of integration must be left open to empirical
determination.
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N. J. Demerath and Phillip Hammond
Demerath and Hammond (1967:202-204) point out that determining the role of religion for American social integration is complicated by the tendency of Americans to assume
that "religion" and "denominational religion" are synonymous.
American sociologists can easily fall under the assumption
that the only religious symbol systems are denominational
systems, and that religion functions only through organized,
denominational structures.

When the institution of religion

is equated with the denomination, sociologists such as Richard Penn (1972) question whether the diversity of denominations can function to integrate a plural society.

Penn's

conclusion, which Robert Stauffer (1973:415) calls the ''end
of ideology" thesis, portrays modern society as lacking the
social structures to support moral integration (see also
Luckmann, 1967).

An alternative conclusion is suggested by

Demerath and Haromond (1967:205) who suggest 'that modern society may have "alternative structural arrangements" for performing integration.

Demerath and Hammond propose that

American civil religion is one such structural alternative
for integration in American society.

They attribute the de-

velopment of civil religion in modern societies to "structural circumstances, specifically differentiation and pluralism
which force the separate institutionalization of the essentially pragmatic from the essentially philosophic aspects of
religion"

(Demerath and Hammond, 1967:208-209).

In a reli-

giously plural society, cognitive religious sentiments become
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structured apart from ethical religious sentiments.

The

former become institutionalized in religious organizations;
the latter, "the rules of general ethical conduct, become
institutionalized chiefly in the religio-political realm .
(Demerath and Hammond, 1967:210).

Demerath and Hammond be-

lieve that it is the differentiated American civil religion
which now performs the function of integration for the modern
United States.
If we now return to the basic Durkheimian issue of
religion in the role of societal integration, it is probably correct to view America's civil religion as the
proper analogue to the Arunta religion of which Durkheim
wrote. Religion, broadly conceived, does play a role in
integrating society, but such religion is not to be confused with "churches" as they are commonly identified
(Demerath and Hammond, 1967:211).
The integrative function of American civil religion is attributed, in part, to the inability of religious organization to
agree theologically to provide sufficient unity concerning
America's ultimate ends.

American civil religion provides a

source of religious unity.in the midst of denominational and
theological diversity (Demerath and Hammond, 1967:212).
Richard Fenn
The position of Richard Fenn on the integrative functions of civil religion has been discussed in detail in
chapter VI, pages 77-86, in the analysis of Fenn's response
to Bellah's model of American civil religion.

Fenn views

modern society as structurally differentiated beyond the capacities of religious systems to offer any overarching

II
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normative basis of integration.

Several of Fenn's proposi-

tions concerning differentiation and its effects on religion
serve as a summary of Fenn's position.
1. There is a high degree of differentiation within the cultural system, within the structural system, and
between the two levels of the system.
2.
Instead of a single, overarching religious
basis to the moral order or orders of a society, there is
a plurality of systems of ultimate significance.
3. To the extent that these several systems of
ultimate significance are institutionalized in differentiated structures and internalized in personality systems,
they provide the sources of ideological conflict in
modern society (Fenn, 1970:135).
Fenn admits that the existence of ideological conflict does
not necessarily imply structural conflict.

But American con-

flicts are typically solved according to pragmatic criteria
rather than by moral directives.
The American system is distinguished by its capacity to
slough off cultural conflict and to base structural relationships on proximate rather than ultimate concerns.
To admit this, however, is to concur on an important
characteristic of modern secular society:
there is too
great a cultural diversity to constitute a moral order.
Morals there may be, but no order . . . (Fenn, 1970:136).
Fenn believes that moral choices exist for the individual in
modern society, but that there is no overarching normative
system which integrates individuals into a similar pattern of
meaning and ultimate ends.

Fenn would agree with Demerath

and Hammond that traditional religious symbol systems no
longer serve as primary sources of integration for modern
society, but disagrees that civil religion is capable of
assuming the function of integration.
Fenn proposes that American civil religion may also be
viewed as differentiated into two types:

personal civil
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religion, which assists the identity development of individuals, and societal civil religion, which is supposed to combine national and biblical symbols to integrate corporate
actors into the social system.

Fenn (1976:165) suggests that

societal civil religion may have existed in the nineteenth
century, when Judea-Christian and democratic values combined
to integrate the individual into America's newly emerging
social structures.

Under contemporary conditions of increased

differentiation "the nation's authority is deprived of the
support of ultimate ends or of significance for the identity
of the individual . .

The nation does not have a unique

identity and purpose which incorporates the individual"
(Fenn, 1976:166).

American civil religion fails in Penn's

analysis to provide a sufficient moral basis for social integration.
The differing positions of Fenn (1970; 1976), Coleman
(1970), and Demerath and Hammond (1967) are evidence of the
debate concerning the integrative role of American civil religion in the contemporary United States.

Fenn is convinced

that American civil religion can no longer integrate citizens, while Coleman and Demerath and Hammond see American
civil religion deposing traditional religious systems and becoming the major source of moral integration for modern society.

The integration debate seems to be a theoretical

controversy of extremes:

the "end of ideology" hypothesized

by Fenn versus the transposition of ideology hypothesized by
Coleman and Demerath and Hammond.

Two additional voices in
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the debate, Conrad Cherry (1970; 1971) and Robert Bellah
(1975; 1976a) suggest mediating positions concerning the
integration hypothesis.
Conrad Cherry
Cherry's (1970) symbolic study of American cults of
the dead led him to conclude that American civil religion
performs both integrative and divisive functions for American society.

In early America, the funeral services of

Thomas Jefferson and John Adams performed integrative functions for the new nation, but by 1968 the funeral services
of Robert Kennedy were both unifying and divisive for the
society.

Due to America's class, regional, and racial

pluralism, certain groups react differently to the symbols
of American civil religion.

Cherry notes that some groups

saw Kennedy's death as evidence that national values had
failed to unite all citizens.

Cherry (1971:19) raises an

important issue when he asks how inclusive American civil
religion can be in a pluralistic society.

Can American

civil religion, for example, include atheism and integrate
atheistic citizens?

How can American civil religion support

the democratic principle opposed to the exclusion of any
group and still maintain transcendent ideals?

Can the val-

ues of American civil religion, which originated in Protestant civic piety, truly integrate America's racial and
religious minorities?

And can these same values, developed

within a particular national tradition, have international
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integrative potential as Bellah (1974b) maintains (Cherry,
1971:19-20)?

Despite these questions and the divisions they

may represent, Cherry would not agree with Penn that American civil religion entirely fails to integrate American society.

Although modern American civil religion is differen-

tiated along regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines,
American civil religion constitutes a "national point of
view" which may be both integrative and divisive (Cherry,
1970:310).

Cherry's analysis is useful in pointing out the

sources of divisiveness in American society, but fails to
suggest the conditions under which American civil religion
may be expected to be either integrative or divisive.
Robert Bellah
Bellah (1974a:29) has defined American civil religion
as an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs about
American society which provides integration through times of
national crisis.

Bellah has selected the biblical image of

"covenant" to symbolize the integrative function of American
civil religion.

The American covenant refers to a normative

symbol system, separate from the actual social behavior of
Americans.

Bellah does not maintain that the potential for

unity found in the American covenant has always been fulfilled.
Instead, the history of America is a history of the "broken
covenant."

"The Pilgrim Fathers had a conception of the cov-

enant and of virtue which we badly need today.

But almost

from the moment they touched American soil they broke that
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covenant and engaged in unvirtuous actions"

(Bellah, 1975:xv).

For example, early Americans violated the concept of covenant
through their policies toward the American Indian and in the
institutionalization of slavery.

In times of war, American

civil religion has not always played an integrative role.
"In both the Revolution and the Civil War commitment to the
tenets of the civil religion led not to 'social integration'
but to war and the near destruction of the nation"
1976a:l54).

(Bellah,

In modern society racism and economic inequality

remain primary sources of national division.

Bellah would

agree with Cherry that American civil religion has the potential both for integration and division, but unlike Cherry,
Bellah has a partial explanation for the societal divisions
which exist despite the institutionalization of American
civil religion.

Bellah sees divisions occurring along ideo-

logical lines when the transcendent universal values of American civil religion are interpreted by various segments of
society in terms of their own theologies or ideologies.

For

example, there is "the theology of cultural sophisticates
and the theology of Bible-believing Christians"
1976a:l55).

(Bellah,

Protestants, Catholics, and Jews may also vary

in their interpretations of American civil religion.

Accord-

ing to Bellah, "there are many public theologies, but only
one civil religion"

(Bellah, 1976a:l55).

Varying ideologies,

such as those of different political parties, may also
emerge.

Bellah notes that in some societies the competition

among theology, ideology, and civil religion may result in
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deep societal division.

In the United States such extreme

divisions have been largely avoided (with the exception of
the Civil War) because "the civil religion has never been
universally shared but it has seldom if ever been faced with
clearly formulated and massively popular alternatives, though
it is possible that that is coming"

(Bellah, 1976a:l55).

Therefore, American civil religion is not integrative by definition.

American civil religion can foster integration only

under the conditions of limited competition from alternative
theological and ideological systems.
Unlike Coleman, who assumes that American civil religion integrates society, and unlike Penn, who assumes that it
does not, Bellah allows the question of American civil religion and integration to remain empirically open.

As an ideal

symbol system, transcendent universal American civil religion
offers a moral basis of integration.

Under actual historical

and social conditions, American civil religion may succeed or
fail to provide a source of social unity.

But as long as the

possibility of integration based on American civil religion
exists, Bellah's view of American society must differ drastically from that of Penn.

Commenting on Penn's description

of the collapse of the American moral order, Bellah observes
that Penn's argument implies that an entirely new system of
social relations has emerged in the United States.
If American society is a mere "political and geographical shell"; if for most Americans "the society itself is taken into account only as a means to the individual's ends"; if corporate actors have monopolized the
power in our society so that individual persons are
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powerless and cannot even find justice in our legal system, if, finally, Professor Penn is right in his comment
that "American society is more accurately conceived not
as a single system but as two: one belonging to corporate actors, and the other to persons," then the republic
of Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln has ceased to
exist. The "ancient faith" is gone, and it is only a
matter of time, probably of very brief time, before our
laws reflect the new reality. That new reality, if Penn
is to be believed, is technocratic, corporate despotism
(Bellah, 1976a:l57).
Bellah calls upon Penn to provide empirical evidence for the
"end of ideology" thesis.

If, as Penn maintains, American

society lacks sources of moral integration, it is up to Penn
to document this change and demonstrate how a society so
divided can still stand.
Religion as a Source of Legitimation
One way which religion serves to integrate society is
through the legitimation of a moral order which binds adherents.

Peter Berger (1967:29) defines legitimation as "soc-

ially objectified knowledge that serves to explain and
justify the social order."

If members of a society do not

share common definitions of reality, integration becomes
problematic.

Hax Weber recognized the link between legitima-

tion and integration.

"Conduct, especially social conduct,

and quite particularly a social relationship, can be oriented on the part of actors toward the idea of the existence of
a legitimate order"

(Weber, 1947:124).

Because societies

attempt to legitimize their institutional arrangements in
terms of an ultimate set of values, legitimation falls within the realm of religion.

Religion serves as a legitimating
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agent in social life by providing an ultimate system of meaning for social behavior.

The link between religious legiti-

mation and social order is summarized by Weber.
Wherever the direction of the whole wa¥ of life has been
methodically rationalized (or systemat~zed) it has been
profoundly determined by the ultimate values toward
which this rationalization has been oriented. These values and points of view were thus religiously conditioned
(Weber, 1958:286-287).
Contemporary sociologist Peter Berger (1967:32) observes that
religion is not the only institutional source of legitimation,
but historically religion has played an extensive and effective role in "world-maintenance."
In primitive and archaic societies, in which there is
no differentiation between religious and political institutions, the political order is typically viewed as a manifestation of the sacred realm.

Those in political power are

conceived of as gods, or as representatives of a supreme
power.

Berger (1967:34) calls this the "microcosm/macrocosm

scheme of legitimation" because the primitive or archaic society tends to view itself as a microcosm of the larger cosmic
order.

In modern societies the microcosm/macrocosm relation-

ship tends to break down with the advent of increased societal complexity.

Separation of church and state may result in

the competition of religious and political systems of legitimation.

Berger (1967:47) proposes that "the less firm the

plausibility structure becomes, the more acute will be the
need for world-maintaining legitimation."

Complex systems of

legitimation tend to emerge in situations where
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interpretations of reality are being challenged by alternatives.

Modern American society is characterized by the dif-

ferentiation of religious and political communities and by
religious pluralism.

Religious pluralism in particular

creates a situation in which religious systems of legitimation are in competition with one another.

Pluralism, accord-

ing to Berger (1967:49) causes a "social engineering" problem
for religious organizations which must compete with one anothers' worldviews, and for society itself, which must find
ways of integrating individuals and organizations with differing conceptions of reality.

11odern society, faced with

the erosion of traditional meaning systems due to pluralism
and the resultant competition, has an increased need for legitimating systems.

Whether or not a plausibility structure

such as civil religion can provide the solution to modern
society's need for legitimation is the subject of debate
among sociologists of civil religion.
American Civil Religion and Legitimation
The major participants in the debate over the legitimating potential of American civil religion are Robert Bellah,
Richard Fenn, and Robert Stauffer.

Bellah's model of Amer-

ican civil religion is based on the Durkheimian assumption
that social cohesion rests upon common moral understandings
based on religious meaning structures.

These moral and reli-

gious meaning systems provide an explanation and justification
of the universe.

142
Such moral and religious understandings produce both a
basic cultural legitimation for a society which is viewed
at least approximately in accord with them and a standard
of judgement for the criticism of a society that is seen
as deviating too far from them (Bellah, 1975:ix).
Bellah assumes that religious symbol systems contain the potential for integration, legitimation, and prophetic guidance.

Bellah believes that American civil religion performed

the function of legitimation for early American society, and
carries the potential for renewal of this function in contemporary times.
In the eighteenth century . . . there was a common
set of religious and moral understandings rooted in a
conception of a divine order under a Christian, or at
least a deist, God.
The basic moral norms that were seen
as deriving from that divine order were liberty, justice,
and charity, understood in a context of theological and
moral discourse which led to a concept of personal virtue
as the essential basis of a good society (Bellah, 1975:x).
Bellah admits that the legitimating power of these American
values has eroded.

The concept of "virtue," for example, has

a different meaning for the twentieth century American than
for the eighteenth century Puritan.
sion has come renewal.

Yet alongside moral ero-

Contemporary Americans retain the

value of individual freedom, and the concepts of liberty and
justice inform the society's treatment of minorities and
women to a greater extent today than in earlier times.

In

Bellah's view, the myths and symbols of American civil religion retain the power to help Americans interpret and legitimate their social experience in the light of transcendent
reality (Bellah, 1975:3).
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Richard Penn
Richard Penn, who argues that American society has no
society-wide source of moral integration, additionally
assumes that no religiously-based societal source of legitimation exists.

In Penn's view, modern religion provides

little beyond a set of personalized meaning structures lacking any societal function.

Personal civil religion may pro-

vide meaning for individual identity development, but
societal civil religion, which could provide a system of
cultural legitimation, no longer operates in contemporary
American life.

American institutions are guided instead by

criteria of functional rationality, which have no religious
basis.

"Americans may no longer be able to agree on ultimate

ends, or what is worth doing, but only what is feasible or
'appropriate'"

(Penn, 1972:18).
Robert Stauffer

Robert Stauffer (1973) critiques the privatistic "end
of ideology" view of Penn.

Stauffer suggests that even a

technically efficient means-oriented society requires the
operation of some underlying cultural interpretation of the
form by which means are accomplished.

Max Weber's definition

of legal rationality is recalled as one such type of cultural
legitimation (Stauffer, 1973:419).

In Stauffer's view, Penn

has overlooked the fact that a technocratic political system
requires its own legitimating worldview, and that functional
rationality itself is a legitimating system of meaning.

In
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addition, Stauffer believes that privatists such as Fenn overlook the possibility that social strains may create a demand
for new forms of legitimation.

One potential strain could

occur as the Protestant Ethic work values clash with the
economic requirement for limited participation in the labor
force.

"Fenn's sanguine implication that the society, pre-

sumably through expert management, will be able to adjust to
structurally induced unemployment is dubious indeed"
fer, 1973:421).

(Stauf-

Stauffer sees differentiation and the result-

ant ideological debate characteristic of modern society to be
fertile ground for the emergence of new ideological systems
of legitimation.

Stauffer would not argue with Fenn on the

importance of the private sphere of religion.

Stauffer

would retain, however, the recognition that "both persistent
and new forms of overarching cultural legitimations . . . do
exist"

(Stauffer, 1973:422).

Stauffer would include American

civil religion among the potentially persistent forms of overarching cultural legitimation.

Although Stauffer questions

the prophetic function attributed to American civil religion
by Bellah, he finds Bellah's work to be a useful model for
the identification of modern legitimating systems which emerge
in response to national strains.
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Religion as a Source of Prophecy
The study of religion's prophetic role originated in
the Weberian tradition which. distinguished between the
priestly and prophetic styles of religious leadership.

As

Weber (1963) notes, the distinction between priestly and
prophetic styles extends beyond religious leadership into
the whole symbol system of a religion.

Contemporary sociolo-

gist Bellah (1975:ix-xi) writes of the prophetic role of religious values as "a standard of judgement for the criticism
of a society which is deviating too far from them'' and as
exerting "continuous pressure for higher standards of moral
behavior."

Demerath and Hammond (1967:212) subdivide reli-

gious prophecy into several dimensions.

Prophetic influence

may be direct or indirect, innovative or supportive of the
status quo.

Demerath and Hammond (1967:224) observe that

"much of what passes for prophecy is really reinforcement of
existing sentiment."

In addition, it is useful to distin-

guish between prophetic attempts and successes.

The sociolo-

gist studying the prophetic function of religion needs to be
concerned with the conditions which facilitate or resist
prophecy, and variations in prophetic impact, such as amount
and direction of change (Demerath and Hammond, 1967:223).
The prophetic role may be assumed to be linked to religion's integrative and legitimating roles.

A direct and pos-

itive relationship among the three functions could be logically proposed.

To the extent that a society is legitimized

and integrated by a common set of moral understandings, the
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greater would be the prophetic potential of these same moral
values.

Values which have the power to inform and unite

would also have the power to judge deviation and demand behavior in conformity to higher standards.

Bellah (1975:ix)

assumes that this basic "relation between morality, religion,
legitimation, and criticism" exists within social systems.
Demerath and Hammond, however, assume an inverse relationship between integration and prophecy, at least within the
context of a particular religious organization.

It is

assumed that the more tightly moral values bind a social
group, the less likely the status quo will be challenged, as
such a challenge would threaten to destroy the very order on
which the group is based.

Referring to religious organiza-

tions, Demerath and Hammond (1969:230) note:
. . . Such an integrative role militates against vigorous
pursuit of the second major religious function, that of
religious prophecy in the interests of social change.
There is a very real sense in which the functions of integration and prophecy are hostile to one another within
the contemporary church. This is the major reason why
the source of religious prophecy itself has shifted to
non-parish personnel and to officials high in the church
bureaucracies who have no special parish flock to bind
together.
The tendency of prophecy to be exemplified more often by nonparish religious leaders has been observed in empirical
studies, such as Jeffery Hadden and Raymond Rymph's (1966)
study, which found more non-parish than parish clergy active
in Chicago demonstrations concerning public school segregation.

It is not the purpose of this analysis to fully answer

these questions concerning the conditions leading to
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religious prophecy and the relationship between prophecy and
integration.

The objective is to suggest that these same

issues relevant to the sociology of religion are also crucial to the study of the prophetic role of American civil
religion.
American Civil Religion and Prophecy
Discussion of the prophetic role of American civil religion can be found in preceding sections of this analysis
which contrast the integrative, legitimating, folk religion
model to the transcendent universal model of American civil
religion (see part I, chapter III, pages 30-39; and part II,
chapters IV and V) .

Church historian Sidney Mead was one of

the first to elaborate on the prophetic potential of American
civil religion.

In "The Nation with the Soul of a Church"

(1967), Mead argues that due to the religiously pluralistic
origins of the United States, Americans began looking to the
society itself to perform the religious functions ordinarily
performed by the established church.

Within a pluralistic

system, with no established church, the nation began to fulfill the traditional religious functions of providing cohesion, personal meaning, and prophecy for historical roles.
Differentiation between religious and political communities
and religious pluralism are the key processes which Mead
credits with producing a highly generalized American civil
religion, partially separate from the denominations, but
standing over them to guard against self-transcendent and
particularistic tendencies.
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Robert Bellah
The sociological model of Robert Bellah has also
stressed the prophetic function of American civil religion.
Bellah (1974b:225) believes that American civil religion is
founded on the belief that "the nation is not an ultimate
end in itself but stands under transcendent judgement."
American civil religion originated with the belief in a
power higher than man and the society, and that belief has
been periodically renewed at critical moments in American
history.

For example, the "Declaration of Independence speaks

of the 'Laws of Nature and of Nature's God' that are clearly
transcendent to and stand in judgement of the laws of the
state"

(Bellah, 1976b:l67).

Bellah interprets the Declara-

tion of Independence as giving clear priority to the individual's relationship with God over his relationship to the
state, as exemplified by the upholding of the right of citizens to form a new government if the state should become
destructive of individual rights.

Bellah additionally affirms

that "it is of the essence of the American civil religion that
it 'challenges institutional authority'"

(Bellah, 1976b:l67).

He cites Lincoln's opposition to the Spanish American War
(Bellah, 1974a:39) and Lincoln's 1857 speech decrying the
Dred Scott decision (Bellah, 1976b:l68) as examples of the
institutionally critical potential of American civil religion.
Critical response to the prophetic function of American
civil religion proposed by Bellah and Mead has come from folk
religionists such as Marty and Herberg, privatists such as
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Fenn, and an empirical study by Thomas and Flippen.

The

folk religionists portray American civil religion as an integrative, culturally legitimating religious symbol system
which is too generalized to have prophetic potential.

Agree-

ing with Demerath and Hammond (1967), the folk religionists
believe that emphasis on the function of religious integration precludes the exercise of prophecy.

The privatist posi-

tion assumes that if religious symbol systems in general, and
American civil religion in particular, perform no functions
on the societal level, the prophetic role is also lost.

And

among the few empirical studies designed to test the transcendent universal model of American civil religion, the
earliest study finds no support for the existence of a transcendent dimension of American civil religion.
Hartin Marty
In The New Shape of American Religion (1959) religious
historian Marty portrays American civil religion as a religion in general lacking the moral and theological substance
of denominational religion.

American civil religion, in

order to be acceptable to Americans of divergent religious
backgrounds, is necessarily overgeneralized to the point of
losing moral content and prophetic vigor.

Americans might

still believe in God, but the God of American civil religion
has become "an American jolly good fellow"

(Marty, 1958:39)

unlikely to be the source of prophetic judgement.

In a more

recent adaptation of his work, Marty (1974:144) observes that
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American civil religion can be either "priestly" or "prophetic."

(Marty's typology of priestly and prophetic forms

of American civil religion is summarized in part I, chapter
II,pages 36-38.)

Thus Marty's most recent view of American

civil religion includes the possibility of a dynamic tension
between priestly and prophetic modes of civil religious expression.
Will Herberg
Sociologist Will Herberg (1960) also portrays American
civil religion as a generalized folk religion which functions
to provide a religiously plural society with an overarching
basis of unity.

Herberg concludes that the prophetic dimen-

sion found in biblical religion is absent from American civil
religion, which serves instead the primary functions of legitimating American culture and integrating American society.
Andrew Greeley (1972:167), in an evaluation of Herberg's
model, acknowledges that the prophetic function is lacking in
American civil religion in its popular folk religion form.
However, Greeley believes there is another, "elite" form of
American civil religion based on the American values of dissent, which has at times produced prophetic action.

Bellah

himself is aware that the transcendent dimension of American
civil religion is not always operative in American society.
At times the symbols of American civil religion are coopted
into support of a pattern-maintaining folk religion, or
twisted into religious nationalism.

However, to Bellah
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(1976b:l67) these manifestations are public theologies, not
American civil religion in its ideal, normative form.

The

variables which Bellah (1975:xii) specifies as intervening
in American society to foster the rise of public theologies
include the rise of science, the market economy, and industrial capitalism, all of which facilitate self-transcendent
interpretations of American civil religion.
Richard Fenn
The privatist position on American civil religion, exemplified by Fenn, assumes that the symbols of American
civil religion have no overall cultural significance, and
therefore cannot direct prophetic guidance for social change.
In particular, Fenn argues that, when the symbols associated
with American civil religion are used to legitimate existing
institutions, their prophetic potential is nullified.

Fenn

(1976) selects the American mythic theme of building a new
Israel as an illustration.

Historically, the symbol of

Israel was used paradoxically both to strengthen denominational authority when Christians were in the minority, and to
facilitate religious pluralism in nations like the United
States.
The "new Israel" theme attempted to assimilate the
symbols of personal religious identity to the symbols of
ecclesiastical authority, while the heretics asserted
secret sources of personal identity and more generalized
and abstract symbols of divinity than the God of the Old
Testament. . . . The theme of the American Israel has
attempted to achieve a similar symbolic interpretation
between the symbols of personal identity and national
authority; and I further argue that the synthesis, never
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complete even on the cultural level, is increasingly
pulled apart by the development of separate corporate
and individual systems of ideas, rules and values.
It
is a development which intensifies the antinomian tendencies of popular religious culture (Penn, 1976:161).
Bellah's response to Penn is a reiteration of the distinction
between public theology and transcendent American civil religion.

In 1776, the symbolism of an American Israel was a

part of public theology, not of transcendent universal American civil religion.

If the new Israel symbolism was used to

reinforce institutional authority, it was only serving the
traditional legitimating function of public theology.

Amer-

ican civil religion serves a legitimating function, but as
Bellah notes, this legitimation is always conditional.
Bellah (1976b:l67) recalls Weber's perspective on religious
legitimation, which holds that "legitimation always involves
an element of contingency, a linking of two spheres, the
political order and ultimate reality, that are not in principle fused."

American civil religion conditionally legiti-

mates American culture, but because American civil religion
is not fused with the culture, it is free to offer prophetic
judgement when the nation violates its own transcendent
ideals.
~mpirical Studies

There has been little direct empirical study of the
prophetic function of American civil religion, but a few
studies of the transcendent dimension of American civil religion provide relevant data.

Thomas and Flippen's (1972)
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content analysis of the editorials of a national sample of
newspapers published during the Honor America .;.veekend,
July 4, 1970, was designed as a test of Bellah's thesis of
transcendent American civil religion.

The coding instrument,

intended to distinguish between civil religion items and
their nontranscendent equivalents, relied on the mention of
God as the main criterion of transcendent civil religiosity.
Analysis of data revealed that a fairly large number of

~

transcendent civil themes were expressed in the Honor America
editorials, but few of the themes specifically referred to a
transcendent deity.

Evaluation of the measurement instrument

used by Thomas and Flippen suggests an alternative interpretation of their findings.

Thomas and Flippen required that

reference to a transcendent being be explicit, while implied
transcendence (illustrated in the statement "America has been
blessed") was coded as non-transcendent (Thomas and Flippen,
1972:221).

Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure items

which reflect

cultura~values

so generally associated with

transcendent origins that explicit mention of these origins
may be considered unnecessary.

Another content analysis,

conducted by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978), using a different
measurement instrument than that used by Thomas and Flippen,
reported evidence of transcendent civil religious values
among Masonic fraternal orders.
studies conducted by Ronald

Two individual belief

~Vimberly

('VVimberly et al., 1976;

Wimberly, 1976) found evidence of a transcendent civil religious dimension of personal belief which is distinct from
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individual political and religious belief systems.

The data

concerning the transcendent dimension of American civil religion are thus inconclusive.

It is even more difficult to

generalize these inconclusive results to the issue of the
prophetic function of American civil religion.

The acknowl-

edgement of a transcendent authority is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for prophecy.

The results of both Joli-

coeur and Knowles, who found a high proportion of transcendent civil religion statements in a national journal published
by a traditional fraternal order, and lvirnberly, who found a
positive association between transcendent civil religious
beliefs and political conservatism could be interpreted as
support for the Dernerath and Hammond (1967) hypothesis of
an inverse relationship between religious integration and
prophecy.

On the surface it seems

segments of the American

~ubJic,

~likely

that conservative

such as Masons and political

conservatives, would be among the prophetic vanguard of the
society, despite their adherence to the values of American
civil religion.

However, conservative organizations have

been vocal in reactionary forms of prophecy, exemplified by
the John Birch Society's advocacy of the return to the "original principles of the American founders."

Additional empir-

ical study is required before sociologists can confirm or
disconfirm Bellah's hypothesis of American civil religion's
prophetic role.
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Sites and Mueller
The most direct empirical test of the prophetic dimension of American civil religion is found in Sites and
Hueller's (1978) analysis of sermons delivered on the occasion of the American Bicentennial, July 4, 1976.

The major-

ity of sermons given in a simple random sample consisting of
sixty Protestant and Catholic churches contained both priestly and prophetic civil religious themes.

Prophetic themes

were those components of the sermons which cited threats to
the

~~erican

heritage and social problems which could be

("

solved only with God's help.

Government scandal and corrup-

tion were the most frequently cited threats to America, followed by poverty, racism, prejudice, big business and the
concentration of wealth, and military involvement and the
misuse of power.

The majority of prophetic themes found in

the sermons coincided with the issues which Bellah (1975)
mentioned as examples of the "broken covenant" between the
American nation and its transcendent authority.

Sites and

Mueller reported some denominational variation with respect
to prophetic Bicentennial themes.

For example, one-half of

the Catholic clergy and one-third of the Episcopal clergy
failed to mention any prophetic issues.

It is possible that

a denomination's tendency to take a prophetic civil religious
stance is linked to the denomination's historical inclination
toward either a priestly or a prophetic orientation.

Never-

theless, some clergy in every denomination sampled mentioned
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prophetic themes.

Si~es

and Mueller concluded that the pro-

\

phetic force in American civil religion is alive and can be
evidenced in the sermons of contemporary American clergy.
Conclusion
There has been considerable theoretical argument,
accompanied by scant empirical research, concerning the functions of American civil religion in contemporary American
society.

The extremes in the debate are represented by

Bellah's model, which argues that American civil religion
performs the specialized religious functions of integration,
legiti~ation,

and prophecy for American society, and Penn's

privatist position, which maintains that American civil religion is incapable of performing any societal function in contemporary times.

There is, however, one common point of

agreement among the participants in the debate.

All agree

that traditional religious symbol systems have become so differentiated and privatized in American society as to be weakened in their contributions to American integration, legitimation, and prophetic judgement.

Penn assumes that American

civil religion has also been similarly weakened, or privatized,
but does not specify what institutional forms do perform the
functions necessary for societal self-maintenance.

As

Stauffer (1973) suggests, even a technological, rational society requires some underlying cultural interpretation of the
form by which means are accomplished and requires some agreement on this interpretation to remain even minimally integrated.
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American civil religion is a potential contributer to such
legitimation and integration for contemporary society.

It

remains for empirical studies to test this logical, although
still unconfirmed, hypothesis.

A test of the prophetic func-

tion of American civil religion is more problematic.
Stauffer (1973:424) sees American civil religion as an institutional alternative which is potentially able to assume the
integrative and legitimating functions traditionally performed
by religion in society.

However, Stauffer is skeptical of the

prophetic function which Bellah attributes to American civil
religion.

There has not yet been sufficient empirical study

of the prophetic dimension of American civil religion to substantially support either Stauffer's or Bellah's position.
Future research into the prophetic function would best view
prophecy as Weber did, as one dimension of a continuum composed of priestly and prophetic styles.

Elaboration of the

conditions under which a religion is more likely to manifest
institutional reinforcement or challenge would be helpful in
determining if American civil religion has primarily reflected priestly or prophetic orientations.

While it has not yet

been demonstrated that American civil religion performs specialized religious functions performed neither by religious
nor political organizations, this hypothesis is promising.
Even those in opposition to the hypothesis agree that in a
society characterized by religious and political differentiation neither religious nor political organizations exclusively
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perform the functions of integration, legitimation, and prophetic guidance.

The institutional field is thus opened for

other symbol systems, such as civil religion, to perform a
contemporary version of the traditional functions of
religion.

CHAPTER X
M1ERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AND
OTHER INSTITUTIONS
In a bibliographic essay on American civil religion
Phillip Hammond (1976:171) poses the question, "What institutions promulgate, transmit, maintain and modify American
civil religion?"

The two preceding chapters have presented

arguments and evidence which suggest that the values of American civil religion are congruent with the values of American
religious and political institutions while being structurally
and functionally differentiated from these institutions.
Contemporary American civil religion appears to be controlled
neither by the religious denominations nor the political system, although civil religious values are manifest in both
institutions at a high level of generality.

The relationship

between American civil religion and other American institutions may be expected to follow a similar pattern.

Three

institutions to which scholars of American civil religion
have addressed themselves are:

public educational institu-

tions, religio-civic voluntary associations, and economic
institutions.
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American Public Education
In Piety in the Public School (1970), Robert Michaelson
presents a historical analysis of the relationship among the
American public schools, American denominations, and American civil religion.

According to Michaelson, there was an

early, close relationship between American religious and educational institutions.

The values of evangelical religion

were formative factors in the rise of formal education in
colonial America.

Institutions of higher education, such as

Harvard and Princeton, were founded to serve the primary
function of Protestant ministerial education.

The establish-

ment of the common school was itself a major cause of educated clergy, many of whom dedicated themselves to developing
a nationwide system of general education.

On his visit to

the United States in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that American education was largely
clergy"

(quoted in Michaelson, 1970:51).

11

entrusted to the

Although Tocque-

ville's statement is an exaggeration, early American educational systems, including the public schools, were influenced
by traditional religious values and were expected to produce
pious and moral citizens.

American schools have also tradi-

tionally served the civil religious function of social integration.

Michaelson (1970:57) states that "the school's role

might be called religious not only in the goal of achieving
moral character, but also in the development of a sense of
community, of a common identity as Americans."

In the late

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a series of legal decisions
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both precipitated and reflected an increasing differentiation
between public education and American religious organizations.
Today, public education no longer manifests particularistic
religious teachings, and public schools are neither expected
nor allowed to perform the function of religious education.
Although the special religious functions of the public
schools have declined due to differentiation of educational
and religious institutions, public schools continue to perform a civil religious function for American society.

By use

of historical data, this process of differentiation and its
effects on the religious and civil religious functions of
public education can be documented.
Religious and Civil Religious Functions of
Early American Public Education
Bernard Bailyn (1960:21) has observed that, during the
early colonial period, the major institutions of socialization and acculturation were the family, community, and church,
rather than the school.

It was not until the end of the col-

onial period that formal schooling became more universal, and
thus a significant source of socialization.

The force of the

Great Awakening stimulated the founding of a number of colonial colleges, whose graduates in turn established institutions and standards for all levels of education.

The awaken-

ers attempted to build an educational system which fostered
religious piety as well as knowledge.

Jonathan Edwards, who

served briefly as president of Princeton, wrote in Thoughts

162
on the Revival that citizens should be educated "in common
learning" and in "vital piety"
49).

(quoted in Michaelson, 1970:

The early history of Princeton itself illustrates the

fusion of religion, patriotism, and education which characterized early American education.
The Reverend John Witherspoon, president of Princeton from 1767 until his death in 1794, eagerly combined
piety and patriotism in his life and work. . . . He had
not been in New Jersey a decade when he became one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence. Witherspoon
early caught the vision of the new man and the new society that were aborning in the new world. His college,
which had been founded to produce zealous converts to
Christianity, could as easily also produce zealous citizens of the new republic (Michaelson, 1970:50).
Michaelson credits evangelical religion as the major
influence on early American formal education but notes that
evangelically influenced schools were often directed toward
patriotism as well as toward religion.

"The habit of looking

to the schools to produce learned piety and patriotism became
so deeply ingrained in the American mind that few questioned
its validity"

(Michaelson, 1970:51).

The expectations of

higher education were extended to all educational levels, to
the extent that American schools typically performed religious
and civic functions along with general educational functions.
The religious and civil religious functions of the school were
not always in harmony, and conflict between religious particularists and generalists was typical.

Particularists were mo-

tivated to institutionalize denominational and/or sectarian
religious values even in the public schools, while generalists advocated nondenominational, nonsectarian approaches to
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morality in public education.

Archbishop Hughes of New York

exemplified the particularist viewpoint.

Hughes conceived

of religion in denominational terms, and worked for the
establishment of a denominationally-influenced public educational system.

Horace Mann and John Dewey represented· the

generalist viewpoint.

Both Mann and Dewey were influenced

by the deistic, Jeffersonian philosophy of education which
stressed the morality of natural, nondenominational religion.
Mann opposed sectarianism and, along with Dewey, advocated
that the public schools be based on a "common faith" in
humanistic, democratic values.

In the early conflict be-

tween particularists and generalists, both sides prevailed in
certain respects.

Particularism influenced public education

into the twentieth century.

Until the United States Supreme

Court decisions of the twentieth century weakened religion's
influence on the public schools, authorized prayer and Bible
reading were commonplace features of the American public
school system.

Although advocates of these practices viewed

them as nonsectarian, they were largely Protestant in orientation, usually based on the King James version of the Bible
and utilizing the Protestant version of the Lord's Prayer.
As particularism slowly receded, however, the civil religious
function of public education emerged more clearly.

Particu-

larly during the late 1800s and early 1900s, when America
experienced its heaviest waves of European immigrants, the
public school was seen as the major institution for the
Americanization and democratization of new citizens.

Civics,
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citizenship, and patriotism courses infused the public
schools, and the schools began to play "a role comparable to
that of the initiatory rites of a primitive tribe"
son, 1970:149-150).

(Michael-

The public schools' role in fulfilling

the civil religious function of social integration is summarized in Michaelson's (1970:156) statement that" . . . the
common school brings common experience which precipitates a
common faith which is essential to common welfare."
There is historical evidence that the American public
educational system performed both religious and civil religious functions from colonial times into the twentieth century.

Often these functions were in competition or conflict.

As the twentieth century progressed, the sectarian influence
in public schools would gradually decline, leaving civil religion as the only institutionalized form of religious expression remaining in American public education.
Differentiation of Public Education
from Religion
The differentiation of American public education from
religion is most clearly evidenced by twentieth-century judicial decisions limiting the role of religion in the public
schools.

Over the past sixty years, the United States

Supreme Court has ruled on a number of relevant cases.
Michaelson (1970:194) presents a summary table of significant
court cases (replicated as figure 7 on the following page).
The first significant Supreme Court rulings of the
twentieth century concerned the relationship between public
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Pierce

Pierce v. Society of Sisters
268 u.s. 510

1925

Cochran

Cochran v. Louisiana
281 u.s. 370

1930

Oregon•s mandatory public
school attendance statute.
Statute providing use of tax
money for books for children attending public and
other schools.
---

Unconstitutional
(unanimous)
Upheld
(unanimous)

Everson

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1

1947

Tax subsidy for bus transportation for children attending Catholic schools (N.J.)

Upheld (5-4)

Allen

Board of Education v. Allen
392 u.s. 236

1968

N.Y. statute requiring taxsubsidized textbooks for
parochial and private
school students.

Upheld (6-3)

Gobitis

Minersville v. Gobitis
310 u.s. 586

"1940

Upheld (8-1)

Barnette

West Virginia v. Barnette
319 u.s. 624

1943

McCollum

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203

1948

Zorach

Zorach v. Clauson
343 u.s. 306

1952

Required daily flag salute in
public school (Minersville,
Pa.) .
State Board of Education ruling requiring flag salute
in public schools.
Released-time program on
school premises (Champaign,
Ill.) .
Released-time program off
school premises (N.Y.C.).

~

Fig. 7.

Unconstitutional
( 6-3)
Unconstitutional
( 8-1)
Upheld (6-3)

Significant Court Cases Related to Religion and the Public School
(Michaelson, 1970:194)
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Engel

Engel v. Vitale
370 u.s. 421

1962

New York State Board of
Regents composed and
school-sponsored prayer.

Unconstitutional
(6-1)

Schempp

School District v. Schempp
Murray v. Curlett
874 u.s. 203

1963

School-sponsored prayer
(Lord's Prayer) and
devotional Bible reading
(Pa. and Baltimore).

Unconstitutional
( 8-1)

Fig. 7.

Significant Court Cases Related to Religion and the Public School
(Michaelson, 1970:194)
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schools and private, parochial schools.

In 1925, in Pierce,

the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled against
Oregon's mandatory public school attendance statute, thus
supporting the right of children to attend private and religious schools.

In the Cochran, Everson, and Allen decisions,

the Court ruled that tax-supported services such as school
books and bus transportation provided to public school children must be extended to children attending private and religious schools (Michaelson, 1970:193).

Although the decision

to extend services paid for by the public to students of
religious schools might appear to result in the mixing of
public and religious domains, these decisions actually aided
the survival of a separate system of religious education.

By

upholding the right to private and religious education, the
Court helped insure that religious alternatives to public
education would continue to be available.
The dominant direction of United States Supreme Court
opinion on religion and public education began to be expressed
in the 1940s.

In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the pro-

visions of the First Amendment on religion were extended to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Explaining the

implications of this decision, Justice Black subsequently
wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another (quoted in Michaelson, 1970:
19 5) .
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Later the Court applied the logic of Cantwell to the McCollum
decision, striking down a released-time education program on
public school grounds in Champaign, Illinois.

The program

offered religious instruction during school time on school
premises.

Although the released-time program was voluntary,

the plaintiff claimed that her son had been harassed for nonparticipation (Michaelson, 1970:196-197).

The McCollum deci-

sion represented a strict separationist position which was
characterized by Justice Black as "a wall of separation between Church and State"

(quoted in Michaelson, 1970:197).

In 1952 separation became accommodation as the Court upheld a
released-time religious education program held off school
premises (Zorach).

Although the Zorach decision was inter-

preted by some legal scholars as a softening of the separationist stance of McCollum (Michaelson, 1970:198), the
decision was still congruent with the concept of differentiation between religious and public education.

The Supreme

Court at no time acted in such a way as to destroy the alternative of a separate system of religious education, as long
as it was clearly separate, physically and temporally, from
public education.

The Engel and Schempp decisions of the

1960s reaffirmed the "wall" between public and religious
institutions when public school-sponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading were ruled unconstitutional.

Two essen-

tial factors in this decision were the "identification of
the prayer as religious" and the decision that its use constituted "an establishment of religion"

(Michaelson, 1970:
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194, 207).

The Court rulings of the 1960s illustrate the

trend toward differentiation.

The extent of this differenti-

ation and the few areas remaining undifferentiated are summarized by Michaelson (1970:206).
On-premises released-time religious education,
ceremonial Bible readings, and school-sponsored group
prayer are excluded under McCollum, Engel, and Schemlp.
But at least three things are left to the school fol owing these decisions:
(1) accommodations of the type permitted in Zorach; (2) ceremonies of a civic, patriotic,
or secular nature in which religious terminology and allusions appear; and (3) the "objective study of" or
"teaching about" religion. Number one has the force of
law; two and three are suggestive dicta.
The immediate impact of the Supreme Court's separationist decisions on the American denominations was varied.
Roman Catholics generally opposed.the decisions, Jewish and
liberal Protestant groups generally supported them, and other
Protestant reaction was mixed.

A fear of rising

tion was typical in the groups in opposition.

~eculariza-

Michaelson

(1970:232) notes, however, that as time went on many opponents of the separationist decisions changed their attitudes.
In 1963, the National Council of Churches supported the
Engel decision as offering opportunity to reexamine the
issue of religious values and public education.

The United

Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., which in the 1950s had
issued a pamphlet identifying "our schools" as "a bulwark for
our Protestant concept of morality, democracy and freedom,"
passed a statement in 1963 supporting Engel (quoted in
Michaelson, 1970: 233).

In 1964, The Lutheran Church in Ameri-

ca declared that its members should not be alarmed over Engel
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and Schempp.

American Catholics were much slower to accept

separationism, but the positive ecumenical statements on education by Vatican II led to a certain relaxation of Catholic
opposition (Michaelson, 1970:234).

Michaelson (1970:235)

concludes that the separationist decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the differentiation of public education from religion, which resulted from the decisions, ultimately had a dual effect on American religious groups.
Initially, the separationist doctrine polarized religious
opinion and organizations, but the separationist decisions
ultimately facilitated interreligious dialogue.
Public Education and American Civil Religion
The United States Supreme Court's separationist decisions promoted the institutional differentiation of American
public education from religion.

The religious content of

public education was limited to the ''objective studyn of
religion or to "ceremonies of a civic, patriotic or secular
nature" in which religious terms were used (Michaelson, 1970:
226).

Civic expression remained the only avenue of religious

expression officially tolerated in the American public school.
In the Engel decision, Justice Black pointed out that, although schools cannot sponsor religious exercises, they are
free to sponsor patriotic exercises.

The fact that American

patriotism traditionally possesses a religious dimension
complicates the issue of separating religion from public
instructional content.

Supreme Court decisions on the issue
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of civil religious expression in public schools have generally maintained that religion can be tolerated in schools if
it is contained in a patriotic, rather than a religious,
ceremony (Michaelson, 1970:208-209).

American public school

students may recite the Declaration of Independence and sing
the "Star Spangled Banner," both of which contain reference
to God.

Although the Court did not label such rites as civil

religious, they contain an acceptable reference to the religious dimension of the polity.

The Court sidestepped the

issue of the civil religiosity of the pledge of allegiance to
the American flag.

In West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), the

Court ruled that the state could not require students to publically profess a "patriotic creed," but the grounds for the
decision concerned freedom of speech rather than freedom of
religion sections of the First Amendment (Michaelson, 1970:
210-211).

In the arena of public school education, the Court

has not ruled, other than in Barnette, on the restriction of
civil religious expression in schools.

Civil religious cere-

mony is one of the few remaining institutional outlets for
religious expression in American public education.
Although the religious content of public education has
been severely restricted by the Supreme Court, there ha~ been
no effort or intention to limit the moral dimension of public
education.

In 1951, the Educational Policies Commission of

the National Educational Association recommended that public
schools emphasize values shared by all Americans and become
a major institutional source of socialization of these values.
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Ten values which the Commission agreed were common to the
American people were:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Human personality--the basic value;
moral responsibility;
institutions as the servants of men;
common consent;
devotion to truth;
respect for excellence;
moral equality;
brotherhood;
the pursuit of happiness; and
spiritual enrichment (Michaelson, 1970:242).

This set of humanistic values, which does not contain reference to a supreme being or to a denominational creed, is
representative of American civil religion of either the folk
religion or common faith models.

Despite the humanistic ori-

entation, the Commission was careful to stress the spiritual
nature of these values, perhaps to reassure those who feared
complete secularization of the public educational system
(Michaelson, 1970:242).

The values were also selected to

represent ideals which Americans have in common, since the
public schools have traditionally tried to perform an integrative function for society.

Michaelson notes the high

level of public expectations for the public schools to foster
American unity.
The American public school came of age in the early
decades of the twentieth century, and with this maturity
came even greater symbolic potency. Enrollments skyrocketed at a far more rapid pace than population growth.
The percentage of the population in school increased
dramatically. The public high school emerged as a new
and crucially important institution.
It continued and
capped the work of the elementary school in socializing
and Americanizing the youth. The comprehensive high
school, offering a wide variety of subjects and experiences to students from every class, every ethnic and
religious group, became the most important symbol of the
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unifying and democratizing role of the public school.
In the American mind the public school became the primary
institution of American democrac~ the cradle and bulwark
of its liberties.
It became a prime article of American
faith to "believe in" the public school (Michaelson,
1970:137).
In the past, American public schools democratized and integrated the immigrant.

In more recent times, the public

school has been the primary American institution charged
with the moral task of racial integration (Brown v. Board of
Education).

In contemporary society, as the school continues

to assume functions traditionally performed by American faroilies and religious organizations, expectations for schools
to serve religious functions are likely to increase, rather
than decline.

Because the Supreme Court ruled that public

schools cannot become an establishment of religion, the religious function of the schools is increasingly expressed in
civil religious terms, and focused on civil religious functions.

Public schools are expected to socialize students to

the civil religious values of equality, brotherhood, and respect for individual personality.

These values are general

and are intended to overarch the values of particular religious organizations, ethnic and racial groups, and class
divisions.

Public schools are expected to produce individ-

uals socialized to these values who are able to participate
in an integrated common society.

This expectation of social

integration has not always been realistic.

Michaelson (1970:

263) observes that the "schools' record in handling pluralism has not been a particularly bright one.

Textbooks, for
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example, tend to project an image of a rising tide of national
oneness of mind, ignoring the ebb of group differences."
Whether or not the schools succeed in fostering generalized,
civil religious values which can truly overarch national divisions is, of course, the basic challenge to American civil religion which Bellah (1975) addressed as the "broken covenant."
The American public schools have historically served as a vehicle of the American covenant, and today many Americans continue to look to the schools as an institutional source of
societal salvation (Michaelson, 1970:254-255).
Voluntary Associations
Warner's (1961) symbolic study of Memorial Day celebrations in an American community suggests that civil religion can be practiced by Americans through voluntary associations such as veteran's organizations and religio-civic
community groups.
Knowles (1978)

Research by Pamela Jolicoeur and Louis

finds that fraternal orders still provide an

avenue of civil religious expression for many Americans today.
Jolicoeur and Knowles note that fraternal orders are likely
institutional carriers of American civil religion because
orders have traditionally performed both religious and civic
functions.

Fraternal orders are not "churches'' or denomina-

tions as such, but they engage in ritual celebrations based
on shared myths and affirm a religiously-based morality.
Several studies have noted the religious and moral dimensions
of fraternal associations (Gist, 1940; Mackenzie, 1967;
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Schmidt and Babchuk, 1972).

Fraternal orders are also major

advocates of patriotism and civic virtue.

Orders are there-

fore among the associations most likely to promulgate the
symbols of American civil religion (Jolicoeur and Knowles,
1978:4).
The fraternal order selected for study by Jolicoeur
and Knowles was the Freemasons, an order founded in England
in the eighteenth century and which has served as a model for
other American fraternal associations.

The estimated nation-

al membership of the Freemasons is four million adult males,
encompassing ten million persons totally through affiliated
organizations for families of members.

Data concerning Free-

masonry were collected from issues of The New Age, a national
Masonic journal, from 1964 to 1974.

The New Age was selected

for content analysis because it has the largest national circulation among Masonic journals and because it is the official journal of the Southern Jurisdiction of Scottish Rite
Freemasonry, representing Hasons in thirty-five states.

An-

alysis of data revealed that 60 percent of the 482 articles
sampled were concerned with general topics, and 40 percent
with topics specifically related to Masonry.

Among the ar-

ticles devoted to general topics, 31 percent concerned American institutions and the American way of life, and 27.2 percent concerned religion or civil religion specifically.

The

remainder of the articles dealt with historical subjects such
as the founding of the nation.

God was mentioned in 46.5

percent of all articles in the sample, the Constitution was
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cited in 19.2 percent, and the founding fathers were referred
to in 21.6 percent (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978:10-11).
Jolicoeur and Knowles interpret these findings as confirmation of the hypothesis that Freemasonry is devoted to the
maintenance of American civil religion.
The Masonic model of American civil religion differs
somewhat from the transcendent universal model of Bellah.
Both the Masons and Bellah would be categorized in Marty's
typology of kinds of civil religion (see figure 1) as representatives of transcendent civil religion, which envisions a
transcendent God who stands in judgement of society.

Al-

though both the Masons and Bellah agree on the divinely transcendent nature of American civil religion, they differ on
the content of the prophetic message.

According to The New

Age, "the most serious challenges to the American way of life
are Communism, creeping Federal control of the nation, and
civil disobedience"

(Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978:17).

Bellah

(1975), in contrast, cites capitalism, racism, and sexism as
major threats to the American covenant.

Other differences

between Bellah and the Masons are revealed by Jolicoeur and
Knowles's data.

Bellah sees Abraham Lincoln as a major pro-

phet of American civil religion, but The New Age articles
contained more references to George \'lashington ( 12. 7 percent
of the sampled articles) than to Lincoln (3.6 percent).

The

Freemasons emphasize the Revolutionary period and see the
Constitution and Bill of Rights as symbols of the personal
freedoms guaranteed to Americans by the government.

The New
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Age gives little attention to Civil War symbolism and its
themes of sacrifice and rebirth which signify to Bellah the
dissolution and renewal of the American covenant.

The civil

religion of the Masons is essentially conservative, emphasizing the defense of American institutions, while Bellah's civil
religion challenges existing institutional arrangements to renew the spirit of the covenant.

Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978:

17) summarize their findings on the Hasonic model of American
civil religion compared to that of Bellah.
To summarize, Scottish Rite Freemasons stress the
importance of the revolutionary era as the golden age of
the nation.
The Constitution and Bill of Rights together
with the Declaration of Independence comprise the blueprints for the divinely-inspired society. The national
dilemma of slavery and the crisis of the War between the
States are largely ignored. The future of the nation
depends on its citizens modeling themselves after the
example of Washington and other revolutionary leaders in
their devotion to God and country. While Masons agree
with Bellah that the present time is an era of great crisis for the United States, their prophetic message is a
call to return to a former golden age rather than to
forge a new society and new structures.
Jolicoeur and Knowles's findings are congruent with
Wimberly's (1976) data which showed a positive association
between American civil religious beliefs and political .conservatism.

Jolicoeur and Knowles believe, however, that al-

though the Masons hold a particular interpretation of civil
religion, considerable diversity of views exists among other
voluntary associations.

Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978:18) sug-

gest that Bellah's model of a universal transcendent American
civil religion is an ideal type within which there is variation in functional reality.

Fraternal orders may function
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as conservative, civil religious, denomination-like, classdefending voluntary bastions, while other voluntary associations, such as the human potential groups and organizations
like Transcendental Meditation, may potentially function as
revolutionary civil religious "cults."

Bellah (1974c:41) be-

lieves that the latter types of associations are "revolutionary" in the sense that they could foster "fundamental structural change, socially and culturally" based on a "shift
away from the exclusive dominance of technical reason," although Bellah admits that these groups "are quite incapable
at the moment of supplying the revolutionary alternative."
The empirical findings of Jolicoeur and Knowles and Bellah's
ideas suggest that future research on voluntary associations
as a vehicle for the practice of American civil religion
would be fruitful.

Research efforts should focus upon iden-

tification of voluntary associations which foster the values
of American civil religion, classification of the associations' ideologies along a conservatism-utopianism continuum,
and exploration of the relationship between the associations
and other institutional carriers of American civil religion.
The Economy
According to Robert Bellah's (1975) analysis of contemporary American society, the values of American civil religion are in conflict with the central values of corporate
capitalism.

Civil religious and capitalistic values emerged

together in the early history of the nation, but have since
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become widely divergent.

Hiding behind the facade of indi-

vidualism, corporate development has created a means-oriented
economic system uninformed by ultimate concerns.

A break in

the American covenant is the result.
The History of Utilitarian Individualism
Bellah sees the American nation born under a dual myth.
From the biblical tradition, Americans conceived of themselves as "God's chosen people" directed to build a "new Israel" in the new world.

The self-transcendent possibilities

implied in the concept of a chosen people were tempered by
the belief in a transcendent, prophetic God.

This relation-

ship between citizen and deity is what Bellah calls the "American covenant."

A second powerful American myth has been

utilitarian individualism.

Utilitarian individualism orig-

inated in ancient Greek philosophy and has been carried to
the modern era by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and later by the
social Darwinists of the late nineteenth century.

Utilitar-

ian individualism has run parallel to biblically-based Arnerican myths, both historically interacting in complex "relations of attraction and repulsion"

(Bellah, 1974:34).

Bellah

elaborates first on the points of conflict between the biblical tradition of American civil religion and utilitarian
individualism.
Whereas the central term for understanding individual
motivation in the biblical tradition was "conscience,"
the central term in the utilitarian tradition was "interest." The biblical understanding of national life was
based on the notion of community with charity for all
members, a community supported by public and private
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virtue. The utilitarian tradition believed in a neutral
state in which individuals would be allowed to pursue the
maximization of self-interest and the product would be
public and private prosperity (Bellah, 1974:34).
There are also points of conjunction between American civil
religion and utilitarian individualism.

Both myths stress

individualism, freedom, and morality, although for different
purposes.
The biblical tradition promised earthly rewards, as
well as heavenly, for virtuous actions. The utilitarian
tradition required self-restraint and "morality" if not
as ends then as means . . . . The central value for utilitarian individualism was freedom, a term that could
obscure the gap between the utilitarian and biblical
traditions, since it is a central biblical term as well.
But for biblical religion, freedom meant above all freedom from sin, freedom to do the right, and was almost
equivalent to virtue. For utilitarianism it meant the
freedom to pursue one's own ends (Bellah, 1974:34-35).
Ultimately biblical tradition was coopted by the utilitarians
to the extent that religious and civil religious values were
used to legitimate the achievement of self-interest.

The

American rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
were celebrated by utilitarian individualists as the right to
pursue wealth and profit through the private enterprise system
(Bellah, 1975:121).
Corporate Capitalism
Although the pure instrumentality of industrial capitalism was originally hidden behind the facade of civil religious
values, the relationship between American civil religion and
modern capitalism has become increasingly tenuous.

Bellah

(1975:130-131) believes that "the system of corporate industry
that has grown up in the last century undermines essential
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American values and constitutional order."

Far from insuring

individual rights and freedoms, corporate growth has diminished the power of the individual citizen.

As examples,

Bellah notes the decline of the small private business and
the near disappearance of the autonomous family farm.

Today

the average American is a wage-earner in corporate industry
or agribusiness.

Along with the loss of economic autonomy,

Bellah believes that individual citizens have lost political
power to corporate hands.

Today, political decision making

is based on utilitarian considerations of corporate profit,
at the expense of personal piety or public virtue.

Bellah

observes that the supposed benefits of the American economy,
"prosperity, abundance, and wealth" are still not available
to certain segments of the population and are ultimately unsatisfying even to many who achieve them (Bellah, 1975:135).
Analyzing the social protest movements of the 1960s and early
1970s, which were notable for their inclusion of middle-class,
educated American youth, Bellah concludes that the protest
movements were symptomatic of a national religious crisis.
That education and affluence did not bring happiness or
fulfillment was perhaps as important as the fact that
society did not seem to be able to solve the problem of
racism and poverty . . . . The deepest cause . . . was, in
my opinion, the inability of utilitarian individualism to
provide a meaningful pattern of personal and social existence . . . (Bellah, 1974c:36),.
Bellah cites the civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., as an example of religiously based response
to the failures of utilitarian individualism.

Bellah (1974c)

also hopes that some of the anti-utilitarian religious
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movements of the 1970s will provide visions which could serve
as inspiration to renew the American covenant.

In the econo-

mic sphere, Bellah (1975:136) advocates a form of "decentralized democratic socialism" which, unlike the anti-individualistic socialism of the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, would
strike a balance between individual and societal needs.
Bellah is not naively optimistic about either religious
renewal or economic change in the United States.

A critical

test of the viability of contemporary American civil religion
is its very difficult task of informing an economic system
with a structure of ultimate meaning.
Bellah's critic, Richard Penn, essentially agrees with
Bellah that the contemporary American economy operates outside
the context of ultimacy.

Penn believes that modern economies

become functional alternatives to religion and contain the
sources of their own legitimacy.
Finally, legitimacy in these most advanced societies
depends on the capacity to meet most popular demands for
participation in the polity and for high levels of consumption rather than on the manipulation of religious
symbols. Cultural integration on the level of religious
beliefs and values, then, is under these conditions no
longer either possible or even necessary for the maintenance of motivation and order (Penn, 1972:17).
Both Bellah and Penn agree that the ideology of American corporate capitalism is incongruent with the valuesofAmerican
civil religion.

Disagreement between Bellah and Penn exists

only on the level of response to the incongruency and recommendations for the future of the nation.

Penn records and

analyzes the differentiation of economic and religious
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institutions, a process he sees as smooth and evolutionary.
Bellah registers concern that economic institutions are increasingly disharmonious with traditional American values, a
process he observes as conflictual and precipitous of both
reactionary and revolutionary social movements.

Bellah is

also not unwilling to respond to what he sees as a crisis of
meaning with a prophetic call for the establishment of an
economic system congruent with the values of American civil
religion.

Another and perhaps synthetic position is offered

by Robert Stauffer (1973).

Stauffer believes that even a

utilitarian economy requires some overarching basis of legitimacy.

The renewal of American civil religion could provide

this legitimacy, or new ideological systems may emerge in the
future to provide legitimacy and guidance to the technological economic sector of American society.
Conclusion
There is little sociological research on the relationship between American civil religion and other American institutions.

Three relevant studies are summarized in this

chapter, but only one (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978) was based
on sociological research methods.

Current knowledge, although

quite limited, would support the hypothesis that most American
institutions are in the process of differentiating from both
traditional religion and civil religion.

The institutions

likely to be least differentiated from American civil religion
are the traditional institutions of socialization and
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integration:

the family, religious organizations, religio-

civic voluntary associations, and educational institutions.
These institutions would be expected to manifest civil religious symbols as a high level of generality.

Sociological

research by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978) and historical research by Michaelson (1970) support this hypothesis.

Insti-

tutions performing instrumental functions, such as the economy and communications media, would be expected to exhibit
the most differentiation from American civil religion.
According to Fenn (1972), Thomas and Flippen (1972), and
even Bellah (1975) it is problematic whether civil religious
symbols continue to infuse these institutions today.

Because

available data are so limited, these hypotheses are quite
tentative.

The field is now open for sociologists to respond

to Hammond's (1976:171) important question, "What institutions
promulgate, transmit, maintain, and modify American civil
religion?"

PART IV
THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL RELIGION

CHAPTER XI
THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION
Four major propositions concerning American civil religion, adapted from the work of John A. Coleman (1970) are
presented in the Introduction to the present study.

Proposi-

tion IV locates the development of American civil religion
within the context of general cultural evolution.

By focus-

ing upon the process of differentiation, stated in Propositions II and III, Coleman concludes that the differentiation
of American civil religion from other social institutions
parallels basic evolutionary trends.

The entire proposition

set, with the final proposition added, is reproduced below.
Proposition I
American civil religion is the religious symbol system
which relates the citizen's role and American society's place
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate
existence and meaning.
Proposition II
American civil religion is structurally differentiated
from both the political community and the religious community.
Proposition III
American civil religion performs specialized religious
functions performed neither by church nor state.
186
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Proposition IV
The differentiation of American civil religion from
political and religious coromunities follows the general direction of cultural evolution.
Proposition IV, which states that the structural and
functional differentiation of American civil religion can be
predicted by the general direction of cultural evolution, requires further elaboration.

In part III, chapter VIII of

this volume, the evolutionary theories of Parsons (1971) and
Bellah (1964) were discussed as predecessors to Coleman's
(1970) theory of civil religious evolution.

The evolutionary

processes of differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion,
and value generalization (Parsons, 1971:126) were shown to
be the basis of Bellah's five ideal typical historical stages
of religious evolution:

primitive, archaic, historic, early

modern, and modern religion.

Although Bellah does not men-

tion the development of civil religion in his article on religious evolution, the evolutionary trends he observes are
logically extended by Coleman to the differentiation of civil
religion.

Coleman finds religion, civil religion, and polit-

ical systems generally undifferentiated in primitive and
archaic societies.

In historic or early modern society,

church-state separation develops for the first time, but
civil religion does not yet appear in differentiated form.
In modern societies, civil religion may continue in an undifferentiated state, sponsored either by church or state.
Another modern alternative is the development of secular
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nationalism, a functional alternative to civil religion, exemplified by the modern U.S.S.R.

The other alternative, the

development of a fairly autonomous, differentiated system of
civil religion, is to be expected in the most modern, highly
differentiated, religiously plural societal type.

Coleman

believes that this pattern of differentiated civil religion
is evident in the contemporary United States.
Coleman's theory of civil religious evolution is a logical outgrowth of the evolutionary models of Parsons and
Bellah.

In order to compare Coleman's theory and Proposition

IV to ideas advanced by other sociologists of religion, several different theories of religious change will be examined.
The ideas of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Joachim Wach, Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Bryan Wilson, Richard Fenn, and
David Martin will be explored, with major attention given to
each theorist's model of religious evolution and its implications for civil religious evolution.

Because each of the

selected theories proposes that religious evolution in some
way results in secularization, the uses of the term "secularization" will first be addressed.
The Concept of Secularization in Theories
of Religious Evolution
On the most general level of analysis, each of the
selected theories of religious evolution proposes that modernization is associated with secularization.

Secularization is

a concept which has been used in different ways by different
sociologists, resulting in analytic imprecision.

Larry Shiner
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(1968:208-209) notes that, besides the original meaning of
secularization (the transfer of lands from church to civil
control) , there are six other common uses of the term in contemporary sociological research:

(1) decline of religion,

(2) conformity with "this world,"

(3) disengagement of soci-

ety from religion,
institutions,

(4) transposition of religious beliefs and

(5) desacralization of the world, and (6) move-

ment from a "sacred" to a "secular" society.

Secularization

as "decline of religion" refers to the loss of prestige and
social acceptance associated with traditional religion.
Empirical studies, such as Glock and Stark's Religion and
Society in Tension (1957), which concluded that religion is
losing its influence, exemplify the decline-of-religion type
of secularization.

Secularization viewed as "conformity with

'this world'" would result in a society preoccupied with
ordinary activities of daily life maintenance to the extent
that religious boundaries between groups would disappear.
Typical of this second meaning of secularization is Will Herberg's (1960) thesis that current, American religious identifications are largely secular in nature and simply reflect
acceptable ways of being a good American.

Secularization as

"disengagement of society from religion" refers to the process by which social institutions separate themselves from
religious understanding and control, leaving religion to motivate the private lives of individuals.

This is essentially

the theory of Peter Berger (1967) and Thomas Luckmann (1967).
Shiner criticizes all three definitions of secularization for
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ambiguity and dependence upon the definition of religion for
derived meaning.

For example, it is difficult to show secu-

larization as a decline of religion without specifying some
original period of religious domination from which decline
could come (Shiner, 1968:210).

Shiner (1968:213) suggests

that "the more descriptive and neutral"concept of differentiation be substituted for secularization when either "decline
of religion" or "disengagement of society from religion" are
intended.
The idea of secularization as a "transposition of religious beliefs and institutions" is a fairly precise meaning
of secularization, referring to the transformation of sacred
phenomena into phenomena controlled by humans.

It was

through "transposition" that the spirit of capitalism became
a secularized version of the Protestant Ethic.

"Desacraliza"-

tion of the world" also has a specific meaning based on
Weber's process of rationalization and disenchantment.

The

final definition of secularization, "movement from a 'sacred'
to a 'secular' society" is taken from Howard Becker's (1957)
analysis.

According to Becker, the secular society is the

society open to change, not only from religious traditions,
but also from any traditional beliefs.

Becker's usage of

secularization is the broadest of the six meanings, as it is
derived from a general theory of social change.
Due to the need for conceptual clarification and precise operational definition, Shiner (1968:207) recommends
that social scientists either stop using the term
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secularization, or recognize that it is "a comprehensive term
covering three complementary processes:
differentiatio~

and transposition."'

desacralization,

Typical of the concept-

ual imprecision criticized by Shiner is the work of Bryan
Wilson, whose conceptualizations of secularization range from
disengagement to desacralization to decline of religion.

In

Contemporary Transformations of Religion (Wilson, 1976:16, 20,
11), for example, Wilson characterizes secularization through
the observations that "the presidency that the Church once
exercised over social life is gone"

(disengagement); "modern

society simply denies the authority of the Churches by ignoring them"

(decline of religion) ; and "we can observe a grad-

ual, uneven, at times oscillating trend, the general direction of which is none the less unmistakable, in the nature of
human consciousness, towards . . . a 'matter-of-fact' orientation to the world"

(desacralization).

Applying Shiner's

criteria for clarification, Wilson can be credited for his
treatment of secularization as a complex phenomenon involving
several separate but interrelated parts; but he can also be
criticized for his failure to distinguish the different processes involved in secularization.

A more systematic treat-

ment of secularization is advanced by David Martin in A
General Theory of Secularization (1978).

According to Martin

(1978:69), differentiation and "the onset of anomie" are the
basic processes related to secularization.

These processes

are subject to cultural and historical variation, resulting
in a variety of basic patterns of secularization.

In order
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to systematize these variations, Martin specifies a series of
cultural frames, events, and categories which characterize
the basic patterns of secularization.

Basic patterns of sec-

ularization may be indicated, for example, by the degree of
religious pluralism in a society, the degree of anti-clericism,
the degree of cultic participation, and by other variables relating to structural differentiation (Martin, 1978:59).

By

evaluating societies according to each indicator, a complex
pattern of secularization emerges which is far more detailed
and specific than Wilson's general use of the term secularization could provide.

Martin is the one contemporary theorist

who has made the greatest effort to conceptualize secularization as a complex phenomenon affected by numerous variables
and observable in a variety of cultural patterns.

Due to the

fact that Martin is exceptional in his precise treatment of
secularization, the following analysis of theories of religious change remains hampered by the conceptual imprecision
critiqued by Shiner.

In the following analyses of the theories

of Durkheim, Weber, Wach, Berger and Luckmann, Wilson, Penn,
and Martin, specific terms such as differentiation and rationalization (desacralization) are substituted whenever possible
for the more general ''secularization.n

It is expected that

this more precise delineation of the specific processes associated with secularization will lead to a clearer understanding
of patterns of religious evolution and the implications of
these patterns for civil religious evolution.
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Selected Theories of Religious Evolution
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim has proposed a unilinear, evolutionary model
for the explanation of the religious changes which are associated with industrial development.

The model posits a uni-

linear movement of societies from the sacred to the profane
polarity associated with the process of differentiation.

A

specific examination of Durkheim's model begins with his primary postulate which asserts that collective representations,
the concrete symbols of the social group, constitute collective reality.

The original collective representation, the

religious symbol, is the basis from which all other representations evolved (Durkheim, 1965:22).

Durkheim further posits

a transition in the collective representations from sacred to
profane, paralleled by a shift from repressive to restitutive
law (Durkheim, 1965:53).

From these postulated changes in

the collective indicators of social reality, a core Durkheimian hypothesis can be deduced:
to organic solidarity.

the movement from mechanical

In terms of social organization, the

transition occurs from segmental to organized social types.
The segmental type, analogous to the homogeneous rings of an
earthworm, is the social organization of the clan.

The organ-

ized type, the product of the division of labor, is similar
to a "system of different organs each of which has a special
role, and which are themselves formed of differentiated parts"
(Durkheim, 1964:181).

The division of labor itself is caus-

ally linked with the growth of moral and material density.
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Not mere population growth alone, but the increased clustering and interaction of populations are the stimuli which set
off a complex chain reaction.

Viewed historically, the

material and moral density of society induced a division of
labor, which produced organized societal types from segmental
ones and organic solidarity from mechanical solidarity.
These processes of transition are indicated empirically by
the concrete changes in legal sanctions from repressive to
restitutive forms, and the movement from sacred to profane
collective representations.

In highly simplified terms,

structural differentiation produces movement from a sacred to
a secular society.
Unlike modern privatists, Durkheim does not predict
that the common conscience would disappear under organic solidarity in modern society.

As society becomes more hetero-

geneous and differentiated, the common conscience would
necessarily broaden to include individual differences.

Durk-

heim spent a portion of his intellectual life shifting back
and forth on the issue of moral crisis under organic solidarity.

On the one hand, he feared the breakdown of the moral

community into a state of anomie.

On the other, he offered

solutions to combat anomie and explanations for the perseverance of morality.

One explanation was the evolution of

justice in restitutive law.

Durkheim presents justice as

the highest form of morality in organic society with individualism the last surviving mechanical form.

The civil
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religion which Durkheim envisioned for France was based on a
combination of justice and rational individualism (Bellah,
1973:xl-xli).
Durkheim's model of religious change can be categorized
as a unilineal model of progressive evolution from sacred to
profane symbols.

The sacred and profane stages are posed as

polar opposites, with no intermediary stages defined.

Al-

though Durkheim clearly associates the sacred to profane
transition with the process of differentiation, users of the
model have no clear indicators of the state of sacred beliefs
at any given point in time, other than through the empirical
examination of restitutive law and of the sacred belief systems themselves.

Durkheim's model is therefore quite general

and suffers from lack of specification of independent, dependent, and intervening variables.

Durkheim's assumption of

unilinear differentiation might also be questioned by the
observers of complex social reality.

Nevertheless, Durkheim's

model stimulated a series of linear theories of religious evolution--most notably the theories of Wach (1962)
(1971)

1

1

Parsons

and Bellah (1964)--which more clearly specify some of

the variables suggested by Durkheim 1 and critically re-address
the assumptions of evolutionary thought.

Coleman's (1970)

theory of civil religious evolution is partially derived from
Durkheim's general model of cultural and religious evolution.
Proposition IV's assertion that the differentiation of civil
religion follows the general pattern of cultural evolution
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assumes a Durkheimian view of evolution, minus the assumption
of absolute unilinearity.
Max Weber
Weber is well-known for his study of religious change
in the modern industrial period (Weber, 1948).

Weber's con-

cept for the unilinear process of modernization is rationalization, a process which has important implications for
religious systems.

Through increasing use of rational bases

for human social action, the world gradually loses its sacred
character to causal and efficiency-oriented explanations of
reality.

Rationality refers to the functional rationality in

which goal attainment is based on utilitarian principles.
The effect of rationalization on religion is secularization
or the "desacralization of the world" type (Shiner, 1968:215216).

In the religious sphere, the trend of progressive

rationalization is evidenced in the social attitude of "disenchantment."
Weber's study of the Protestant Ethic is an effort to
gauge the effects of progressive rationalization in the context of modern Protestantism.

In particular, Weber was

interested in the legitimating function of religion, and how
that function might be affected by rationalization.

Weber's

conclusions on the Protestant Ethic thesis have been controversial and open to varying interpretations and critiques.
One commentator, David Little (1970) has made observations
which have particular relevance to the relationship between
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rationalization and system of legitimation.

According to

Little's analysis of Weber, rationalization and the rationallegal type of authority assume increasing institutional differentiation and autonomy, in contrast to the institutional
dominance of the traditional system.

Yet, religion always

serves as a legitimating force, even for the process of rationalization.
Wherever the direction of the whole way of life
has been methodically rationalized, it has been profoundly determined by the ultimate values toward which this
rationalization has been oriented. These values and
points of view were thus religiously conditioned (Weber,
1958:286-287).
Little concludes that Weber found Calvinism and Puritanism to
be congruent in their support of the capitalist ethos, and
thus served as legitimating factors.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
was written to suggest that some of the characteristics
of the spirit of capitalism are contained in the theological symbols and beliefs that could initially solve--or
at least give some direction to--the crisis of order
which attends the development of modern industrial society (Little, 1970:13).
Although neither Weber nor Little addresses himself to the
issue of civil religion, Little's interpretation of Weber's
theory of modernization is congruent with Coleman's theory of
civil religious evolution.

Both theories predict increasing

differentiation as the basic evolutionary process.

Both the-

ories also state that the crisis of order precipitated by
differentiation must be addressed by an ultimate system of
reference.

For Coleman, this ultimate system of reference is

civil religion.
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Joachim Wach
Wach's (1944) model of religious change throughout history contains many descriptive examples of the ways in which
religious differentiation follows social differentiation.
The result is somewhat similar to Bellah's (1964) differentiation theory of religious evolution.

Typical of Wach's model

is his outline of three types, or stages, of church-state relationship.

In the primitive Stage 1, church and state are

fused to the point that it is impossible to determine which
institution dominates.

In Stage 2 (comparable to Bellah's

archaic and historic religions) both politics and cults gain
strength, leading either to state establishment as a means of
control over religion or the beginnings of the process of
eventual church-state separation.

In Stage 3 (Bellah's his-

toric, early modern, and modern religions) the state reacts
to new and competing religions with the same alternatives of
Stage 2--establishment or pluralism (Wach, 1944:299-302).
Wach's model does not address the possibilities subsequently
raised by Coleman (1970)

for the variation of church-state

relations in contemporary societies.

Depending upon the lev-

el of institutional differentiation within a society, Coleman
observes either an undifferentiated form of civil religion
sponsored by either church or state, secular nationalism, or
differentiated civil religion within a religiously plural
context.
Wach's linear model of religious change is not sophisticated, but it sets the style of future, more elaborate
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models developed by Parsons (1971) and Bellah (1964).

Wach's

treatment of religious evolution is to be credited for its
analysis of secularization in terms of the more specific
processes of social and religious differentiation.

In Wach's

view, it is the differentiation and pluralization of religious
structures, not secularization, that is the characteristic
and dominant religious process of the modern age.

Proposi-

tion IV, which states that civil religious systems follow
the same differentiating pattern as other religious systems,
is a logical extension of Wach's model to the realm of civil
religion.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann
The works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann on religion and modernization will be examined together, based on
their collaboration in the development of the dialectical
process theory presented in The Social Construction of Reality (1966).

The dialectical process theory traces the mech-

anisms by which social forms are "internalized" through
socialization, "externalized" through social action, and "objectified" through reification and institutionalization,
only to be internalized by the subsequent generation.
Through this ongoing dialectical process social reality (including religious reality) is "created."
Peter Berger (1967) views religion as the human construction of a "sacred cosmos''

(1967:25).

During the dialec-

tic stage of objectification, religious constructions are
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reified and become separated from the individual.

When reli-

gious constructions begin to lose their power, due to industrialization, cultural differentiation, or other forces
inherent in religion itself, secularization emerges in a similar dialectical process.

Berger views secularization as

both a societal and individual process.

On the social level,

secularization is the process whereby religions lose their
legitimating influence over segments of society.

This con-

ception of secularization is similar to Shiner's (1968:212214) secularization as "disengagement of society from religion."
Secularization of consciousness refers to the individual loss
of religious interpretations of the world and of the self.
Through secularization, religion is no longer a source of a
binding worldview and moral community but becomes privatized.
In one sense, secularization (differentiation)· has acted as a
disorganizing process, but it has also opened up a world of
many religious and nonreligious modes of potential reorganization.
In a later work, The Homeless Mind:

Modernization and

Consciousness (with Brigitte Berger and Hansfield Kellner,
1973), Berger specifies in more detail the components of modern
consciousness and the processes of modernization.

Modern

(secularized) consciousness is indicated by the characteristics of rationality, componentiality, multi-relationality,
makeability, plurality, and progressivity. (1973:111-113).
The processes of modernization include the primary processes
of technological production and bureaucratization
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(rationalization) , and the secondary processes of urbanization, open systems of stratification, mass education, and mass
communication (differentiation)

(1973:103).

The major trans-

mission process of rationalization and differentiation is
cultural diffusion, by which the symbols of modernization are
envied and copied (1973:139).

In The Homeless Mind, Berger

does not expand beyond his earlier conclusions on the implications of modernization for religion.

Religious alienation

and privatization continue to be the presumed result of modernization.

Berger does predict the development of a non-

religious ideology, "demodernization consciousness," as the
dialectical result of the objectification of modernizations.
Although The Homeless Mind brings little new to the study of
religious change, Berger's specification of the processes of
modernization is important for the future use of the dialectic process model for the study of religious evolution.
Thomas Luckmann (1967) focuses more specifically than
Berger upon the reorganization potential of secularization
for religion.

Luckmann begins his 1967 analysis by noting

that the sociology of religion has frequently taken it for
granted that the church and religion are identical.

This

assumption led to the conclusion that, when modernization
began to undermine the traditional churches, religion was
similarly undermined.

Luckmann suggests that the study of

the effects of modernization on existing religious institutions actually obscures the fact that new religious meaning
systems are being developed (1967:40).
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Luckmann describes several alternative modes of adaptation to the erosion of traditional religious meanings.

The

individual may alternatively make an individualistic "leap of
faith" into a personal, religious meaning system; he or she
may shift back and forth between traditional and secular definitions of reality; or he or she may develop an explicitly
secular value system (1967:86).

Church religion is thus one

surviving organizational form of religion and is not disorganized in the formal organizational sense of the term.

Pri-

vate but still religious views of reality are also emerging,
based (according to Luckmann) on the themes of autonomy,
self-expression, self-realization, the mobility ethos, sexuality, and familism (1967:108-114).

These themes are more

or less identical to those specified by Richard Fenn (1972:
17) as the only remaining functions of religion in modern
society.

Luckmann is also in agreement with Fenn (1970;

1972; 1974) in his conclusion that the new, subjective religious forms are far less cohesive than traditional religious
forms, and have a low degree of transcendence.

The evolu-

tionary perspective is maintained in Luckmann's prediction
that the religious trends he describes are irreversible byproducts of modern industrialism.
Neither Berger nor Luckmann specifies stages of religious evolution associated with stages of modernization.
Differentiation and its impact on religious construction of
reality proceeds in an unspecified evolutionary manner,
marked only by the dialectical process stages of objectification,
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externalization, and internalization.

Neither Berger nor

Luckmann deals explicitly with the functions of religion,
but both generally predict a decline of the role of traditional religion in fostering social integration and legitimation of meaning.

Both predict a weakening of traditional

religious structures, the privatization of religion, and the
development of multiple sacred and secular ideological choices
for the modern individual.

Although Berger and Luckmann do

not include civil religion as one of the possible religious
choices in contemporary society, presumably civil religion
could provide an alternative mode of adaptation to the ero-

sion of traditional religion.

But the fact that neither

theorist considers civil religion for this purpose suggests
that privatism does not offer strong support of a theory of

civil religious evolution.
Bryan Wilson
Wilson draws both on Durkheim's assumption of unilinear differentiation and on Weber's process of rationalization
as bases for a modern theory of secularization which characterizes religion as declining in influence, becoming desacralized, and differentiating from other institutions.

With

the advent of industrialization and technological development, the "slow process of change in the thinking of men has
been steadily to make religious belief and practice .
difficult for modern man"

(Wilson, 1976:12).

The result is

that "traditional theology, church organization, and sacred
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rituals appear to be fundamentally irreconcilable with the
values, lifestyles, and functional imperatives of advanced
industrial society"

(Wilson, 1968:73).

Sources of the de-

cline of religion are to be found in the processes of differentiation and rationalization, particularly manifest in ''the
decline of community," "increased social mobility," and
impersonality of role relationships"

11

the

(Wilson, 1976:99).

Where these processes are observable, particularly in Western
societies, societal responses include ecumenism, voluntary
destructuration, incorporation of rationalization, eclecticism, and charismatic renewal (Wilson, 1976:85).

These re-

sponses to religious erosion are all viewed as manifestations
of the overriding process of secularization.

Even counter-

secular forces such as religious renewal are characterized as
merely ephemeral substitutes for declining traditional religious organizations.
Although Wilson posits the erosion of religious beliefs
and institutions along a line of progressive rationalization,
he is aware of cultural and historical variation in religious
evolution.

The unique feature affecting the American pattern

of religious evolution has been the structure of denominational pluralism.

Wilson believes that the American pattern

of interdenominational competition is itself a manifestation
of religious decline.

"That competitiveness itself reflects

one of the primary secular values of American life."

As a

result, "American churches function as voluntary associations
and voluntaryism itself may account for their institutional
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resilience"

(Wilson, 1968:77-78).

In Wilson's (1968:79) view,

religious organizations in America function as "surrogate communities based on the will for togetherness," performing emotional functions for individuals, but failing to provide
sources of societal legitimation and regulation.
Wilson's theory of the progressive decline of religion
in modern society has implications for the study of American
civil religion, although Wilson limits his own analysis to
denominational religion.

Wilson's assumption of unilinear

religious decline and desacralization leads to a privatistic
position.

Wilson concludes that religious cohesion (and by

implication, civil religious cohesion) is lost in the rationalized, differentiated society.

"Modern societies have ceased

to depend on an integrated consensus of values as the basis
of cohesion"

(Wilson, 1976:113).

New religious movements are

dismissed as too transitory and uninstitutionalized to provide
new bases of societal integration and legitimacy.

The poten-

tial of civil religion to perform these functions is not even
considered.

Application of Wilson's assumptions to American

civil religion would lead to the conclusion that American
civil religion, like other religious forms, has declined in influence.

If American civil religion persists at all, it

would be manifest as nationally self-transcendent folk religion.
Wilson's theory is limited by the assumption of unilinear secularization.

Once secularization is predicted, all

observable religious forms are necessarily viewed as eroding,

206

inadequate, or transitory.

The persistence of religious sym-

bols and the phenomenen of religious renewal are not adequately explained.

Wilson's assumptions further lead to the

prediction of a societal crisis.

Wilson (1976:114-115) warns

that "no persisting society can leave people to do their own
thing" while observing that "we know no moral order to give
meaning to our social order."

If these statements are accu-

rate, presumably modern society no longer exists.

Yet there

is evidence which suggests that modern social orders do persist.

Wilson fails to confront this evidence and is drawn

into a paradox which remains unsatisfactorily answered.

This

paradox could be addressed by recognizing civil religion as a
potential source of social cohesion and legitimation for modern society.
Richard Penn
Richard Penn's basic assumptions concerning American
civil religion appear in chapters VI and IX of the present
study.

In a recent work, Toward a Theory of Secularization

(1978), Penn locates the evolution of civil religion within
the general context of religious evolution by specifying the
emergence and subsequent decline of civil religion as one
stage of secularization (differentiation) .

The five steps

in Penn's theory of secularization are:
Step 1

Differentiation of religious roles and institutions.
*Differentiation may be partial, continuing and
reversible.
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Step 2

Demand for clarification of boundary between religious and secular issues.
*Conflict between religious ethnic groups and the
larger society.

Step 3

Development of generalized religious symbols or
ideology:
the "civil religion."
*Problems of authenticity arise in the political
use of religious themes.

Step 4

Minority and idiosyncratic definitions-of-thesituation: secularized political authority.
*The dispersion of the sacred.

Step 5

The separation of individual from corporate life.
*Religious groups differ in their conceptions of
the scope of the sacred and in their demands for
integration of corporate and personal values systems (Penn, 1978:xvii).

Penn predicts that civil religion will emerge as a societal
solution to transcend particularistic ethnic and religious
identities which might divide society.

Civil religion is a

socially constructed myth, which is more or less believable
depending upon societal, and particularly political, conditions.

The power of civil religion is weakened, for example,

when ''the state itself departs from the standards of civil
religion, while continuing to invoke its symbols" thus leaving citizens "caught in a 'double-bind' between dissent and
loyalty"

(Penn, 1978:41).

When political or economically

motivated activity is masked by the symbols of civil religion, the symbols become tarnished and lose their transcendent and unifying potential. In the final stages of secularization, the state loses its sacred character, while "a
wider range of personal and social activity comes to acquire
sacred significance," until the boundary between secular and
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sacred realms corresponds to the boundary between societal
and personality systems (Penn, 1978:54).
Penn (1978:53) acknowledges that his theory of religious
evolution leads toward a "death of society" position.

Unlike

Wilson, Penn is willing to confront this issue by questioning
the process by which sociologists infer that a morally based
social order exists.
I have also become increasingly skeptical as to
whether there exists an overarching set of beliefs that
most Americans hold to be true of God and man, let alone
true for this nation.
References to such a cultural
whole by social scientists and politicians are forms of
mystification, in short, ideology. What is it, after all,
of which individual citizens are a part? What is that
"society" and where are its boundaries? For what does it
stand and what are its essential standards (Penn, 1978:
ix)?
Although Penn's five steps lead toward the moral dissolution
of society, the trend is not portrayed as totally unilinear.
There is dynamic tension between the trend toward desacralization of the societal system and the contrary trend of "desecularization" in other areas of social life.

"As political

authority becomes secularized various individuals, groups,
and institutions turn to religious culture for support in
their increased claims to social authority"

(Penn, 1978:55).

As the state is demythologized, private religious mythologies
become more demanding and competitive.

By recognizing the

dynamic relationship between secularization and desecularization, Penn acknowledges that religious change is a complex
process manifest through seemingly paradoxical trends and
countertrends.

Penn remains closed, however, to the
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possibility of desecularization at the societal level leading
to the renewal of American civil religion.

"To establish the

existence of such a cultural whole inevitably requires a leap
beyond the data"

(Fenn, 1978:51).

Although Fenn is only will-

ing to discuss American civil religion in the past tense, the
fact that he includes civil religion as a critical phase of
religious evolution is a contribution to the study of the relationship between general religious trends and patterns of
civil religious evolution.
David Martin
In A General Theory of Secularization (1978) David Martin outlines a series of propositions designed to specify the
conditions under which religious institutions lose influence
and religious beliefs become desacralized.

The resulting

theory is more specific and complex than the other theories
surveyed here, because more than one basic pattern of secularization is proposed.

Differentiation is specified as the

major universal process affecting religious change in modern
societies.

Martin is careful to note that, although universal

processes may be expected to occur, they are not invariate
and are subject to influence from a number of cultural factors.

Cultural "frames" through which differentiation flows

include major historical events, such as the Reformation or
the American Revolution; the influence of major ideologies,
such as Calvinism or enlightenment thought; and the relationship between religion and cultural identity (Martin, 1978:4-9).
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These general cultural frames suggest additional categories
of variables which Martin isolates as particularly crucial to
the formation of basic patterns of secularization.
egories include:

Major cat-

(1) whether the society is Catholic or not;

(2) whether the religion is monopolistic or not; and (3)
whether the society has developed through internal conflict
or conflict against external oppressors (Martin, 1978:17).
Variations in these categories result in the basic patterns
of secularization observable in different societies.

Al-

though Martin (1978:59) considers as many as eight different
patterns of secularization, the dominant types are the AngloSaxon, American, French, and Russian patterns, described
below:
(1)

Anglo-Saxon

Institutional erosion, erosion
of religious ethos, maintenance
of amorphous religious beliefs.

(2)

American

Institutional expansion, erosion
of religious ethos, maintenance
of amorphous religious beliefs.

(3)

French (or Latin)

Massive religious beliefs, ethos
and institutions confronting massive secularist beliefs, ethos
and institutions.

(4)

Russian

Massive erosion of religious beliefs, ethos and institutions
but maintenance of the beliefs
and the ethos within the surviving religious institutions (Martin, 1978: 7-8).

Hartin suggests a number of additional characteristics by
which the basic patterns can be identified and better understood.

Basic patterns of secularization can vary according

to the degree of anti-clericism, the status of the clergy,
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the degree of cultic participation, the influence of intellectualism in religion, the extent of democratic or communist
influence, the existence of religious political parties, and
the type of civil religion, among other factors (Martin, 1978:
59) •

Martin's complex schema can be illustrated by examination of one of the four major patterns of secularization-the American case.

According to Martin, the American pattern

of secularization was framed in a pluralistic, Protestant society which was strongly shaped in a revolution against foreign
rule.

The result is a society where church and state are dif-

ferentiated, where denominations and sects have proliferated
and command large memberships, and where religious organizations play an important role in the sponsorship of charitable
and welfare endeavors.

The clergy, however, lack social power

and are "assimilated to the concept of rival entrepreneurs
running varied religious services on a mixed laissez-faire
and oligopolistic model," and "religious styles constantly
adapt and accept vulgarization in accordance with the stylistic tendencies of their varied markets"

(Martin, 1978:28).

American religious organizations remain influential on some
measurements (membership and professed belief) and show decline on others (social power, maintenance of theological
rigor).

Unlike Bryan Wilson, Martin does not portray secular-

ization as an absolute trend.

Differentiation, as framed by

the unique American cultural configuration, has produced a
mixture of secular and religious forms.

Individual response
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to secularization is also complex.
differentiation of

~~erican

Personal responses to the

society include:

(1)

"apathy

which retires from explicit institutional religion";

(2) a

turn to mysticism as a reaction against fragmentation and
meaninglessness; and (3) a search for functional equivalents
to religion in the family, community, or commune (Martin,
1978:93).

Within American culture a religious cycle of re-

sponse to differentiation can be detected.
American religion then comes to operate as a feeder
system whereby old-fashioned evangelical denominations
pull in new recruits and pass them on to liberal bodies
(Glock and Stark, 1968). These then lose members to mystical cults which in turn reassemble behind the Protestant Ethic (Martin, 1978:31).
Martin's propositions lead to a theory of religious evolution
in America which incorporates both linear and cyclical change.
A central feature of the complex pattern of American
religious evolution as characterized by Martin is the existence of American civil religion.
Any characterization of the United States must emphasize the fact that it represents a very high degree of
differentiation in that church is formally separated from
state, and even religion from school, and yet the overall
social order is legitimated by a pervasive civil religion
(Martin, 1978:28).
Martin views American civil religion as a by-product of the
American cultural frame of church-state separation, the synthesis of Protestantism and enlightenment thought, and the
Revolutionary experience of internal cohesion against external
domination.

Like Robert Bellah (1975), Martin locates the

historical origins of American civil religion in the fusion
of Puritan and Enlightenment principles of the American
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founders, 'l.vhich led to the institutionalization of churchstate separation.

Because no monopoly religion existed, the

moral basis of the social order was necessarily derived from
general values which could overarch particular religious organizations.
. . . It is just this explicit separation of church from
state that enable a pluralistic religion-in-general to
buttress the higher level legitimations of American society . . . . Such legitimation must, of course, not only be
general, but vague.
They must be above specific denominations and specific institutional arrangements, whether
these be religious or secular (Martin, 1978:70).
In Parsonian terms, differentiation is accompanied by value
generalization (Parsons, 1971).

Martin is aware of both the

structural strengths and weaknesses of American civil religion.

The fact that the values of American civil religion

must be highly general to unite a pluralistic society is not
necessarily a weakness.

"If an ideal is sufficiently broad,

it cannot be compromised by poor political performance and
corruption, but acts rather as a potent point of moral appeal"

(Martin, 1978:70).

A typical response to the Watergate

scandal, for example, was the isolation of Richard Nixon as
an immoral individual rather than the total condemnation of
American standards of political morality.

Yet, Richard Penn

(1978) has warned that the symbols of American civil religion
are vulnerable to manipulation for political and economic
goals, with loss of public faith a common result.

Martin al-

so acknowledges this structural problem, but predicts that,
if the vision of American civil religion remains future
oriented, the covenant is less likely to be broken.
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Of course if an ideal becomes too successful a generation
may arise which expects it to be realized in the proximate
future. Then alienation must follow, as for example happened in the 1960s. Broad religious legitimations encounter a limit because their promises must either remain in
the long-term future or be compromised by contemporary
performance (Martin, 1978:70).
Martin's portrayal of American civil religion recalls Bellah's
(1975) image of the broken covenant.

American civil religion

is seen as constituting a generalized system of national legitimation, cohesion, and prophecy, which under specific conditions can fail at one or all of these areas of performance.
Variations in the performance of American civil religion are
not automatically viewed by Martin as evidence of the death
of American society.
Martin's theory of religious evolution begins where
many of the other theories cited in this chapter tend to end:
with the processes of differentiation and rationalization in
modern society.

Instead of assuming that these modern trends

proceed invariably to a universal decline of religion, Martin
seeks sources of cultural variation which significantly shape
religious change.

Martin provides a theoretical framework by

which variations in religious evolution may be studied empirically.

Martin's approach differs from that of unilinear

theorists such as Bryan Wilson, who tend to interpret all behavior as manifestations of secularization once secularization has been assumed.
Martin's theory, however, has its own limitations.
Some of his variables overlap with one another; he is unclear
about the number of basic patterns of secularization to be
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specifiedi and he fails to distinguish independent from dependent variables clearly.

Despite these limitations, Martin

has developed a general theory of religious change which can
account for a variety of cross-cultural religious patterns,
as well as the specific patterns of religious evolution within a single society.

When Martin's theory is applied to the

United States, a number of religious and "secular" phenomena
are revealed, including the presence of American civil religion.

American civil religion is portrayed as the religious

symbol system of the nation subject to the same evolutionary
influences and shaped by the same cultural frame as other
American religious forms.

By viewing civil religion as one

variable in the context of religious change, r1artin contributes perspective both to the study of religious evolution and
to the study of American civil religion.
Evaluation of the Theories of
Religious Evolution
Among the theories of religious change which have been
considered in this chapter and also in chapter V, religious
evolution has been variously conceived of as occurring unilinearly between two discrete poles

(Durkheim) , along the

progressive line of rationalization (Weber and Wilson) , alona
a continuum of cultural and religious differentiation (Parsons, Wach, Fenn, Bellah, and Coleman), in a dialectical process of social reality construction (Berger and Luckmann),
and as a complex combination of linear and cyclical processes
within cultural frames

(Martin).

S. N. Eisenstadt (1964:375)
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notes that two critical stumbling blocks for evolutionary
models have been:

(1) the assumption of linearity, and (2)

failure to fully specify the systemic characteristics of
major developmental stages.

The models of Durkheim, Weber,

Wach, Parsons, and Wilson are all limited, in differing degrees, by the stumbling block of assumed linearity.

Among

the linear theorists, only Bellah and Coleman are careful to
note that their models are not dependent upon the absolute
linearity of differentiation.

Like Eisenstadt, Bellah (1964:

358) and Coleman (1970:76) are willing to foresee stagnation
and breakdown as potential outcomes of evolution.

Martin's

model, which accounts for both linear and dialectical trends,
does not assume that universal trends such as differentiation
always occur (Martin, 1978:3).

The dialectical model of Ber-

ger and Luckmann has been included for discussion primarily
because it does not maintain a linear perspective.
The models of Durkheim, Weber, Wach, Berger and Luckmann,
Wilson, and Fenn are also limited by their failure to specify
the defining systemic characteristics of evolutionary stages.
Parsons is the most explicit in elaborating the variables of
cultural change and the historical details of each evolutionary period.

Bellah and Coleman focus upon only one of Par-

sons's change variables--differentiation--but present a more
systematic explanation of the characteristics of religious
organizations and their symbol systems at each stage of religious or civil religious development.

Martin presents defin-

ing categories for the basic patterns of secularization
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without reliance on an explicitly historical evolutionary
sequence.

Of the two criteria for useful evolutionary models

noted by Eisenstadt, avoidance of rigid linear assumptions
and specification of systemic characteristics, Bellah's model
of religious evolution, Martin's model of secularization, and
Coleman's model of civil religious evolution meet both criteria.
The models of Durkheim, Weber, and Wach serve as intellectual predecessors of the Parsonian evolutionary model,
elaborated and adapted by Bellah and Coleman.

The classic

theories of religious change advanced by Durkheim, Weber, and
Wach are highly congruent with Coleman's model of civil religious change, stated in Propositions I through IV.

Proposi-

tions I through IV, and Proposition IV in particular, propose nothing radically new for the sociology of religion
beyond inclusion of the concept of civil religious evolution
as an aspect of religious evolution under the specific conditions of social differentiation and religious pluralism.
Additional variables and cultural configurations affecting
civil religion are suggested by Martin's contemporary secularization theory.

The Berger and Luckmann dialectic model

does not directly contradict Propositions I through IV, but
neither does it provide a supportive framework.

Berger and

Luckmann take a privatistic position, similar to that of
Bryan Wilson and Richard Fenn, which foresees traditional religious systems losing significance for modern society.
Neither Berger and Luckrnann, Wilson, nor Fenn would predict
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the renewal of any overarching religious symbol system, including civil religion, in modern societies.

Privatism has

no place for Proposition I, which affirms the existence of
American civil religion.

It is concluded that the four basic

propositions concerning American civil religion receive their
greatest support from Durkheimian and Parsonian evolutionary
thought, and the least support from modern privatism.

The

contemporary theories which offer the strongest conceptual
framework for the study of civil religion are the theories
of Bellah, Martin, and Coleman.

CHAPTER XII
THE M1ERICAN CASE
John Coleman (1970), as we have seen, has proposed
three types of civil religion in modern societies:

(1) con-

tinued undifferentiated civil religion, either church sponsored or state sponsored;

(2) secular nationalism; and (3)

differentiated civil religion.

Church-sponsored civil reli-

gion is observable when an established religious tradition
provides the context for sacred civic symbols, as in the case
of the Khomeini government of Iran.

State-sponsored civil

religion, exemplified by Restoration Japan, may be observed
when the political system institutes a self-transcendent
cultus.

Secular nationalism, a functional alternative to

civil religion typified by the U.S.S.R. arises when a historical religious tradition is associated with a pre-revolutionary government and cannot serve as a symbol of a modernizing
revolutionary state.

Coleman believes that the third type of

civil religion, differentiated civil religion, is observable
only in the United States.

In a highly differentiated soci-

ety like the United States, civil religion tends to follow
the pattern of differentiation and move away from either political or religious sponsorship.

And in a religiously

plural society like that of the United States, there is no
need for the functions of civil religion to be performed by
219
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a secular

v~rsion

of nationalism.

The historical strength of

the American religious tradition, combined with the absence
of religious establishment, set the stage for the differentiation of a religiously oriented but non-church-sponsored
civil religious system.

The two specific conditions assoc-

iated with the rise of differentiated civil religion are
institutional differentiation and religious pluralism.
In part III of the present study, theory and research
have been cited to support the thesis of a differentiated
civil religion in the United States.

Most significant are

Wimberly's (1976) empirical findings that a measurable,
civil religious dimension of belief is distinguishable from
either religious or political belief systems.

Coleman's

theory and Proposition IV would predict that Wimberly's findings of a differentiated civil religion are unique to the
United States.

Cross-cultural empirical research by Cole

and Hammond (1974) points to a similar conclusion.

It is

Hammond's (1974) thesis that in modern, religiously plural
societies, the function of societal conflict resolution
moves away from the domain of traditional religion and comes
under the control of legal institutions.

The legal struc-

tures of modern society become the new source of moral integration.

In Hammond's research with Cole, the following

argument is tested:
. . . (1) The condition of religious pluralism creates
special problems for social interaction; (2) social interaction in such situations is facilitated by a
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universalistic legal system; (3) a universalistic legal
system may, therefore, be elevated to the sacred realm
(Cole and Hammond, 1974:187).
The major variables, examined for ninety-two nations, were
religious pluralism, societal complexity, and legal development.

Religious pluralism, measured by the number of reli-

gious groups comprising at least 2 percent of a society's
population, was expected to be related to the level of society complexity, measured by indicators of levels of communication, technology, bureaucratic organization, and money and
market complex.

Both pluralism and societal complexity were

expected to be related to degree of legal development, measured by the extent of legal repression.

Evidence of repres-

sion signified that legal development was low, while absence
of repressive laws indicated a higher level of legal development (Cole and Hammond, 1974:181-183).

Analysis of data found

support for the hypothesized inverse relationship between
legal development and societal complexity.

Although religious

pluralism itself is a type of societal complexity, it was expected and found to have an inhibiting effect on "secular" or
economic indicators of complexity.

Analysis of data also in-

dicated a positive relationship between legal development and
societal complexity.

Societies with the highest levels of

legal development were the most complex.

Additionally, data

revealed that, as religious pluralism increases, the positive
association between societal complexity and legal development
also increases.

Figure 8 illustrates the findings.

Substi-

tuting the terms used in Propositions I through IV for the
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RELIGIOUS
PLURALISM

/

SOCIETAL
COMPLEXITY

Fig. 8.

+

LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT

Relationship between Religious Pluralism,
Societal Complexity, and Legal Development
(Cole and Hammond, 1974)
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terms used by Cole and Hammond, their results could be diagramed as they appear in figure 9.

Figure 9 leaves the direc-

tion of the relationship between religious pluralism and
institutional differentiation unspecified, as Cole and
Hammond's data on this relationship are questionable.
Cole and Hammond are not reluctant to apply their findings to the issue of civil religious development.
The question that arises is to what civil religious
implications there may be in the role played by legal institutions in a religiously plural society.
It can be
ventured that if people experience conflict, they attempt
to resolve it. . . . It is here that the law may be turned
to, especially to the degree that it is "universalistic,"
thus overriding whatever parochial conditions have stood
in the way . . . . But if . . . the agencies of this legal
order use the language and imagery of purpose and destiny,
if they not only resolve differences but also justify
their resolution, it is easy to see how someth1ng ldentifiable as civil religion could emerge (Cole and Hammond,
1974:186) . •
Cole and Hammond suggest that, in a religiously plural society, conflict can be generated through a clash of religious
meaning systems.

If the conflict is to be resolved, some

overarching system of meaning must develop which can integrate
the conflicting systems.

If this overarching system of inte-

gration, the legal system, adopts universal language and acts
to legitimate behavior as well as to resolve conflict, it
constitutes a system of civil religion.

Cole and Hammond

expect most plural, complex, and legally developed nations
to feature civil religious orientations in their legal systerns.

The United States, although not included in the sample

of nations, is singled out as the society most likely to exhibit civil religious symbols in its legal order.
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+

DIFFERENTIATED
CIVIL RELIGION

Hypothesized Relationship between Religious
Pluralism, Institutional Differentiation, and
Differentiated Civil Religion
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Certainly central to the alleged American civil religion is the notion of ''fair play" (see Bellah, 1967) .
. The legal order has institutionalized this ideal as
the doctrine of due process, and thus it is in the legal
arena that fair play is most often celebrated.
Such a
process, we think, illustrates our contention that the
legal order may take on erstwhile religious duties.
Hore
than this, insofar as the notion of due process is not an
isolated cultural item but part of a coherent ideology
with its accompanying institutional arrangements, we may
speak of this "package~ as a civil religion (Cole and
Hammond, 1974:187).
Other nations found to rank high in societal complexity, religious pluralism, and legal development (e.g., Bulgaria, Mayala, The Philippines, and Trinidad) are treated as developing
nations whose level of civil religious development should be
reflected in their legal systems.

Cole and Hammond do not

consider their findings to be conclusive but suggest that
civil religious development is a cross-culturally observable
evolutionary phenomenon related to other indices of societal
development.

The clearest indicator of civil religious de-

velopment today may be found in the legal system of the societies under study.
American Civil Religion and the
Jud1c1al System
The results of Cole and Hammond's study point to legal
systems as institutional carriers of civil religion.

Although

in all societies the legal order is an arm of the state, in
the United States the governmental structure of checks and
balances results in a judicial system which is semi-autonomous
from legislative and executive branches.

Officials in the

judicial system are appointed by executives to rule on laws
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enacted by legislators, but judicial officials also have the
power to declare laws unconstitutional and to judge elected
officials for legal offenses.

To the extent that the judi-

cial system can override decisions made in other governmental
systems, the judicial system may be seen as partially differentiated from other branches of the state.

In the United

States the judiciary has the autonomy to take a prophetic
stance with regard to other political and social institutions.
Phillip Hammond hypothesizes that the American system
of religious pluralism is the key variable which contributed
to the expansion of judicial influence in the United States.
In a religiously plural society, the judiciary is required to
maintain order and develop universally acceptable explanations
for legal decisions.

With the expansion of the judicial sys-

tem, "the judiciary has adapted the task of articulating the
collective moral architecture"

(Hammond, 1974:129).

Hammond

cites several United States Supreme Court cases which illustrate the "developing rhetoric'' of civil religion as revealed
through the judicial system.

The cases cited by Hammond all

concern issues of church-state separation, a major legal
arena whereby the society's "commitment to religious liberty
(pluralism) makes impossible the documents (precedents, rhetoric) of any
found"

~

religious tradition; so a new religion is

(Hammond, 1974:133).
In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.

226 (1892), the "moral architecture" constructed by the Court
reflected the Protestant civic piety of the nineteenth century.
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The Court held that a law prohibiting the importation of
aliens for labor did not prevent a church from hiring a foreign minister.

The Court affirmed that ''we are a Christian

people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted
upon Christianity"

(quoted in Hammond, 1974:130).

By the

time of United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), the
Court had developed
church and state.

a

separationist position with regard to

The Court was asked to decide if citizen-

ship should be denied to a person unwilling to fight in the
nation's defense.

Although the Court acknowledged the right

of freedom of religious belief, it held that the nation's
goal of survival was primary.

Citizenship was denied, justi-

fied by the ultimate objective of national survival.

In two

subsequent conscientious objector cases, United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163· (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970), the Court broadened the concept of religious
belief to include views other than orthodox monotheistic beliefs.

Both Seeger and Welsh were granted conscientious ob-

jector status on the basis of "moral, ethical or religious
beliefs about what is right or wrong"
1974:131).

(quoted in Hammond,

The Welsh decision affirmed that in a religiously

plural society an individual's own perception of his beliefs
as religious was of prime importance in the Court's recognition of them as religious.

With the Seeger and Welsh deci-

sions, "'religion' for legal purposes becomes simply 'conscience'"

(Hammond, 1974:132).

The multiplication of reli-

gious definitions within society required the Supreme Court
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to redefine religion in a way to reduce religious conflict
and foster social integration.

The authority to make deci-

sions on issues of ultimacy as they affect the nation illustrates Hammond's thesis that the courts are the architects
of "common religion 11 or "civil religion"

(Hammond, 1974:133-

134) .
Legal scholar Robert McCloskey (1972) agrees with
Hammond that both the structure and ethical influence of the
United States Supreme Court have expanded in the past forty
years, beginning with the period of the Stone Court (19401945) established after the New Deal.
Court decisions

res~ricting

The majority of major

the role of religion in the public

schools (see figure 7 of the present study) occurred during
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Americans have learned to ex-

pect the Court to perform the dual functions of interpreting
and applying the law fairly and ethically to the issue under
consideration.

"America does expect the Court to be both

courtlike and statesmanlike, a law-finding and a value-judging
agency, and the modern Court has enthusiastically endorsed
that dual conception of its duty"

(HcCloskey, 1972:294).

The

expectation for ethical judgements by the Court does not imply
that all Americans agree with the ethical outcomes of judicial
decisions, or that all Americans even support the judiciary's
right to render such decisions.

Public protest of the Engle

(1962) and Schempp (1963) decisions declaring public schoolsponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading unconstitutional
was widespread (see pp. 169-170 of this volume).

Segments of
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the public were also outraged at the desegregation decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Gold-

stein v. Collin, 99 U.S. 277 (1976), in which the Court ruled
that an American Nazi group could demonstrate publicly in a
community with a large Jewish population, is a recent example
of a judicial decision which aroused public criticism on a
national scale.

McCloskey suggests that public reaction to a

judicial decision is often confused due to the failure to distinguish between the functions of the courts.
I suggest that our evaluation of a Supreme Court
decision--or of a whole line of judicial conduct--ordinarily depends on one or more of three different judgement
components: the question of what have been called above
historical-technical standards, the question of power,
and the question of value.
In other words, in criticizing a judicial action we say that the Court has misread
the Constitution, or that it has overtaxed its power capabilities, or that it has chosen the wrong ethical solution (McCloskey, 1972:292).
The very fact that judicial decisions are often unpopular
with the public suggests that the ethical function of the
judiciary becomes at times a prophetic expression of the values of American civil religion.

Martin Shapiro provides some

general examples of the prophetic stance historically assumed
by the Supreme Court.
In the last analysis there is something compelling
about an institution that can say with authority that the
south may not preserve slavery any longer, that one man's
vote is not to be worth seventeen times that of another,
that the police too must obey the law, that the poor and
ignorant are entitled to the same legal protection as the
rich and educated, that one man may not tell another man
what he may not read or what he must pray.
The ability
of the Court to say these things, not on the basis that
they would help us achieve more than the Russians or
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soothe powerful and demanding social interests, but because they were somehow right, returns us to the mysterious (quoted in McCloskey, 1972:vi).
There are numerous subjects of modern Court decision
which illustrate the civil religious functions of the judiciary.

The separation of church and state issue explored by

Hammond (1974) and the issue of religion in the public
schools, discussed in chapter X of this volume, both directly
address the society's role with regard to multiple definitions
of ultimate reality.

The civil rights decisions, such as

Brown, evoked the ethical principle of fairness while interpreting the law to protect the rights of minority citizens.
Less obvious in their civil religious implications, but relevant nonetheless, are numerous other judicial decisions concerned with the civil religious values of individual freedom
and social equality.

A recent illustrative example is the

United States Supreme Court decision on the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Furman concerned two ethical issues:

the right of the

state to impose the death penalty and the equal application
of punishment.

The three defendants in the case, who had re-

ceived death sentences, appealed their cases to the Supreme
Court arguing that the death penalty constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment" and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.

The Court refused to rule that cap-

ital punishment per se is cruel and unusual.

The Court did

rule that the death penalty was unconstitutional in these
three cases because its imposition constituted racial
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discrimination.

The Court left the way open for states to

develop nondiscriminatory capital punishment laws to be applied fairly and uniformly.

In Furman the Court sidestepped

the issue of the morality of capital punishment itself to
address another moral issue:

social inequality.

The Court

noted that the death penalty was rarely invoked, and, that
when imposed, was carried out primarily on blacks or members
of other minority groups.

Justice Brennan, concurring with

the Furman decision, noted that "when the punishment of death
is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it
is being inflicted arbitrarily"

(Furman v. Georgia, 1972:239).

Justice Marshall, noting that capital punishment was inflicted more often upon blacks compared to whites, more upon men
compared to women, and more upon the poor compared to other
economic classes, made a prophetic call for legislative
change.

"So long as capital sanction is used only against

the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators
are content to maintain the status quo, because change would
draw attention to the problem and concern might develop"

(Fur-

man v. Georgia, 1972:365-366).
The morality of capital punishment itself was a secondary issue in Furman.

Justice Brennan, in a concurring opin-

ion, attempted to define "cruel and unusual" punishment.
Brennan states that the Court cannot define "cruel and unusual" punishment in general, but must instead decide each case
of punishment to determine if it is cruel and unusual.
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Constitutional guidelines for evaluation of punishment are
based on three fundamental principles:

that (1)

11

even the

vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common dignity";

(2) "the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe

punishment"; and ( 3)

"a severe puni.shment must not be unaccept-

able to contemporary society"
286) .

(Furman v. Georgia, 1972:272-

The civil religious nature of the three principles is

self-evident, as the principles directly concern the American
civil religious values of human dignity and social equality.
The final guiding principle of the Court evaluates the society
and its moral consensus as the final arbitrator of the life or
death of its citizens.

s.

Ct. 2909

Subsequently, in Gregg v. Georgia, 96

(1976), the Court went a step beyond Furman to

decide that capital punishment is not invariably unconstitutional, leaving the way open for state legislators to develop
acceptable death penalty statutes.

The Furman and Gregg deci-

sions demonstrate the Supreme Court's active role in constructing the moral architecture of the nation.
Several examples have been selected from United States
Supreme Court cases to illustrate Hammond's (1974) thesis
that interpretation of the law has civil religious implications.

The judicial decisions chosen as examples are by no

means randomly selected.
could be found.

Contrary decisions on similar issues

However, the direction of judicial decisions,

or the popularity of such decisions, are irrelevant to their
consideration as civil religious.

Whether the courts rule

that capital punishment is or is not unconstitutional, the
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courts are addressing an ethical issue with ultimate implications for state and citizen.

In the United States, the judi-

cial system is in a unique position with regard to the legitimation of civil religious values.

The rhetoric of American

civil religion can be found outside the courtroom, in politicians' speeches or clergymen's sermons, but nowhere except
inside the courtroom does the rhetoric of American civil religion have such binding moral and legal force.

Hammond

questions the relationship between the generalized American
civil religion espoused in other social institutions, compared to the more particularistic moral architecture constructed by the courts.
What is not so clear yet are the connections between the
civil religion as theology and the parallel civil religion as moral architecture. · How does "God," as portrayed
in Presidential speech, relate to "due process," as portrayed in Supreme Court opinion (Hammond, 1974:155)?
An answer to Hammond's question is suggested by Propositions
I through IV and Coleman's thesis of a differentiated civil
religion in the United States.

If American civil religion is

particularly formulated and legitimated by the judicial systern in the United States, then American civil religion is not
entirely differentiated from the state, but is semi-differentiated to the extent that the judiciary is itself semi-differentiated from other governmental institutions.

Further exam-

ination of the role performed by the American judicial system
is recommended in conjunction with study of the evolution of
American civil religion.

234
Conclusion
Coleman (1970) proposes that under conditions of institutional differentiation and religious pluralism, a differentiated form of civil religion will develop.

Cole and Ham-

mond (1974) present cross-cultural data which suggest that
the conditions necessary for the development of civil religion
are the absence of a universally established religion, religious pluralism, and high levels of societal and legal complexity.

The United States is a society which meets these

criteria, and therefore one in which differentiated civil religion would be expected to develop.

Cole and Hammond predict

that the conflict resolution function of a society's legal
system will serve as an important indicator of the differentiation of civil religion.

Examination of the American legal

system, particularly the judiciary, reveals numerous examples
of conflict resolution legitimated by what Bellah (1975) defines as civil religious ideals.

Data cited in preceding

chapters (part III) suggest that, although American civil religion is differentiated from other American institutions,
highly generalized civil religious symbols are found in many
American institutions and are embodied in the personal belief
systems of many citizens.

If Hammond's thesis is correct,

the most value-specific source of American civil religion is
the judicial system, where Hammond believes the "not-soelementary forms" of American civil religion reside today
(Hammond, 1974:135).

CHAPTER XIII
CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH
In the preceding chapter, Coleman's theory of the evolution of civil religion was applied to the Unitd States, the
society most likely to demonstrate evidence of a differentiated civil religion.

But what of other modern societies?

If the development of civil religion follows the lines of
cultural evolution as stated in Proposition IV, differentiated
civil religion could be expected in other differentiated.societies.

An additional variable intervenes in the evolution

of civil religion, however:

the history of church-state re-

lations in the given society.

According to Coleman's hypoth-

esis, a society can be differentiated but lacking differentiated civil religion if it lacks a tradition of church-state
separation.

Great Britain, for example, is a differentiated

society culturally similar to the United States.

Yet, the

British traditions of an established church and the divine
right of kings are manifest today in the retention of a
church-sponsored civil religion.

State Shinto in Restoration

Japan represents Coleman's other type of continued undifferentiated civil religion:

state-sponsored civil religion.

The modern U.S.S.R. illustrates the secular alternative to
civil religion, secular nationalism.

The cases of modern

Great Britain, Restoration Japan, and the U.S.S.R. will be
235
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examined as examples of the variation in civil religious evelution in modern and modernizing societies.
Coleman (1970:70) states that the absence of civil religion should not be assumed merely because a differentiated
system of civil religion has not appeared within a society.
In the absence of differentiated civil religion, the functions
of civil religion may be performed either by a church-spansored or a state-sponsored type.
Church-Sponsored Civil Religion:
Modern Great Britain
Civil religion is church-sponsored when an established
religious tradition within the society provides the context
•
for sacred civic symbols. Although there are ample examples
of church-sponsored civil religion in the non-Christian world
(e.g., modern Israel and the Islamic, Khomeini government of
Iran), in Great Britain it is historical Christianity which
sponsors the symbols of civil religion.

The "civil religious

concepts of the sacredness of the monarchical form of government in the divine right of kings" and "the notion of the
manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon nations in the unfolding
providence of world history" are British traditions (Coleman,
1970:70).

In modern Britain, the monarchy retains little

overt political influence, but the ceremonial influence of
the monarchy is still pronounced.

In a symbolic study of the

British Coronation Service, Edward Shils and Michael Young
(1953) present a description of the civil religious functions
retained by the modern British monarchy.

237
Shils and Young (1953:65) base their study of the British Coronation Service on the assumption of the existence of
a "general moral consensus of society" founded upon the standards and beliefs of societal members.

Common consensual

standards in Western societies include generosity, charity,
loyalty, justice, respect for authority, dignity of the individual, and the right to individual freedom.

These consen-

sual moral values "restrain men's egotism" and "enable society to hold itself together"

(Shils and Young, 1953:65).

The

general moral consensus referred to by Shils and Young can be
recognized as Bellah's (1976a) concept of creneral civil religion, which provides the religious discipline necessary for
responsible moral citizenship and an integrated society.
The special expression of moral consensus, or general civil
religion, occurs during occasions of national celebration.
Ceremonial occasions are important events in a society's life
during which societal mores are ritually affirmed and renewed.
Shils and Young (1953:67) contend that in British society
"the Coronation Service itself is a series of ritual affirmations of the moral values necessary to a well-governed and
good society."

Shils and Young present a symbolic analysis

of the Coronation Service itself, and of the public participation in this civil religious celebration.
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The British Coronation Service
The central symbol of the service is the monarch's vow
to abide by the moral standards of the society.

Each portion

of the service reaffirms the monarch's obedience to God and
to the Church of England.
The recognition
The presentation of the monarch to the assembly by the
Archbishop signifies Church sponsorship of monarchical authority.

"When the Archbishop presents the Queen to the four

sides of the 'theatre,' he is asking the assembly· to reaffirm
their allegiance to her not so much as an individual as the
incumbent of an office of authority"

(Shils and Young, 1953:

68) .
The oath
On taking the oath of office, the monarch promises to
govern all British subjects in accordance with the laws of
state and the laws of God.

By doing this, the monarch acknowl-

edges "the superiority of the transcendent moral standards
and their divine source, and therewith the sacred character
of the moral standards of British society"

(Shils and Young,

1953:68).
Presenting the Holy Bible
The Bible presented to the monarch symbolizes God's law
and will, which are to continually inspire the monarch's public decisions.

"The Bible is the vessel of God's intention,
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a source of continuous inspiration in the moral regulation
of society"

(Shils and Young, 1953:69).

The anointing
The Archbishop anoints the monarch with oil, a symbolic
act which sanctifies her assumption of office.

The anointing

continues a tradition which began with the anointing of King
Solomon, and has continued for all British rulers.

After the

anointing, the monarch "shows her submission before the Archbishop as God's agent, kneeling before him while he implores
God to bless her"

(Shils and Young, 1953:69).

Presentina the sword and the orb
The sword presented to the monarch symbolizes the power
to enforce social order.

The sword is a dual symbol of author-

ity and potential destruction to any who would disrupt society.
Throughout the remainder of the ceremony, the sword is carried
unsheathed in front of the monarch, to remind subjects of
"the protection which a good authority can offer them when
they themselves adhere to the moral law, and of the wrathful
punishment which will follow their deviation"
1953:70).

(Shils and Young,

The monarch is next given bracelets of sincerity

and wisdom and robed.

These actions symbolize the transfor-

mation of a private individual into a public head of state.
Once transformed, the monarch is invested with a sacred orb,
symbolic of "the wider sphere of her power and of the responsibilities for its moral use"

(Shils and Young, 1953:70).
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The Benediction
The duties of subjects are featured in the Archbishop's
Benediction which asks God to give the monarch "'wise counsellors and upright magistrates; leaders of integrity in learning and labor; a devout, learned, and useful clergy; honest,
peaceable, and dutiful citizens'"
1953:70).

(quoted in Shils and Young,

The monarch is admonished to obey God, and her sub-

jects are in turn commanded to obey her.
Shils and Young's analysis of the Coronation Service
reveals a central theme of church sponsorship of civil religious symbols.

The Archbishop of the Church of England, as

God's representative, invests the new ruler with authority.
The religious investiture of political authority aptly illustrates Coleman's concept of church-sponsored civil religion.
According to Shils and Young, the significance of churchsponsored civic rituals has not disappeared in the modern era.
For example, the last Coronation Service and Procession were
"shared and celebrated by nearly all the people in Britain"
in "a great nation-wide communion"
70-71).

(Shils and Young, 1953:

The celebration was widely exposed on radio, tele-

vision, and in magazines and newspaper accounts.

Along with

the many explanations offered for the popularity of the Coronation (e.g., commercialization and the British love of ceremony), Shils and Young (1953:71)

suggest that public interest

was motivated primarily by desire for "communion with the
sacred."

Just as the Coronation Service was a religious

event, public involvement also took on aspects of religious
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ritual.

Gift giving, a typical feature of many religious

celebrations, was evident in several manifestations.

Many

subjects sent gifts to the Queen, community organizations
gave gifts to children and the elderly, and many people celebrated the occasion by giving gifts within their own

fa~ilies.

Shils and Young (1953:74) compare the public festivities to
an orgy in the sense that orgiastic expression commonly follows a religious experience.
Shils and Young's observations also reveal examples of
the civil religious function performed by the Coronation.
The Coronation Service is a socially integrating ceremony.
Public participation in the last Coronation went beyond the
level of individual entertainment to become a collective
affirmation of societal unity.

Family unity, symbolized by

devotion to the Royal Family, was also fostered by involvement in the Coronation.
The Coronation, much like Christmas, was a time
for drawing closer the bonds of the family, for reasserting its solidarity and for re-emphasizing the values of
the family--generosity, loyalty, love--which are at the
same time the fundamental values necessary for the wellbelng of the larger society (Shils and Young, 1953:73).
But family solidarity was not reinforced at the expense of
national unity.

"On this occasion one family was knit to-

gether with another in one great national family through
identification with the monarchy"

(Shils and Young, 1953:76).

Shils and Young believe that even class divisions were at
low ebb during the time of the last Coronation.

They observe

that a "degree of moral consensus" has developed in the
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various classes in modern Britain, along with a

11

decline in

the hostility of the British working and middle classes
towards the symbols of the society as a whole and towards the
authorities vested with those symbols ..
76).

(Shils and Young, 1953:

Class accommodation is not attributed to the Coronation,

but the accommodation observed during the Coronation is considered symptomatic of the integrative power of British churchsponsored civil religion.
The monarchy is one pervasive institution, standing above
all others, which plays a part in a vital way comparable
to the function of the medieval church . . . --the function of integrating diverse elements into a whole (Shils
and Young, 1953:79).
Shils and Young's analysis of the Coronation's integrative
function minimizes genuine sources of societal conflict which
may not have been evident at the particular time of the Coronation Service.

Shils and Young's treatment of British

church-sponsored civil religion lacks Bellah's (1975) concept
of the

11

broken covenant"--a civil religion which can both uni-

fy and divide society.
Shils and Young cite several examples of the British
monarchy's capacity to legitimate other social institutions.
Military organizations, in particular, have ceremonial ties
to the Crown.

Other organizations with royal sponsorship in-

elude a multiplicity of voluntary associations, such as the
Royal Society and numerous educational and medical facilities
(e.g., St. Mary's Hospital and the University of London).
Sponsorship by the monarchy endows each sponsored organization
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with a sort of charisma binding each organization to the
structure of the societal moral system.
Every corporate body which has some connection with
the sacred properties, the charisma, of the Crown thereby
has infused into it a reminder of the moral obligations
which extend beyond its own corporate boundaries.
It is
tied, so to speak, to the central value system of the society as a whole through its relationship with Royalty
(Shils and Young, 1953:79).
It is not only institutions which are both defined and integrated by the monarchy.

Monarchical charisma can extend to

individual subjects, especially during times of ritual celebration.

On the day of the Coronation Service, crowds waited

patiently in the rain for some glimpse of the Queen, "waiting
to enter into contact with the mighty powers who are symbolically, and to some extent, really responsible for the care
and protection of their basic values 11
75).

(Shils and Young, 1953:

The legitimacy of the British monarch's authority is

derived from a transcendent authority.

Each ritual of the

Coronation Service is designed to symbolize the monarch's
obedience to a higher power.

When the Queen kneels before

the Archbishop, for example, she indicates submission to
God's higher authority.

The sword presented to the monarch

is the symbol of God's prophetic judgement, to be enacted
through the Crown, against any violator of society's laws.
Under Shils and Young's examination, the Coronation Service
reveals rich imagery concerning the integrative, legitimating,
and prophetic functions of the modern British monarchy.
Shils and Young's analysis of the British Coronation
clearly illustrates the form by which church-sponsored civil
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religion can survive the modernization of a society.

In the

British case, the constitutional monarchy is recognized as
the symbolic authority of the society, and this symbolic
authority is clearly derived from the historic sponsorship
of the monarchy by the established Church of England.

Many

British subjects who are not Church of England members, or
who are not religious, still participate in the civil religious function of the monarchy.

In this respect the British

case differs from the situation of a nation like the Soviet
Union where the monarchy was destroyed by revolution and
modernization.

In the U.S.S.R. a system of secular national-

ism developed to replace church-sponsored civil religion.
Shils and Young suggest that Great Britain did not become a
society of secular nationalism because public hostility
against political authority was displaced from the monarchy
to the leaders of competing political parties.

As the polit-

ical power of the British monarchy slowly declined, its symbolic authority was tolerated and even appreciated by unthreatened politicians.

"When protected from the full blast

of destructiveness by its very powerlessness, royalty is able
to bask in the sunshine of an affection unadulterated by its
opposite"

(Shils and Young, 1953:77).

Church-sponsored civil

religion might continue to persist in the modern or modernizing state only if its structures are used as an aid to the
acquisition and maintenance of political power (e.g., the
Khomeini government of Iran) or are considered politically
neutral, as in the case of the British monarchy.

Despite
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the decline of the political power of the British Crown,
Shils and Young conclude that the monarchy retains considerable social and moral significance for the integration of
British subjects, the legitimation of institutions, and the
prophetic guidance.of the society's course in history.
Within its society, popular constitutional monarchy
enjoys almost universal recognition in this capacity, and
it is therefore enabled to heighten the moral and civic
sensibility of the society and to permeate it with symbols of those values to which the sensitivity responds.
. . . The Coronation provided at one time and for practically the entire society such an intensive contact with
the sacred that we believe we are justified in interpreting it as we have done in this essay, as a great act of
national communion (Shils and Young, 1953:80).
State-Sponsored Civil Religion:
Restoration Japan
Civil religion sponsored by the state occurs in societies where the political system institutes a self-transcendent cultus.

The institution of a state-sponsored form of

civil religion is most likely to occur in a society characterized by competing religious traditions and an authoritarian political system.

When no religion is powerful enough

to perform civil religious functions for the society, the
state may assume these functions to intensify its power and
establish its authority.

Imperial Rome is one historical

example of a society with state-sponsored civil religion.
A modern example is found in the State Shinto of Restoration
Japan.

State Shinto was based on the belief in the divinity

of the historical line of Japanese emperors.

State Shinto

was instituted as the state religion of Japan in 1868, at the
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beginning of the Meiji era and was not formally disestablished
until December, 1945.

During this period, State Shinto func-

tioned as a form of religious nationalism despite official
claims in later years that the Shinto national cult was not
technically a "religion."

Analysis of the religious origins

of State Shinto during the Tokugawa period and of the civil
religious functions assumed by State Shinto during the Heiji
period provides evidence that State Shinto exhibited the
essential characteristics of a state-sponsored civil religion.
Robert Bellah (1957) found that the historical religious roots of State Shinto could be traced to the primitive,
tribal religion of early Japan.

Bellah (1957:87) notes that

"the earliest Japanese word for government is matsurigoto,
which means religious observances or worship.

This would

seem to indicate the lack of differentiation of function between the religious and political spheres."

During the Toku-

gawa period (1600-1868), the historic lack of differentiation
between religion and politics continued, manifest in the popular slogan sonno (revere the emperor) and the development of
the concept of kokutai (national body)

(Bellah, 1957:99).

The ideas of sonno and kokutai were widespread, promulgated
by two intellectual movements, the Kokugaku School and the
Mite School.

The major religious goal of the Kokugaku School

was the restoration of the emperor to power.

The ideas of

the Kokugaku School proliferated during the nineteenth century and influenced the subsequent Restoration in 1868
(Bellah, 1957:102).

The Mite School developed the idea of
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kokutai as "a concept of the state in which religious, political and familistic ideals are indissolubly merged"
1957:104).

(Bellah,

The resulting national religion was to be cen-

tered on the figure of the emperor.

Bellah concludes that

the ideology of sonno-kokutai had an impact on the political
modernization of Japan and contributed to the establishment
of State Shinto.
The civil religion of Restoration Japan was based on
three dogmas of:

(1)

"divine imperial sovereignty,"

(2)

"special guardianship extended to the land and its people by
ancestral deities," and (3)
1947:9, 13, 19).

"benevolent destiny"

(Haltom,

According to the dogma of divine imperial

sovereignty, the emperor's bloodline may be traced back to
the sun-goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, the ancestress of the
Japanese state.

The emperor is considerced to be divine be-

cause he is the direct living embodiment of sacred ancestors
of the nation's past.

According to D. C. Haltom's analysis

of State Shinto, "Shinto reaches its highest form of manifestation in the worship of the emperor"

(Haltom, 1947:12).

The second Shinto dogma, which holds that the spirits of the
sacred ancestors extend a special guardianship to Japan, is
signified by the concept of Japan as "the Land of the Gods."
The dogma of sacred guardianship affirms the transcendent
nature of Japanese history.
From the beginning they have received the impress of the
creative wills of divine ancestors who foresaw the fardistant future and gave to land and race and institutions
an initial divine character that must be forever theirs.
It means that these ancestral deities are eternally
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living in the spirit world from which they mold the destiny of the present according to their unchanging purposes. The existence of such superlative benefits, manifested in the form of sacred historical absolutes and
immediate superhuman guidance, entails corresponding responsibility and loyalty on the part of the living
(Holtom, 1947:14).
From the dogma of ancestral guidance through history, the
third dogma of benevolent destiny is derived.

Japan is be-

lieved to be the "savior" of the rest of the world.

Japan's

mission in history is to expand the nation and extend the
Japanese way to all other people of the world.

The Japanese

slogan "the whole world under one roof" symbolizes Japan's
"special divine commission to expand sovereignty and righteousness over ever widening territories"

(Holtom, 1947:20).

State Shinto, in its basic dogmas, clearly fulfills Coleman's
(1970:69) definition of civil religion as a religious symbol
system which relates the roles of citizen and society in history to the conditions of ultimate meaning.
The civil religious functions of State Shinto were performed by the Japanese government.

The first critical func-

tion addressed by the government at the beginning of the
Meiji period was that of integrating Japan's heterogeneous
population.

The feudal heritage of Japan had left diverse

rival clans scattered over the countryside.
religiously diverse.

Japan was also

Restoration Japan housed Buddhists,

Confucianists, Hindus, Moslims, Taoists, Christians, Secular
Shintoists, and adherents of a variety of folk religions.
The Japanese government needed an overarching symbol of
national unity to integrate diverse local and religious
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groups, and State Shinto provided this type of unifying symholism.

The newly restored imperial government in 1868 first

attempted to establish unity by suppressing competing religions.
Buddhism, which was associated with the discredited Tokugawa
regime, was criticized.

Christianity, a symbol of "Western

imperialism," was banned until 1873.

Later, under pressure

from the West, religious pluralism was officially tolerated
as long as the overarching State Shinto tradition was accepted as the highest ethical authority.

In order to facilitate

religious integration, the Japanese government began in 1899
to insist that State Shinto was not itself a religion.

Jap-

anese Christians and Buddhists eventually accepted State
Shinto as a non-competitor and adopted policies of coexistence.

The National Christian Council of Japan stated that

"we accept the definition of the government that the Shinto
Shrine is non-religious"

(Holtom, 1947:169).

Coleman be-

lieves that the religious integration attempted through State
Shinto was only partially successful, thus illustrating one
of the structural weaknesses of state-sponsored civil religion:

conflict with historical religions.

The dogmas of

State Shinto came into particular conflict with the tenets of
Buddhism and Christianity.
Against the Buddhist doctrine of pacifism, State
Shinto espoused the theory of the holy war.
In particular, it shared with imperial Rome the apothesis of a
living human in emperor worship. This could never rest
easy on the Christians with their tradition against idolatry (Coleman, 1970:72).
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Despite the structural weakness noted by Coleman, State
Shinto proved to be a powerful integrating force for many
Japanese.

A traditional avenue of integration, the school

was used for this purpose.

In 1899, Order Number Twelve was

issued by the Restoration government, bringing an end to all
specifically religious instruction in public and private
schools; instead, instructions in State Shinto were to be
substituted.

The goal was the replacement of traditional

religion with religious nationalism which would unify the
society for the accomplishment of its divine mission (Holtom,
1947:76).
A church-sponsored form of civil religion bestows an
established, religiously based legitimacy on a political authority.

In the case of state-sponsored civil religion, the

political order establishes its own legitimacy by proclaiming the state to be a self-transcendent cult.

All institu-

tions which serve the national cult are automatically legitimated, and opposing institutions (such as competing religions) are discredited.

Yet, State Shinto might never have

aroused world attention if it had not been used to legitimate
Japanese territorial expansion.

The dogma of benevolent des-

tiny, accompanied by an effective military, resulted in the
extension of Japanese control to an overseas empire.

Japan-

ese hegemony was accompanied by the establishment of Shinto
shrines in conquered territories.
Given the nature of the Japanese state and its inseparable association with Shinto belief and ritual, it is
impossible to think of a political control apart from a
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vigorous determination to secure the subordination of
conquered populations to the central religious interest
of the state. Where go the Japanese armies there go the
Japanese gods (Holtom, 1947:157).
The legitimation of Japanese hegemony illustrates another structural flaw of State Shinto and other state-sponsored forms of civil religion.

Coleman (1970:72) observes

that there "was no humble sense of the nation being under God
which would provide leverage for prophetic critique of the
civil religion from the organized churches."

Holtom presents

a similar observation concerning State Shinto's prophetic
failure.

"The Japanese state . . . had been a sacred church

. . . and, like other churches, it was founded on the arrogation that in the last analysis the validity of its decisions
were superhuman and supernatural"

(Holtom, 1947:176).

The State Shinto of Restoration Japan exemplifies Coleman's ideal type of state-sponsored civil religion.

In a

society with a pluralistic religious tradition the Restoration government was able to proclaim itself as a national cult
in order to perform the functions of social integration, political self-legitimation, and legitimation of imperialism.
Japanese Shinto was subject to both of the structural weaknesses Coleman finds in state-controlled forms of civil religion.

First, State Shinto provoked conflict with competing

historic religions, most notably Buddhism and Christianity.
Secondly, State Shinto fell victim to its own nationally
self-transcendent worldview, which led to the Japanese
attempt, and failure, at world domination.

The case of
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Restoration Japan illustrates the structural vulnerability
of state-sponsored civil religion when extended beyond the
society into the national arena.
Secular Nationalism:

Modern Soviet Union

Coleman views secular nationalism as a functional alternative to civil religion which is likely to appear "when the
historic national religion is either too traditionalistic or
too closely tied to prerevolutionary regimes to serve as the
civil religion of a modernizing politico-economic regime"
(Coleman, 1970:72).

Secular nationalism provides a legiti-

mating symbol system which competes with the symbol systems
of historic religions.

Secular nationalism differs from

state-sponsored civil religion primarily in its non-religious
or anti-religious self-presentation.

Secular nationalism

performs civil religious functions for citizens and the society while disclaiming religious significance.

The Marxist-

Leninist ideology of the U.S.S.R. is a case in point.

To the

Western observer, Soviet communism is a worldview which "on
one hand can be called a religion and, on the other, is totally opposed to religion in all acceptable forms"
1969:101).

(Zeldin,

Soviet Marxist-Leninism does not conceive of it-

self as a religion.

It is opposed to traditional forms of

religion, and yet it can be observed nonetheless to perform
religious functions.

The debate concerning whether Soviet

communism is or is not a religion can be avoided by adoption
of Coleman's term, secular nationalism.

The religious
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functions of Soviet communism are, however, of special interest to the identification of types of civil religion.
Zeldin's (1969:104) analysis of Russian ideology identifies three dogmas which have been transferred from the
church-sponsored civil religion of the Czars to MarxistLeninist secular nationalism:
as "the Third Rome,"

(2)

(1) the conception of Moscow

"the belief in the kingship of the

holy Tsar," and (3) the concept of "wholeness, symbolized in
the term pravda, truth and justice."

The messianic idea of

"holy Moscow" or "Hoscow the Third Rome" developed in the
fifteenth century when Rome fell to barbarian invasion and
Byzantium came under Islamic domination.

Moscow was then

considered to be the world center of Christianity.

Today,

Moscow, now the capital of the U.S.S.R., has become the inspirational center of the Third International.

The historic

belief in the Czar as the divinely inspired teacher of true
Christianity has been transferred to the Soviet Communist Party
Central Committee, which is the new source of truth.

The

ideal of the unity of Eastern Slavs, symbolized in the concept of pravda, "is now found in every aspect of Russian
communism:

in the total integration of life under communism,

in the fusing of people into one mass"

(Zeldin, 1969:107).

Zeldin concludes that significant symbols of modern Soviet
secular nationalism are congruent with the symbols of the
Czarist-sponsored civil religion of the pre-revolutionary
period.
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·The religious functions of Soviet secular nationalism
are apparent in numerous Soviet civil ceremonies, which have
been researched by Jennifer McDowell (1974).

t-1cDowell (1974:

265) classifies Soviet civil ceremonies into two broad categories:

(1) private ceremonies such as christenings and wed-

dings, which aid the identity formation of individuals; and
(2) public ceremonies, celebrating national or local holidays,
which aid social integration.

The first Soviet civil cere-

monies were established shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, with new ceremonies being added at various subsequent
points in time.

The public ceremonies celebrating newly cre-

ated national holidays, such as January 22 (the overthrow of
the Czar), functioned to legitimate and solidify the new regime by clearly symbolizing the break with the past.

Private

ceremonies, such as the "red baptism" and "red funeral," were
established soon after the Civil War but fell into disuse by
1930, only to be officially restored again in the 1950s.
McDowell (1974:267) suggests that, in the early years of the
Communist regime, the Russian peasants disliked the secularism of the private ceremonies, while Communist Party members
and members of the Young Communist League resisted their
frivolous ceremonialism.
Soviet scholars, P. P. Kampars and N. M. Zakovich (1967:
35-38), present a categorization of Soviet civil ceremonies
which assists analysis of the ceremonies' functions.
major categories are:
Laboring Holidays,

Their

(1) Revolutionary State Holidays,

(3) Civil Rituals and Mode-of-Life

(2)
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Holidays and Rituals, and (4) Traditional Festivals Dedicated
to the Times of Year and to Nature, to

Wor~

and to Songs.

The first category, Revolutionary State Holidays, includes a
variety of national holidays such as. Lenin's birthday (April
22) and the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (November 7) .

Revolutionary State Holidays celebrate

the nation's unique historyandoffer inspiration for the fulfillment of national destiny.

A typical celebration of

November 7, for example, includes a military parade, athletic
demonstrations, and a civilian parade of 200,000 persons.
The mass demonstrations of people, shouting slogans such
as "'Long Live the Inviolable Unity of the Peoples of our
Country!'" illustrate the integrative function of Revolutionary State Holidays (McDowell, 1974:271).

Laboring Holidays

honor the major occupational groups with holidays such as
Railway Man's Day, Teacher's Day, Cattle-Breeder's Day, et
cetera, and celebrate the anniversaries of particular collective farms and industrial plants (McDowell, 1974:270).

La-

boring Holidays function to integrate diverse occupational
groups into Soviet society and to reinforce economic achievement.

Traditional Festivals Dedicated to the Times of the

Year, to Nature, to Work, and to Songs include traditional
Russian celebrations such as the New Year's celebration.
Traditional Festivals, along with National and Laboring Holidays, have received general popular support and have been
successful as mechanisms of integration.

Civil Rituals and

Mode-of-Life Holidays and Rituals include civil christenings,
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coming-of-age ceremonies, weddings, major wedding anniversaries, and funeral services.

These Civil Rituals have ex-

perienced the least acceptance among the Soviet public,
especially in rural areas.
These ceremonies have met with the greatest public resistance, for they do not contain the outer, public life of
the individual, but rather the inner person . . . . This
sphere has traditionally belonged to religion. Thus, at
junctures of this type, adherence to traditional religion
comes to the surface with the greatest clarity, for these
personal ceremonies have at the same time a public character, and in a true sense force the issue of religious
or political allegiance (McDowell, 1974:272).
Despite the conflict of allegiances aroused by private Civil
Rituals, available data indicate that these ceremonies are
beginning to gain in popularity, due to the decline of traditional religiosity fostered by urbanization.

One of the few

remaining functions of traditional religion in the U.S.S.R.,
the sanctification of birth, marriage, and death, is gradually coming under the domain of the civil religion of Soviet
secular nationalism.
Upon examination, Soviet Marxist-Leninism is found to
be a system of secular nationalism--a functional alternative
to civil religion.

Although defining itself in non-religious

terms, Soviet secular nationalism performs the traditional
religious functions of social integration and political legitimation.

Due to its self-transcendent stance, however,

Marxist-Leninism excludes the role of prophetic protest from
its civil religion.

Coleman observes that the strains inher-

ent in secular nationalism as a replacement for a transcendent
civil religion include persecution of religious citizens and

257
the limitation of religious and civil liberties.

Both strains

are observable in the modern Soviet Union.
The Russian civil religion includes saints (Lenin
entombed) , sacred feasts (May Day) and a crucial belief
in Russia's special role in unfolding world history as
the spearhead of the socialist revolution.
In all important ways this secular nationalism is a civil religion.
The price for its successful and unchallenged hegemony,
however, was religious persecution of Christians and
Jews and severe restrictions on religious and civil liberties (Coleman, 1970:73).
Conclusion
Proposition IV asserts that civil religious development
follows the general direction of cultural evolution.

The

civil religious systems of four societies, in different
stages of modernization, have served to illustrate the possibilities of civil religious evolution.

Great Britain

serves as an example of continued undifferentiated churchsponsored civil religion, Restoration Japan exemplifies continued undifferentiated state-sponsored civil religion, and
the United States typifies differentiated civil religion
(see part IV, chapter II).

The key variable Coleman isolates

as a predictor of civil religious development is differentiation.

Implicit in Coleman's theory is a related variable:

religious pluralism.

Religious pluralism here refers to

something slightly different from simply another manifestation
of differentiation.

Some societies have had fairly low levels

of differentiation but have housed numerous major religions
with thousands of varying sects.
China serve as illustrations.

Historic India, Japan, and

Other differentiated societies,
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such as modern Italy, are low in religious pluralism, being
dominated by a historically established religion.

Figure 10

illustrates that variation in levels of differentiation and
religious pluralism may be related to the type of civil religious system which is to be expected in the modern or modernizing society.

The level of differentiation ranges from the

high differentiation of the most developed society to the low
of the modernizing society.

Religious pluralism is indicated

by the society's history of religious toleration versus a
historically established religion.

The secular nationalism

of the U.S.S.R. is characteristic of a society with a history
of an established religion (Russian Orthodoxy) and a low level
of differentiation.

Although the modern Soviet Union is

approaching a high level of differentiation today, when
Soviet secular nationalism was first imposed after the Bolshevik Revolution, the society was just emerging from feudalism.

For secular nationalism to develop under these condi-

tions, the established religion must be perceived as too
traditionalistic to perform the civil religious

fun~tions

for

a modernizing government (Coleman, 1970:72).
In modern Great Britain, the established church and its
historic sponsorship of the monarchy lost power gradually, as
the society moved into the modern era.

The monarchy, a major

symbol of British church-sponsored civil religion, was retained as a powerful national symbol because it threatened no
vested political interest.

The monarchy was not viewed as a

symbol of failure to modernize and was instead viewed as the
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inspiration behind the empire.

Thus, in a highly modern so-

ciety, a somewhat traditional church-sponsored form of civil
religion has been retained.
Japan has historically tolerated a variety of religious
traditions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Shintoism, and Christianity.

Because no one religion was officially established,

political interest groups felt required to institute a statesponsored cult to perform civil religious functions.

The sym-

bols of State Shinto were derived from ancient cultural myths,
the only Japanese religious symbols with the potential to
unify diverse religious organizations.

The traditional Jap-

anese absence of differentiation between religious and political institutions (Bellah, 1957:87) also permitted the establishment of a powerful state-sponsored civil religion.
The United States is a highly differentiated society
with a tradition of religious toleration.

Religion and pol-

itics have been officially differentiated since the writing
of the Constitution.

Because no religion was established

which would perform civil religious functions, church-sponsored civil religion did not develop.

The American revolu-

tionary tradition precluded the likelihood of Americans
worshipping the head of state.

Therefore, an American form

of state-sponsored civil religion would not be expected to
emerge.

Secular nationalism was also an unlikely choice for

the United States, given the American tradition of religiosity and opposition to atheism.

Instead, if Propositions I

through IV are valid, the United States was sufficiently
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differentiated and religiously plural to facilitate the emergence of a type of civil religion which was differentiated
from both religious and political systems, but manifested in
these and other institutions at a high level of generality.
This chapter has attempted to place the development of American civil religion into a cross-cultural, evolutionary context.
All societies can be conceived of as having civil religious
functions.

In undifferentiated and even many modern societies,

these functions are performed by either an established religion
or the state (Coleman, 1970:70).

Compared to other societies

exhibiting varying degrees of differentiation and religious
pluralism, American civil religion can be explained as a differentiated civil religion which developed to perform the
specialized religious functions of a modern, plural society
which were not being exclusively performed by either religious
organizations or the state.

PART V

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has attempted to trace the intellectual
development of the sociological concept, "American civil
religion," and to order the body of civil religion research
into a set of testable propositions.

A survey of the lit-

erature revealed that the current state of knowledge concerning civil religion (and especially American civil
religion)

is primarily theoretical.

Philosophers, histor-

ians, and social scientists have advanced various theoretical models of American civil religion:

folk religions,

democratic faith, religious nationalism, transcendent universal religion of the nation, and Protestant civic piety
(Richey and Jones, 1974).

This conceptual diversity pre-

sents a stumbling block to contemporary research.

Probably

the best-known sociological model of American civil religion, the transcendent universal religion documented by
Robert Bellah (1967; 1975), has stimulated the greatest
amount of empirical research (e.g., Thomas and Flippen,
1972; Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976; Hueller and
Sites, 1977; Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978).

Bellah's model

of American civil religion has been productive, due in
part to its comprehensiveness.
263

Bellah's concept of
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transcendent universal American civil religion includes the
other basic models of civil religion as elements of a more
inclusive model.

Bellah researched the origins of American

civil religion in the American Puritan tradition, thus including the model of Protestant civic piety as typical of early
American civil religion.

Transcendent universal civil reli-

gion also contains the option for the expression of common
faith, folk religion, and religious nationalism.

Through the

image of the broken covenant, Bellah (1975) symbolized the
self-transcendent application of American civil values.

The

productivity and inclusiveness of Bellah's model of American
civil religion recommend it as the point of orientation for
future research.

A concise statement of Bellah's concept of

American civil religion is adapted from the work of John A.
Coleman (1970).

Stated in this volume as Proposition I,

American civil religion is viewed as "the religious symbol
system which relates the citizen's role and American society's
place in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate
existence and meaning."

This definition has the advantage of

including reference to both the individual and societal levels of analysis and has the potential to guide sociological
research more specifically than have previous definitions
derived from philosophical, historical, or early sociological
traditions.
Sociological research on American civil religion has
been primarily concerned with the functions performed by
civil religious systems and their relationship to other
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social systems.

Coleman (1970) hypothesized that American

civil religion is structurally differentiated from both the
political community and the religious community (Proposition
II).

Parsons's (1971) definition of differentiation, in con-

junction with Bellah's (1964) theory of religious differentiation, represents the general theoretical framework from
which Coleman's structural differentiation hypothesis is derived.

Empirical studies concerning the location of indica-

tors of American civil religion in other social institutions
(e.g., Cole and Hammond, 1974; Mueller and Sites, 1976) have
provided data in support of Proposition II.

The greatest

empirical support for the structural differentiation of American civil religion from religious and political communities
is found in Wimberly's (Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976)
empirical studies of individual civil religious belief.

Wim-

berly finds American civil religion to be a separate, measurable, individual belief dimension which overlaps only minimally with other religious and political beliefs.

The limited

amount of empirical evidence gathered to date suggests that
the values of American civil religion are congruent with the
values of American religious and political institutions, although American civil religion is structurally differentiating from these institutions.

The relationship of American

civil religion to other American institutions is more problematic.

Historical and theoretical studies must be relied upon

for the most part, with the exceptions of Jolicoeur and
Knowles's (1978) study of American civil religion in a
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voluntary association and Thomas and Flippen's (1972) analysis of American civil religion in the American press.

There

is, therefore, as yet little evidence to support the logical
hypothesis that most American institutions are in the process
of differentiation from both traditional religion and civil
religion.

The institutions likely to be least differentiated

from American civil religion are the traditionally integrative
institutions such as the family, the schools, and religiocivic voluntary associations.

Instrumental institutions,

such as the economy and communications media, might be expected to exhibit the greatest degree of differentiation from
American civil religion.

However, much more research on

American belief systems and their location within various
American institutions is necessary before the structural differentiation of American civil religion can be confirmed or
disconfirmed.
There are conflicting data concerning the functions of
American civil religion.

Demerath and Hammond (1967) , Cherry

(1970), Coleman (1970), and Bellah (1967; 1975) find American
civil religion to be an institutional source of social integration, while Fenn {1976) doubts this.

Bellah and Cherry

note American civil religion's dual function for social integration and division but fail to fully specify the conditions
under which American civil religion is either integrative or
divisive.

Bellah also notes the power of American civil reli-

gion to legitimate other American institutions.

He believes

that the legitimating power of American civil religious
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values has eroded but affirms the possibility of renewal.
In Bellah's view, the myths and symbols of American civil
religion are still sufficiently powerful to aid the interpretation and legitimation of American social experience.
Jolicoeur and Knowles's (1978) empirical study of the civil
religious values still cherished by Masonic fraternal orders
supports Bellah's position.

Penn (1972), taking the position

of religious privatism, theorizes that no religiously based
system of cultural legitimation, including civil religion,
exists for contemporary America.

Stauffer (1973) agrees with

Penn on the growth of the private sphere of religion but
argues that

~

mechanism of cultural legitimation must

operate in even the most rational, differentiated society.
Stauffer finds Bellah's concept of American civil religion
to be a useful model of a modern legitimating system.
Research on the prophetic function of American civil religion
also yields conflicting conclusions.

Bellah's model of tran-

scendent, universal, American civil religion contains a potential for prophetic judgement.

Bellah's data on civil

religious prophecy are primarily historical, as are the supporting data of historian Mead (1967).

Empirical research

by Wimberly (1976) lends support to Bellah's model in the
measurement of a transcendent civil religious dimension of
personal belief.

Critical response to the prophetic function

of American civil religion comes from folk religionists
Marty (1959) and Herberg (1960) and the empirical study of
Thomas and Flippen (1972).

There is not yet sufficient
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evidence to confirm or disconfirm Proposition III, which
states that American civil religion "performs specialized
religious functions performed neither by church nor state."
Yet the functional differentiation hypothesis is promising.
Even those in opposition to the hypothesis would agree that,
in a society characterized by church-state separation, neither
religious nor political organizations exclusively sponsor
social integration, cultural legitimization, and prophetic
guidance.

The field is open for other"symbol systems such as

a differentiated civil religion to assist with the performance
of these functions.

It is the task of the sociologists of

contemporary American society to determine if American civil
religion does in fact play a role in the integration, legitimation, and prophetic direction of the society.
If subsequent research confirms that American civil
religion is differentiating from religious, political, and
other institutions and performing increasingly specialized
functions as the religious dimension of the polity, such confirmation will be congruent with the predictions of the major
sociological theories of religious evolution.

The theories

of religious evolution of Weber (1948), Wach (1944), Bellah
(1964), Durkheim (1965), and Parsons (1971) each predict increased differentiation of religious symbol systems due to
modernization.

Following the assumptions of these evolution-

ary theories, Coleman (1970) predicts the evolution of different forms of civil religion, based on the level of differentiation and degree of religious pluralism.

Adapting
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Coleman's theory to the specific case of American civil religion, Proposition IV states that the differentiation of American civil religion from political and religious communities
follows the general direction of cultural evolution.

Ameri-

can civil religion may be an expected manifestation of predictable cultural patterns.

Currently there is little empir-

ical evidence which relates directly to Proposition IV.

The

best cross-cultural examination of civil religious development is presented by Cole and Hammond (1974) .

Their data

suggest that religious pluralism and high levels of societal
and legal complexity are the specific conditions associated
with the development of civil religious systems.

The United

States is the society in which these conditions are manifest
to the highest degree and is therefore the society in which
differentiated civil religion would be expected to develop.
Additional cross-cultural research, expanding the Cole and
Hammond study, would be necessary before any conclusions
concerning evolutionary patterns of civil religious development could be made.

The present analysis has been forced to

rely on more easily obtainable historical and symbolic studies
of civil religion in other societies.

Coleman's ideal types

of modern civil religious evolution are illustrated by Holtom's
(1947) and Bellah's (1957) studies of state-sponsored civil
religion in Japan, Shils and Young's (1953) symbolic analysis
of church-sponsored civil religion in Great Britain, and
Zeldin's (1969) and McDowell's (1974) research on secular
nationalism in the U.S.S.R.

These selected cases are only
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illustrative of modern civil religious development but will
hopefully pave the way for more comprehensive and systematic
cross-cultural comparisons.
The present study summarizes the civil religion literature from several perspectives.

Compiling and ordering the

existing body of literature facilitates the task of determining future research directions.

Today, conceptual debate

still characterizes American civil religion theory, hindering
the development of precise measurement instruments.

Theoret-

ical problems could be reduced by accepting Coleman's (1970)
definition of American civil religion as the religious dimension of the American polity and by adopting the conceptual
framework advanced in Propositions I through IV as the basis
for future research.

Empirical problems remain.

The sociol-

ogist of American civil religion is confronted with the task
of locating empirical indicators of a generalized cultural
symbol system.

Thus far, most civil religion research has

been conducted through content analyses (e.g., Bellah, 1967;
Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Mueller and Sites, 1977; Jolicoeur
and Knowles, 1978) and symbolic studies (e.g., Shils and
Young, 1953; Warner, 1961; Zeldin, 1969; McDowell, 1974).
Continued research of both types will aid the location and
classification of civil religion symbols within American
institutions.

Subjects such as the local celebrations of

national holidays are particularly rich data sources for symbolic analysis.

Symbolic case studies, however, are limited

to the descriptive level of civil religious research, while
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content analyses can be designed to yield explanatory data.
The early content analyses, such as Bellah's 1967 analysis
of presidential inaugural addresses, lack the precise measurement instruments and sampling techniques of later studies
(e.g., Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978).
Unfortunately, reliance upon widely differing measurement
instruments has limited the comparability of the recent studies.
In two different studies (Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Jolicoeur
and Knowles, 1978), the same item was coded as "secular" by
one set of researchers and as "civil religious" by the other!
A valid and reliable instrument for the identification of
American civil religious content is thus needed.

Once such a

coding guide is developed, it could be fruitfully applied to
the following content areas:

United States Supreme Court

decisions, United States presidential inaugural addresses,
political election speeches, sermons, official journals of
religious organizations and religio-civic voluntary associations, commencement addresses, mass advertising contents, and
mass communication media coverage of national holidays and
times of national celebration and mourning.
The most promising model for future civil religious
research at the level of individual belief is Wimberly's
(Wimberly et al., 1976) scale of American civil religious
belief items.

Wimberly's items (see Appendix) demonstrated

ability to discriminate among other items of religious belief
and political attitudes when administered to selected and
random samples of Americans.

Wimberly's civil religion items
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also have high face validity as a measurement of Bellah's
transcendent universal American civil religion and score
high on indicators of reliability.

Wimberly (1976:349-350)

concluded that his research "extends support for the civil
religion hypothesis" and advances American civil re.ligion to
"the status of a social scientific concept."

Continued appli-

cation of vVimberly' s American civil religion scale to additional samples and the continued refinement of his measurement
items should advance the field of empirical knowledge concerning individually held civil religious belief.
The best empirical test of Propositions I through IV
will probably not come from traditional modes of civil religion research in American sociology.

Individual belief

studies such as Wimberly's produce data which can only be
applied at the individual level of analysis.

Individual be-

lief data are directly applicable only to Proposition I,
which states that American civil religion is the religious
symbol system which relates the citizen's role and American
society's place in space, time, and history to the conditions
of ultimate meaning.

Although Wimberly's individual belief

studies have been cited in this analysis in support of Proposition II, concerning the structural differentiation of
American civil religion, this generalization from the level
of individual belief to that of social structure is tenuous.
Symbolic studies and content analysis have been limited to
the context of one society and have failed to generate the
comparative material necessary to test Proposition IV, which
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concerns the cultural evolution of civil religious systems.
If the entire proposition set is to be adequately tested, a
modern, empirical version of Weberian socio-historical comparison is called for.

Cole and Hammond (1974) have made the

greatest contribution to this type of research effort in
their cross-cultural institutional comparison of world societies.

Additional cross-cultural data on civil religious sys-

tems need to be gathered to add to the data on societal complexity and legal and religious systems compiled by Cole and
Hammond.

It is expected that, if cross-cultural data on

civil religion are made available, they will generally confirm Proposition IV.

It is also expected that the data will

reveal that cultural evolution and concomitant civil religious
evolution are more complex than Proposition IV predicts.

For

example, in many societies, civil religion will be in the process of differentiating from religious or political domination
and will not fit neatly into any of Coleman's ideal types of
modern civil religion.

Propositions II through IV and Cole-

man's types of civil religion are based on the possible variation of only one variable known to be operant in the process
of evolution:

differentiation.

Inclusion of other variables

associated with evolution, such as adaptive upgrading, inclusion,and value generalization (Parsons, 1971) would add complexity to the research effort but would also generate more
comprehensive information concerning the patterns of civil
religious development.

It is the conclusion of the present

analysis that the study of American civil religion can best
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be advanced by expanding research beyond the boundaries of a
single societal case.

Cross-cultural research is critical to

the compilation of a comprehensive explanation of civil religious development.

Cross-cultural research is also necessary

for the prediction of the emergence of new civil religious
systems and for the prediction of the continuation or decline
of the American system of civil religion.
This study has been dedicated to the purpose of conceptual clarification and theoretical codification and has been
conducted as a necessary first step before actual empirical
research on American civil religion can be done.

It is the

conclusion of this analysis that American civil religion is
a viable sociological concept, deserving of and fruitful for
continued scientific inquiry.

Several directions for contin-

uing research have been elaborated with the hope and expectation that the information presented here will provide answers
to some of the specific questions of the contemporary sociology of American civil religion.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
CIVIL RELIGION ITEMS USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF RONALD WIMBERLY,
DONALD CLELLAND,

THO~~S

HOOD, AND C. M. LIPSEY (1976:893).

Civil Religion
1.

We should respect the president's authority since his
authority is from God.

2.

National leaders should not only affirm their belief in
God but also their belief in Jesus Christ as Savior and
Lord.

3.

Good Christians aren't necessarily good patriots.

4.

God can be known through the experience of the American
people.

5.

The founding fathers created a blessed and unique republic when they gave us the Constitution.

6.

If the American government does not support religion, it
cannot uphold morality.

7.

It is a mistake to think that America is God's chosen
nation today.

8.

To me, the flag of the United States is sacred.

All items were scored on a 5-point scale ranging from
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree."
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